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Abstract 
Forced marriage affects a number of communities within the UK, including British Muslims. In 
some cases, Islam is used to justify this practice and the media has highlighted cases where young 
Muslims have been coerced into marriage. This thesis attempts to address this issue from a 
normative perspective, using Islamic legal sources to assess whether Islamic law (sharīca) allows 
forced marriage and will determine what can be done about it from within this context. It provides a 
much needed comparative and contrastive account of key discussions and debates of Muslim jurists 
(fuqahā’) from the four Sunni schools of law regarding elements of the marriage contract which are 
pertinent to this discussion, specifically: wilāya (guardianship), ikrāh (coercion) and maqāṣid al-
sharīca (the aims and objectives of Islamic law). 
The Introduction sets out the main themes and structure of the thesis determining the motivation for 
the research, the research problems, its rationale, its significance and contribution to academic 
literature, the research questions, the methodology and the overall structure of the thesis. The issue 
will be approached from three perspectives: the nature of Marriage in Islamic jurisprudence, the 
role of guardianship in concluding marriage contract, and the ruling of marriages contracted under 
the effect of coercion. Chapter 2 defines forced marriage whilst looking at the distinction between it 
and arranged marriage, contextualising the issue in terms of UK and human rights law. It also 
introduces the problem of forced marriage within the Muslim community, and asks whether or not it 
is sanctioned by Islamic law. Chapter 3 looks in depth at the meaning and significance of marriage 
in Islam, and some elements of marriage; khiṭba (engagement/betrothal), the maqāṣid (legal 
objectives), the arkān (cornerstones), the ṣīgha (marriage formula), the shuhūd (witnesses), kafā’a 
(suitability or social equity of the spouses) and the mahr/ṣadaq (dowry). Wilāya (guardianship) 
ahliyya (legal capacity), and wilāyat al-ijbār (compelling guardianship) will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 focuses on the pivotal issues of ikrāh (coercion) and riḍā (consent). The 
Conclusion will gather together all the pertinent information and arrive at a definitive judgement 
with regard to forced marriage in Islamic law: forced marriage is not compatible with the objectives 
of the Sharīcah and has no reliable basis in its sources; the function of the walī (guardian) is to 
protect the interests of the ward and not to exercise his authority over her; the woman with legal 
capacity has the right to choose her spouse; the marriage contract conducted under coercion is 
invalid. This chapter will also include suggestions for further research and recommendations for 
addressing the issue of forced marriage. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
In its article TV drive targets forced marriage problem, the Yorkshire Post discussed the 
problem of forced marriage which it claims is happening throughout the UK with areas 
such as West Yorkshire having a high number of cases. The article argues that 
advertisement can be used to highlight this problem and persuade families not to tolerate 
this practice. According to the report by Maggie Stratton, the Forced Marriage Unit of the 
Home Office and Foreign Office deals with 300 reported cases of forced marriage 
annually. Although the government was still consulting on a proposal over whether to 
make forcing someone into marriage a criminal offence, the government launched a 
national television advertising campaign to tackle the problem on the 16
th
 March 2006. 
The high-profile information campaign included adverts that were screened across Asian 
satellite channels were backed with a newspaper and magazine campaign. Campaigners 
believe forced marriage issues lie behind the high rate of young Asian women who go 
missing from home – four times the national average – and who commit suicide – three 
times the national average between the ages of 16 and 24 and double for women of 25 to 
35.
1
 
This issue, I believe, is not restricted to the Asian community within the UK context. It 
has been observed by scholars in Muslim communities throughout the world and, 
therefore, Islamic law has dealt with it as a social problem. The aforementioned Yorkshire 
Post article has been the driving force behind the current work through which I hope to 
provide some solutions to this problem through a series of recommendations and advice. 
1.2  Interest and Motivation behind the Research  
Over the past decade and a half I have met several young women and men who have been 
common victims of forced marriage for counselling. Throughout the period of my work as 
                                                     
1
 See Maggie Stratton, ‘TV drive targets forced marriage problem’, the Yorkshire Post, 16 March 2006, p.10. 
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an Imam of Leeds Grand Mosque in the United Kingdom, and because of being close to 
many young people, I became aware of several stories and facts that are relevant to the issue 
of forced marriage. Despondently, these stories are full of horrific and distressful events 
which have had a profound impact on me. All of this sad reality became the motive behind 
this study to provide an appropriate understanding of marriage in Islam and to uncover 
whether or not forced marriage has a place in Islamic teachings, in the light of the wisdom of 
the Qur’an and standard practice of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna). Thus, all of this 
observation and experience suggested to the researcher that the issue of Forced Marriage 
should be studied and examined from an angle which seems not to have been approached by 
most writers, academic researchers, social workers and legal professionals in British society. 
It is an important angle which is directly related to the problem of Forced Marriage and has 
not been dealt with carefully by a specialist in Islamic studies, namely: the ruling of Islamic 
law on forced marriage through a study of jurispĀrudence with regard to marriage in the 
Sunni schools of jurisprudence which are adhered to by the majority of the Muslim world.  
1.3 Problem of the Research 
The pivotal research problem that will be investigated in this work is forced marriage in 
the Sunni Muslim community of the United Kingdom. This will be examined according to 
the Qur’an and ḥadīth, along with objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīcah) and 
Islamic jurisprudence. Since 1999, there has been great interest in forced marriage from 
the media. Media reports and research commissioned by policy-makers. This phenomenon 
turned out to be a growing problem among ethnic and religious minorities in British 
society, and awareness of it was created through newspaper headlines. Public awareness 
concerning forced marriage has risen since 1999, even though reports from the Forced 
Marriage Unit mention that there were 1,300 cases.
2
 
 
                                                     
2
 H M Government, The Right to choose, Multi-agency guidance for dealing with forced marriage, (2014), p.1. 
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1.4 Rationale of the Research  
Forced marriage is a highly controversial and sensitive problem that has significant 
psychological, social and financial implications on a large number of young European 
Muslims in general and British Muslims in particular. This research aims to provide a 
solution to this contentious problem through recommendations given at the end of this work 
which may assist governmental and non-governmental organisations, families and 
individuals. These recommendations will also aim to raise social and educational awareness 
about this problem and its devastating impact on the individuals involved.  
Among the recommendations of this study, a statement is given of Islamic rulings (ḥukm al-
sharīcah) on the issue of forced marriage and related practices in the light of the objectives 
of the Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīcah) and the authentic Sunna of the prophet, in the hope 
that this will contribute in providing an appropriate understanding of the nature of marriage 
in Islam and whether or not forced marriage as practiced today is something supported by 
Islamic law. 
This problem has also been of tremendous interest to critics of Islam, politicians and the 
media. Evidence from the legal texts, i.e. the Qur’an and ḥadīth (Sunna), along with 
maqāṣid al-sharīcah has demonstrated that a rational solution can be found for this social 
problem. 
1.5 Aims and Significance of the Research  
This research aims to examine the problem of forced marriage from a number of 
perspectives. First of all, it will look at the context, that is, forced marriage in the UK. It will 
outline debates surrounding defining forced marriage and it will look at current legislation. It 
will also look at some responses to the issue by contemporary Muslim bodies and critics of 
the practice. It will then look at the institution of marriage in the Sharīcah in the light of the 
legal textual evidence (Qur’an and ḥadīths) through the lens of the four Sunni legal schools. 
In doing so, it will focus on the objectives of marriage in Islamic thought and the role of 
wilāya (guardianship), explaining certain legal rulings and scholarly debates surrounding it. 
 4 
 
It will then look at the issue of ikrāh (coercion) and its legal effect on the marriage contract 
from the four aforementioned perspectives.  
The main contribution of this thesis is that, after a thorough survey of the issue in both the 
UK context and the Islamic law, it will find solutions to this problem and provide awareness 
to the academic and Muslim community about the Islamic legal perspective of this practice. 
It is believed that only in that light, can real and effective solutions to this problem be found. 
In other words, for any solution to gain the acceptance of the Muslim community, it must be 
found through the foundational sources of Islamic law; the Qur’an and the Sunna. 
1.6  Research Questions   
     The following questions will be addressed in this work: 
(i) What is the nature of marriage in Islamic law? 
(ii) What is the role of guardianship (wilāya) in concluding a marriage? 
(iii) Does Islamic jurisprudence allow coercion with regard to concluding marriage 
contract?  
(iv) Do the objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīcah) agree with the idea of 
forced marriages and is it a breach of human rights according to Islamic 
jurisprudence? 
(v) What is the effect of coercion on marriage contract and how does someone get 
out of a forced marriage according to Islamic jurisprudence?  
1.7 Methodology 
The main body of this research is based on a comparative-contrastive analysis of marriage in 
the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāficī and Ḥanbalī madhahb). 
It will compare between the schools’ various positions regarding forced marriage, focussing 
on their respective stances on the pivotal issues of guardianship (wilāya) and coercion 
(ikrāh), including the evidence and juristic principles invoked by each. This work will 
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further mention the discussions made by each group of scholars regarding the other schools’ 
evidence and methods. This work will then choose the most relevant from among these 
opinions, based on which opinion meets the requirements of the purposes of marriage in 
Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīcah) and the benefits of the Muslim community in the UK. 
In order to provide an informative discussion on this topic, my comparative and contrastive 
account will be based on specific aspects of marriage, including components of the marriage 
contract such as the pillars (arkān) and the conditions (shurūṭ) of validity. As previously 
mentioned, it will investigate guardianship in marriage specifically (al-wilāya fī caqd al-
zawāj) and its other general aspects in the respective schools of jurisprudence in order to set 
the scene for the reader regarding what the role of guardianship in marriage is. 
As the major focus of my research is ‘forced marriage in the UK Muslim community’, I 
have adopted a methodological investigation of this problem through looking into how 
writers and scholars have approached it and how they judged this practice from different 
points of view, using that as a source of evidence to show the impact and effect of forced 
marriages. In order to achieve this, I have relied on major sources such as recent articles, 
books and encyclopaedias to provide the data for the comparative-contrastive analysis. 
However, since the focus of my research is ‘from an Islamic law perspective’, the majority 
of the thesis (i.e., chapters 3, 4 and 5) will be concerned with Islamic jurisprudence in order 
to specify what constitutes a forced marriage, the reasons behind it and to find solutions to 
this problem from within Islamic law itself. Therefore, the Qur’an, ḥadīth, tafsīr (exegesis of 
the Qur’an) and classical and modern jurisprudence text books will also be consulted and 
invoked. Due to the fact that the majority of the British Muslim community are Sunni, I have 
not included other perspectives in my jurisprudential discussion. 
1.8  Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis falls into five chapters:  
Chapter One: Introduction.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
This chapter will deal with forced marriage as practised by a minority of Muslims in the 
United Kingdom. It will also investigate the reasons behind forced marriages, some statistics 
related to this problem, the position of British law towards forced marriage, and how the UK 
Government has responded to this problem. The chapter will also deal with authentic cases 
of forced marriages.  
Chapter Three: Marriage in Islam 
This chapter details theological and anthropological definitions of marriage. It provides an 
informative account of the constituents of Marriage contract in Islamic Law. This chapter 
will thoroughly investigate the legal cornerstones and stipulations of the marriage contract 
(arkān wa shurūṭ fī caqd al-zawāj). This chapter will also examine the matters which cause 
the marriage contract to be invalid (bāṭil) and irregular (fāsid). The chapter also provides a 
comparative-contrastive analysis of jurists of the four major Sunni schools’ views with 
regard to the legal principles, the conditions and matters that make marriage contract invalid. 
Chapter Four: Guardianship (wilāya) in the Marriage contract  
The chapter will focus on the issue of guardianship (al-wilāya) and its impact on the 
marriage contract. It will specifically discuss the significance and definition of wilāya, as 
well as the purposes and reasons for it. The chapter will further look at who has the right of 
guardianship as well as what the rights and responsibilities of the guardian (walī) are as well 
as the various types of guardian. This chapter will also account for the problem of whether a 
person has the legal capacity (al-ahliyya) to make a contract. Furthermore, it will look at the 
legal evidence for it and the jurists’ discussions surrounding the issue and how the various 
juristic methodologies led to different rulings. It will also introduce and discuss the issue of 
wilāyat al-ijbār (compelling guardianship) from the perspectives of the four legal schools 
respectivly. 
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Chapter Five: The effect of coercion (ikrāh) on marriage contract. 
This chapter will examine whether or not Islamic law gives liberty to the individual to make 
contracts in general and whether a contract concluded under coercion is legally valid. This 
chapter will also examine the effect of coercion on consent (riḍā) which causes marriage 
contract to be either invalid (bāṭil) or irregular (fāsid). The chapter also provides a 
comparative-contrastive analysis of jurists’ views of the four major Sunni schools of law 
with regard to the legal effect of coercion, whether or not the contract can be terminated and 
the conditions and other matters that make the marriage contract invalid. 
Chapter Six: Conclusion and recommendations  
This will be a critical assessment of the problem of forced marriage among some British 
Muslims. It will also provide recommendations that aim to raise social awareness about this 
problem and its devastating impact on the individuals involved. The solutions in the form of 
recommendations can be established on the basis of Islamic law; in the light of Qur’an, the 
standard practice of the Prophet Muḥammad and the objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-
Sharīcah). 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Background  
There are many reasons why people marry. These motivations can be legal, social, 
emotional, economical and religious in nature. They might include inter alia family 
obligations, the desire to establish a family unit, legal protection of children, public 
declaration of commitment, and to obtain citizenship. However, marriage is a relationship 
between two individuals before anything else; therefore, the emotional aspect is the most 
important of these reasons. Thus, marriage should not be entered into without the desire, free 
will and choice.
3
 Therefore, distinguishing between forced marriages and arranged 
marriages is on the basis of the distinction between free consent and the other that come 
under the influence of coercion. 
The following discussion is to define forced marriage and examine whether it is 
distinguished from so-called arranged marriage or not. This section will also emphasise that 
forced marriage is a crime against human rights, as it involves physical and emotional 
abuses. Furthermore, we will clarify that the problem of forced marriage was the reason for 
governments and states to issue laws and legislation in order to tackle and reduce the 
negative effects of it on the individuals who are subjected to it.  
2.2 The problematic of Forced Marriage  
Forced Marriage has been considered in the national and international literature from an 
ethnic perspective and constructed as a cultural pathology,
5
 and is a social problem, because 
of its impact on individuals and societies. It can include a range of intimidating behaviour 
such as domestic violence, physical and emotional pressure and coercion. It has been 
suggested that forced marriage is an extension of the practice of endogamy (the custom of 
marrying only within the limits of a local community, clan, or tribe), and cultural notions of 
                                                     
3
 See Abu Sadik Maruf, Forced Marriage, A Study on British Bangladeshi Community, (Bloomington, USA: 
AutherHouse, 2012), p. 5. 
5
 Samad, Yunas, ‘Forced marriage among men: An unrecognized problem’, Critical Social Policy 30.2 (2010), 
p.190. 
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honour and shame. As this study will be dealing with the problem of forced marriage as it is 
practiced within the Muslim communities in the UK, it is worth saying that the majority of 
Muslims in the UK originate from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. There are also other 
Muslim communities from various Arab and Muslim countries. According to the report 
issued by the Office for National Statistics in December 2012, Indian is one of the largest 
ethnic group with 1.4 million people (2.5 per cent) followed by Pakistani (2.0 per cent). 
Arab accounted for 240,000 permanent residents (0.4 per cent of the population).
6
 
Since the largest population in Muslim communities originated from South Asia, it is useful 
to know that marriage in the Asian sub-continent and the rest of Muslim world, as in most 
societies, is based on custom and tradition which has been inherited from one generation to 
another.
7
 Gill and Anitha believe that forced marriage is a significant cultural tradition in 
numerous countries worldwide and within certain communities in the UK.
8
  
Generally, forced marriage has been seen as a religious practice, associated largely with 
Islam. However according to Strickland all major religions including Islam reject this 
practice; and others suggest that forced marriage is a harmful cultural practice which is 
considered a form of violence against women and a serious abuse of human rights.
9
 
2.3 Defining Forced Marriage  
Marnia Lazreg states that there is no agreement on the definition of forced marriage. For 
example The Council of Europe defines the term as: ‘covering slavery, arranged marriages, 
marriage custom law, child marriage and marriage of shame; unlike arranged marriage in 
which the couple give their consent’.10 In the case of forced marriage, one or both of the 
people involved are forced into a marriage against their will and without their permission. 
                                                     
6
 See Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011, Office for National Statistics, (11 December 
2012), pp. 4-10.  
7
 See Liberation from Forced Marriages, report, Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, (2008), p.5. 
8
 See Aisha, Gill, and Anitha,Sundari ‘The illusion of protection? An analysis of forced marriage legislation 
and policy in the UK’, Journal of social welfare & family law 31.3 (2009), p.258. 
9
 Pat Strickland, Forced Marriage, House of Common’s Library; Home Affairs Section, (23 March 2012), p.1; 
Samad, Forced marriage among men, p.190. 
10
See Marnia, Lazreg, ‘Forced Marriage: Introducing a Social Justice and Human Rights 
Perspective’, Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 42.5 (2013), p.744. 
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Therefore, in forced marriage, at least one party does not consent to the marriage and several 
elements of coercion are involved.
11
  
The officially recognised definition of forced marriage in the UK is:  
A marriage in which one or both spouses do not (or, in the case of some 
adults with learning disabilities, cannot) consent to the marriage and duress is 
involved. Duress can include physical, psychological, financial, sexual and 
emotional pressure.
12
 
It is generally believed that this definition underlines the influence of coercion insofar 
recognises it as a main factor in defining forced marriage. Therefore, the issue of consent 
became central. According to Gangoli et al., the definition of forced marriage in the UK 
acknowledges the role of duress and the ways in which it serves to curtail consent, and this 
should help to underline that forced marriage is a form of violence against women.
13
 
However, others argue that current definitions of forced marriage focus exclusively on the 
point of entry into marriage. The Home Office defines forced marriage as occurring: ‘Where 
one or both parties are coerced into a marriage against their consent or duress at point of 
entry into marriage’. Gangoli, et al., argue that even though this is a useful definition, it also 
creates questions surrounding exit options, particularly where consent has not been given or 
where pressure was put upon women and men to stay in forced marriages. Pressure here 
includes any emotional, physical, financial and cultural state, as well as immigration 
status.
14
  
Strickland claims that forced marriage must be distinguished from arranged marriage, where 
both parties fully and freely consent to the marriage, although their families take a leading 
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role in the choice of partner.
15
 However, some people conflate the concept of forced 
marriage with arranged marriage. Therefore, it would be relevant to shed some light on this 
issue. 
2.4 Drawing a line between Forced Marriage and Arranged Marriage 
Forced marriage is where one or both parties are coerced into a marriage against their will 
and under duress. This was based on the Home Office report on forced marriage, published 
in 2000, which focused on consent as the discriminating factor. The report defined arranged 
marriage as a marriage facilitated by family, but with the consent of both partners, and a 
forced marriage as that which either or both parties fail to give consent to, or do so only 
under duress.
17
 The tradition of arranged marriages has operated successfully within a 
variety of communities and in many countries for a very long time.
18
 
As for Quek, the consultation paper from the UK government sought a straightforward 
distinction between forced and arranged marriages. In A Choice by Right Report, the UK 
government was seeking to make clear to relevant groups that its concern was only with 
forced and not arranged marriage, which was described as a ‘tradition’ which has operated 
successfully within many communities.
19
 Therefore, the Home Office report attempted to 
accept minority cultural practices, through adopting a twofold distinction between arranged 
and forced marriage. According to Thiara et al., in forced marriage an individual has been 
coerced against their will and under duress, while in an arranged marriage the family assists 
in the marriage in order to help their children to choose by introducing them to marriage 
partners. Therefore, this sets forced marriage apart from other forms of marriages.
20
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Quek claims that it is important not to confuse forced and arranged marriages, as feminist 
research recently indicated that, in practice, the distinction between customs may not always 
be clear. Moreover, there is evidence within feminist literature which indicates that, in some 
cases, the so-called "arranged marriage" can be described as a "forced marriage" and that, 
when practiced, forms of non-physical pressure is applied on young women.
21
 Meanwhile, 
Phillips and Dustin believe the distinction between arranged marriage and forced marriage 
may make it easier to bring community leaders on board any government initiatives to deal 
with problem of forced marriage if they can be assured that government action is not 
directed against the practise of arranged marriage. However, because they see that the 
distinction between forced marriage and arranged marriage revolves around the notion of 
consent, if the parties consent to the marriage it cannot be described as forced in their 
view.
22
  
An-An’im claims that the most dramatic cases of forced marriage involve abduction and 
physical violence. He also states that forced marriage is a union which lies on the continuum 
of arranged marriage, which is defined by degrees of coercion and consent.
23
 According to 
Maruf, traditionally in arranged marriage, parents arrange for a spouse for their son or 
daughter, if their children do not agree, the parents start looking for another partner. In this 
type of situation, an all-out attempt to convince their children about the value of the 
arrangement is used by the parents to make it happen, but without utilising force.
24
 For 
Chantler, et al., forced marriage is also included within the domestic violence definition used 
by the government.
25
 On the other hand, in an arranged marriage, families choose marriage 
partners on the basis of their socio-economic status, sometimes on the basis of their religious 
sect, but the decision lies with the potential couple as to whether to go ahead with the 
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marriage or not. Therefore, in arranged marriages the will of the potential bride and 
bridegroom is established without any pressure.
26
 
Chantler et al. question the forced marriage definition given by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office which also considers that there is a clear distinction between forced 
and arranged marriages based on whether consent has been given or not. In many cases, the 
young person has been rushed to accept the arrangements and gives her/his consent without 
understanding what they are doing because they have been given insufficient information.
27
 
An-An’im believes that this distinction that researchers often make it’s only an effort to 
protect the culture of arranged marriage, characterising the arranged marriage as legitimate 
and forced marriage as objectionable. He further states that a closer examination of 
individual cases indicates a sharp distinction between the two can be misleading.
28
    
2.5 The Issue of Consent and Duress  
The issue of consent was problematic for a number of researchers, as forced marriage was 
defined as a marriage conducted without the full and free consent of the couple involved. 
Gangoli argues that the Home Office definition assumes the distinction between arranged 
and forced marriage is based on ‘full and free consent’. However, she sees this definition 
does not specifically address the issue of age, while much of the official literature 
surrounding forced marriage indicates that the primary victims are young girls under the age 
of 18, with the implication that women and men of any age can be forced into marriage.
29
 
Quek believes the vital issue with forced marriage is the issue of choice, so she sees the 
main problem with forced marriage is the denial of choice of one’s spouse. She refers this to 
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results from a working group which states that the denial of choice is the distinction between 
forced and arranged marriage; in forced marriage there is no choice.
30
  
Again, Gangoli et al., state that one of the important issues within the consent debate is that 
the existing definitions of forced marriage focus on whether one or both spouses had the 
right or the ability to choose the marriage at the time of entry into marriage.
31
 However, for 
Sundari et al. the crucial question still remains whether threats, blackmailing, pressure, or 
whatever pressure is applied, is such as to destroy the reality of consent and overbears the 
will of the individual.
32
 
For Gangoli et al., the notion of consent is further complicated by the definition of forced 
marriage which counterpoises arranged marriages with forced marriage.
33
 An-Na
’
im 
believes there is no difference between arranged and forced marriages, but that they fall on a 
continuum between consent and coercion. He claims that this classification allows for the 
cultural and contextual nature of consent and considers its difference from coercion as the 
matter of degree and perception, with persuasion playing a key role in the grey area of the 
continuum.
34
  Gangoli et al. adds that the separation of arranged and forced marriages is 
obviously an attempt to accept diverse cultural practices.
35
 In the same context, Anitha and 
Gill also believe that there are grey areas between coercion and consent and, therefore, the 
notion of free will remains central to the legal discourse surrounding forced marriage in the 
UK.
36
 
Furthermore, Gangoli and Chantler et al. state that this separation between arranged and 
forced marriages serves to cover up some of the indirect forms of coercion that can 
sometimes result in ‘slippage’ between arranged and forced marriages. Also, they note that 
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the vocabulary of forced marriage is rather recent, but it is important to note that degrees of 
coercion have been accepted as the norm within some scholarship on arranged marriages, 
particularly in the Indian subcontinent.
37
 Again, Anitha and Gill, claim that consent might be 
given under the influence of power imbalances and gendered norms in the absence of 
explicit threats.
39
 It is also supported by Bredal who focuses on understanding coercion in 
terms of degrees and both direct and indirect constraints.
40
 
2.6 Forced Marriage as a Human Rights issue  
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office report, Forced Marriage – Human Rights and 
Democracy, states: 
‘Forced marriage is an appalling and indefensible practice and is recognised 
in the UK as a form of violence against women and men. It is a serious abuse 
of human rights and, where children are involved, child abuse. Victims of 
forced marriage can suffer physical, psychological, emotional, financial and 
sexual abuse, including being held captive unlawfully, assaulted and 
repeatedly raped’.41  
Therefore, many consider the issue of violence against women to be a human rights issue 
and because forced marriages are among those issues which violate human rights, it should 
be taken seriously at an international level.
42
 
Quek confirms this by saying: ‘At the level of the international human rights community, 
forced marriage has been identified as a harmful cultural practice, and is increasingly 
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discussed by feminist scholars as a violation of women’s human rights’.43  For Maclean and 
Eekelaar, forced marriage clearly falls within the category of human rights issue under UK 
state law.
44
 Moreover, Gill and Anitha stated that forced marriage violates the fundamental 
right to freely consent to marriage that is protected in numerous international human rights 
instruments.
45
 
In a 2006 study of all forms of violence against women, the former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan stated that:  
A forced marriage is one that lacks the free and valid consent of at least one 
of the parties. In its most extreme form, forced marriage can involve 
threatening behaviour, abduction, imprisonment, physical violence, rape, and, 
in some cases, murder.
46
 
Chantler et al., believe that, from a human rights perspective, forced Marriage breaches a 
number of international Human Rights standards, specifically, the issue of consent. 
Therefore, there are many of the international Human rights instruments and standards in 
which forced marriage falls under its provisions, including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1984 (UDHR), the convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Woman (CEDAW), and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989 (CRC). The UDHR confirms the acceptance of 30 rights and was adopted by UN 
member states in 1948. Furthermore, the UK is party to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR) as well as CEDAW and CRC.
47
 Moreover, 
The United Kingdom is a signatory to The Euorpean Convention on Human Rights. The 
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United Kingdom is therefore under a legal obligade to adhere to and secure individual’s 
rights under the Articles of the Convention. Here are a number of examples: 
1. Forced marriage violates Article 12 of the convention, which declared that 
‘Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and found a 
family according to national laws governing the exercise of that right’. The 
article demands that there is free and full consent to marriage by intending 
spouses.  
2. The practice of forced marriage would contravene Article 3 of the 
Convention prohibiting torture and inhumane or degrading treatment. 
3. Also, forced marriage may also involve the deprivation of personal liberty, 
namely, the arbitrary detention of victims by family members, which is 
again a violation of human rights.  
4. Finally, some cases of forced marriage can result in the violation of the 
individual’s right to life, where those who refuse to enter into marriage are 
killed.
48
  
International bodies or emanations of the state can be used to hold to account forced 
marriage as an abuse of Human Rights. Moreover, forced marriage has been seen as a form 
of child abuse, because sometimes it is young girls who experience the negative 
consequences of such marriages. Harmful outcomes include sexual assault and health risks 
associated with early pregnancy.
49
 Therefore, The UN Human Rights Office highlighted that 
although forced marriage is common in the developing world, particularly in Africa and 
Asia, it is in fact a global problem, across many countries, cultures, religions and 
ethnicities.
50
 
Quek believes that it is important to note that the discourse on human rights has been 
criticised by both feminist and non-feminist scholars. However, as several scholars argue, 
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the language of rights can also be a useful as a tool with which to battle harmful practices 
that have been left to grow.
51
 For Choudhry, the main emphasis of the prohibition of forced 
marriage by international legal instruments was based on progress made by the State in 
respect of its obligations in this area and by focusing on the need for free consent and the 
full approval of each party to the marriage.
52
 Therefore, human rights laws which are 
designed to enable individual self-determination are lost on the female victims of patriarchal 
cultures.
53
  
In the UK, the official policy on domestic violence is aligned with the Human Rights Act 
of 1988 and the European Convention on Human Rights. Article (3) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights states: ‘No one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment’.  Based on the meaning of this Article, Choudhry questions whether 
forced marriage is inhuman and degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3.
54
 
Furthermore, she states that, under the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), public 
authorities are required to protect victims of violence. This means that the government, 
police, prosecution authorities and courts are required to take positive steps to protect 
victims of violence
55
 Finally, Choudhry claims that applying a human rights framework 
can bring about real protection for the victims of domestic violence and forced marriage. 
She then gave an example of the case of Opuz v Turky where the European Court of 
Human Rights accepted for the first time that victims of domestic violence could fall 
within the group of ‘vulnerable individuals’ entitled to state protection under Article (3).56  
Thus, the existence of the problem of forced marriage continues in many communities, 
especially those which maintain cultural heritage, customs and traditions which affect 
women and violate their rights. Therefore, it was imperative that the international 
community takes practical steps to reduce, control and prevent these unjust practices. 
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2.7 The ‘Forced Marriage Civil Protection’ Act 2007 and its impacts 
As mentioned above forced marriage involves coercion and duress. The legal response from 
the UK government toward this problem was ‘the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 
2007’, which was issued in November 2008. The UK government wanted for this law to 
introduce civil remedies in order to protect individuals at risk of being forced into marriage, 
or to help remove them from a situation of forced marriage in the form of Forced Marriage 
Protection Orders. They asserted that this sends out a strong message that forced marriage is 
unacceptable practice and will not be tolerated. 
According to Mavis Maclean, before the Forced Marriage Protection Act there had been 
ongoing argument about whether legislation was a suitable way to respond to the situation 
and how far the reform should go towards the criminalisation of forced marriage.
57
 In 1999, 
Mike O’Brien, the Minister for Community Relations, set up a working group to investigate 
the extent of forced marriage in England and Wales and presented proposals for tackling it 
effectively. Its report, A choice By Right (2000), clarified the key issues regarding forced 
marriage. Following the publication of the report, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) established a Community Liaison Unit (CLU) to take forward the working group’s 
recommendations. The CLU was absorbed into a joint FCO-Home Office Forced Marriage 
Unit (FMU) in 2005.
58
  
Mavis Maclean states that in 2005, the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) was set up which later 
in the year issued a consultation entitled Forced Marriage -A Wrong Not a Right. This 
sought views on whether the creation of a specific legal offence would help to combat 
forced marriage. By June 2006, the government had decided against introducing 
legislation.
59
  Later, the Liberal Democrat peer, Lord Lester, sought to extend the range of 
protection available by introducing the forced marriage (Civil Protection) Bill as a Private 
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Member’s Bill in November 2006. The bill was supported by the government and has now 
been passed as the Forced marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007.  
According to Gill and Anitha, the main arguments against the proposed legislation were that 
(i) A criminal offence would not represent an effective prevention, nor 
would it provide adequate protection for victims. 
(ii) It would be difficult to obtain sufficient evidence in individual cases to 
satisfy the criminal burden of proof require under the proposed law. 
(iv) The new law will eventually prevent victims of forced marriage from 
seeking help of authorities for fear that family members would be 
prosecuted.
60
 
And, as a result of consultations, in June 2006 the UK government decided not to introduce 
a forced marriage criminal law. However, despite overwhelming support for this decision, a 
number of those who were consulted believed that this would stop the practice or send a 
clear message to potential perpetrators.
61
 However, from her review of the implementation 
of Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, Mavis Maclean argued that it seems the 
impact of legislation as a response to this issue is limited, referring to a report by Gill in 
2011 on an independent survey of 74 respondents, conducted by Roehampton University on 
the question of the criminalisation of forced marriage, which showed little desire for further 
legislation. Therefore, Mavis stated that change will come from working together in the light 
of current ideas of individual rights and liberties, rather than by redefining old practices as 
new crimes.
62
  
Many non-governmental organisations argued, critically, that there are no adequate 
resources provided to meet victims’ needs, both during and after legal proceedings. As a 
result, these services often have a limited understanding of forced marriage victims’ specific 
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needs.
63
 However, others believe that since 25 November 2008, family courts have been 
successful in making Forced Marriage Protection Orders to protect individuals from being 
forced into marriage. Furthermore, the Act makes it possible for potential victims to make 
applications prior to a forced marriage in favour of dealing with cases after the fact.
64
 Yet, 
the report of The Home Affairs Committee states that it is not at all clear that the Act is 
wholly effective as a tool in protecting individuals from forced marriage. Nevertheless, 293 
Forced Marriage Protection Orders have been made during the two years and four months 
following its enactment.
65
  
2.8 Recent Legislation on Forced Marriage 
A new law came into effect in England and Wales in June 2014 making forced marriage a 
criminal offence. Courts have been able to issue civil orders to prevent forced marriage since 
2008, but offenders will now be punishable by up to seven years imprisonment. (This is 
subject to criteria that will be outlined later).
66
 This was the result of a public consultation 
and, as an outcome of that, the Prime Minister announced on the 8
th
 of June 2012 that his 
government intended to make forcing someone to marry a criminal offence in England and 
Wales; suggesting that in order to strengthen the civil law in England and Wales it is vital to 
make the breach of a Forced Marriage Protection Order a criminal offence. These proposals 
were part of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, which received royal assent 
on 13 March 2014 (the 2014 Act).
67
 
The Home Secretary Theresa May said: ‘The practice was “A tragedy for each and every 
victim". Furthermore, she added: ‘the criminalisation - under the Anti-social Behaviour, 
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Crime and Policing Act 2014 - was "a further move by the government to ensure victims are 
protected by the law and that they have the confidence, safety and the freedom to choose".
68
 
The new law come into force on 16 June 2014, and Section 121 of the 2014 Act proclaims 
that: 
1. A person commits an offence in England and Wales if he or she:  
(a) Uses violence, threats or any other form of coercion for the purpose of 
causing another person to enter into the marriage, and  
(b) Believes, or ought to reasonably believe, that the conduct may cause the 
other person to enter into the marriage without free and full consent. 
2. In relation to a victim who lacks capacity to consent to marriage, the 
offence under subs.(1) is capable of being committed by any conduct 
carried out for the purpose of causing the victim to enter into a marriage 
(whether or not the conduct amounts to violence, threats or any other form 
of coercion). 
3. A person commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if he 
or she practices any form of deception with the intention of causing another 
person to leave the United Kingdom, and intends the other person to be 
subjected to conduct outside the UK that is an offence under subs. (1) or 
would be an offence under that subsection if the victim were in England 
and Wales.  
The maximum penalty for the forced marriage offences is 7 years’ imprisonment in a 
criminal court.
69
  
Gill and Anitha, argue that the civil remedies available under the Forced Marriage (Civil 
Protection) Act primarily focus on protection and prevention, rather than on prosecution and 
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punishing of the perpetrators. Therefore, they see that point as the main difference between 
the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act and the criminal statute that was originally 
proposed. In other words, “the principal remedy under the Forced Marriage (Civil 
Protection) Act is the injunction: an order made by the court prohibiting certain acts that 
may lead to forced marriage.”70 They further suggested that attempting to prevent forced 
marriage through injunctions or criminal proceeding is only part of the solution.
71
  
However, Mavis Maclean states that there are limits to what courts and the law can achieve. 
She then raised the question of whether further legislation could provide more protection for 
those in need without taking into account the improvement of education and welfare 
authorities in order to increase awareness of the practice and its impact. Moreover, she 
suggested considering the needs of those who still need long-term support to live apart from 
their family and culture after the legal protection is in place.
72
 According to Hanisha Patel, 
many have argued that under the new law victims may choose not to disclose information 
about what happened because of their fear to see their own family members sent to prison. 
However, the law allows for victims to go for civil action through a forced marriage 
protection orders through the family courts rather than criminal action.
73
  
One of the latest observations of the new legislation is in  where they suggest that victims 
could determine whether or not to pursue remedies under civil or criminal law; thus, the new 
challenge would arise the following:  
1- Ensuring that victims are able to make informed choices.  
2- Qualified professionals would be required to advise victims, as well as 
assess their ability to make an informed decision.  
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of criminalisation is contingent upon the development of 
legislation that distinguishes effectively between forced and arranged marriages; however, 
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this is not an easy task, even for trained professionals. A number of European countries have 
already criminalised forced marriage, although, to date no research on the success of such 
legislation has been published in English. Meanwhile, the Scottish Government, having 
investigated these European examples, opted in 2009 to forgo criminalisation and, instead, 
created civil legislation based closely on FMCPA. Finally, they conclude their article by this 
statement ‘Thus, while the issue of forced marriage has received significant attention from 
the British Government as a result of NGOs’ work, their arguments against criminalisation 
seem to have fallen on deaf ears’.74 Some believe that legislation is not the only choice in 
tackling the forced marriage problem and they assert that the key issue is how countries may 
balance social integration and multiculturalism.
75
  
2.9 Forced Marriage as a problem among Muslim communities in the United        
Kingdom   
It has been suggested that forced marriage is a product of immigration rather than a 
‘tradition’ which is exported from countries of origin.76 It is true that South Asian 
communities are the largest ethnic minorities in the UK, therefore, scholars have pointed out 
the public debates on forced marriage are mostly addressed in terms of immigration.
77
 In the 
UK, forced marriage has also been seen as harmful culturally within some communities, 
specifically South Asian and/or Muslim communities.
78
  
According to An-Na
’
im, in the Indian sub-continent arranged marriage is central to the 
social systems of the community, and in particular to the system of honour. Marriages are 
often negotiated by community elders who view the union as bringing together two families, 
rather than two individuals. Conformity to the union brings honour to both families. 
Therefore, migrants to Britain maintain their links to the sub-continent and cultural 
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traditions through marriages.
79
 According to Samad, forced marriage is seen as part of 
endogamy practices (the custom of marrying only within the limits of a local community, 
clan, or tribe) where cultural notions of izzat (honour) and sharam (shame) play a role.
80
  
For Mavis Maclean, forced marriage is not just a practice; it is a strategy of survival, both 
cultural and economic. Moreover, there are a number of reasons why members of a 
community might pressurise a couple to marry. In the majority of cases involving young 
girls, there may be family honour and family connections to maintain, or an economic aspect 
comprising either reward for offering a marriage as way to facilitate economic migration.
81
 
Some research suggested that parents who force young people into marriage believe that 
they are upholding the cultural practices of their country of origin.
83
 However, Chantler et 
al. state that there has been much focus on Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities 
with regard to forced marriage, and it is important to recognise that a wider range of ethnic 
minorities are engaged in the practice, including African, Middle Eastern and Latin 
American immigrants. Also, mentioned to a lesser extent were Eastern Europeans, Albanian, 
Chinese, Jewish and some Christian groups, including Mormon, Jehovah’s Witnesses and 
Greek Orthodox.
84
 Finally, based on the evidence collated by the Home Office and Foreign 
and Commonwealth there is a much wider range of ethnic communities and religions where 
forced marriage is practiced. This involved Europeans, Africans, Chinese and increasing 
numbers from Middle Eastern communities, who are mainly Kurds, as well as South 
Asians.
85
  
2.10 Perspectives on Forced Marriage 
To understand forced marriage from a religious perspective is the central objective of this 
research. In this case, it will be the religion of Islam, as the problem is closely related to 
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Muslim communities in the UK. Chantler et al., claim that many people from Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani communities believe that forced marriage is a problem which was projected 
specifically through their religion; that is, Islam. Furthermore, forced marriage has been 
considered a South Asian - and in particular a Muslim problem - in the public’s eye.86 
Furthermore, according to Mavis Maclean and John Eekelaar, forced marriage is a practice 
based not on religious belief, but on local customs in certain areas where immigrant families 
who have come to the UK are from.
87
 
Historically, forced marriage was common among all communities. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, the use of force in marriage has become less common within the white 
British community as a result of changes in the nature of the relationship between parents 
and children, and between men and women.
88
 In the UK, forced marriage currently has a 
deep involvement with some cultures, specifically South Asian and Muslim communities.
89
 
It has been said that forced marriage has no foundation in Islamic teaching, as explicitly 
stated by the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in their report in 2008: “Forced or coerced 
marriages have no foundations in Islamic Law and shall be nullified under the edicts of 
Islamic tenets”.90 Nevertheless, studies on forced marriage suggest that it is being practised 
in Muslim communities far more than others, even though many are claiming that Islam 
does not allow forced marriage and that it is a misinterpretation of Islam. However, cultural 
traditions of particular communities have made it quite common in various Muslim 
communities.
91
  
Therefore, to answer the question of whether Islam allows Forced Marriage, it is important 
to know that the issue of forced marriage can be approached from a number of theoretical 
perspectives. Our concern here is that forced marriage is multidimensional. Thus, we have to 
engage with one of the most important factors related to forced marriage which is the impact 
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of Islamic jurisprudence on the problem of forced marriages and its teaching regarding 
marriage in general. Therefore, we will approach this problem from three different 
perspectives:  
a) The nature of Marriage in Islamic jurisprudence. 
b) The role of guardianship in concluding marriage contract.  
c) The ruling of marriage contract under the effect of coercion. 
Most researche’s and writers working on forced marriages, with reference to the practice of 
Muslim communities in the UK, have claimed that this practice is not permitted by Islam; 
yet, none of them have gone to the length of proving this through an academic study of 
Islamic jurisprudence.
92
 Therefore, this study will undertake the task of exploring the issue 
to ascertain whether or not it is permitted in Islamic Jurisprudence. However, there are many 
research papers and articles that have dealt with the problem of forced marriages in the UK 
from different angles, which will be sources and references in the following sections and 
chapters of this thesis. 
2.11 Statistics on Forced marriage in United Kingdom 
According to Pat Strickland the number of cases that were registered with the Forced 
Marriage Unit (FMU) in 2011 amounted to 1,468 while according to a report released by 
‘The National Centre for Social Research’ issued in July 2009, the number of forced 
marriage cases in the United Kingdom can be estimated to be 5,000 to 8,000 in 2008. In 
78% of the total number of cases registered with the FMU the victims were female, while 
22% were male.
93
 Another report issued by the Home Office of the United Kingdom in 2013 
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stated that the number of cases relevant to forced marriage reached more than 1,300 cases.
94
 
This was after the issuance of ‘The Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act’ on 26th July 
2007 which came into effect from 25
th
 November 2008. The aim of the Act is to provide 
civil remedies for those faced with forced marriage, and victims of forced marriage. A 
person is considered to be forced into marriage if they are forced by another person to enter 
into that marriage without having given their free and full consent. “Force” is defined as 
including threats or other psychological means and may be directed against someone other 
than the victim. The Act applies to England and Wales and Northern Ireland.
95
 
However, studies and research on the subject of forced marriage in United Kingdom have 
shown that coercion is still sometimes practiced by the guardians over their wards. For 
example, Gill and Anitha stated that the most common claims of duress which have come 
before courts have involved duress imposed either by one of the parties to the marriage or by 
the family of one of the parties.
96
 Moreover, they believe that the notion of free will remains 
central to the legal discourse on forced marriage in the United Kingdom. For them, this 
preoccupation with free will ignores the fact that consent is constructed under threats, power 
imbalances and gendered norms.
97
 They conclude by stating that the current definition of 
arranged and forced marriage is based on a defective distinction between consent and 
coercion. Although, consent and coercion are clearly distinct, they are connected through 
degrees of social expectations, control, pressure, threat and the variety of force, which 
operate in the context of gender inequalities.
98
  
Through records of the British authorities such as Foreign Affairs Office, Home Office and 
the police authorities, we find that in most forced marriage cases threat and coercion were 
exercised. For example, in the report of Foreign & Commonwealth Office, it is stated that: 
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Forced marriage is an appalling and indefensible practice and is recognised in 
the UK as a form of violence against women and men. It is a serious abuse of 
human rights and, where children are involved, child abuse. Victims of forced 
marriage can suffer physical, psychological, emotional, financial and sexual 
abuse, including being held captive unlawfully, assaulted and repeatedly 
raped.
99
 
In the case of British Muslims, this practice is not because guardians are enacting the right 
of guardianship which is granted to them by Islamic Law, because forced marriage is a 
compulsion to marry, which is against the objectives of wilāya (guardianship) as we will see 
in chapters three and four of this thesis. Even if we were to hypothetically accept the validity 
of exercising compelling guardianship, the jurists stipulated conditions to validate the 
exercising of that type of guardianship. We will discuss this in depth later in this work. 
Coercion (ikrāh) is closely related to the subject of this thesis and deserves to be highlighted 
to clarify that all types of pressure, death threats and coercion practiced by the guardians 
over their wards in order to pressure them into accepting the marriage is coercion as can be 
seen in the evidence of cases presented in British courts, and here we can mention some 
examples: 
 The murder of Rukhsana Naz by her family, after she left her arranged marriage;  
 The plight of Jack and Zena Briggs, who were forced into hiding to escape bounty 
hunters employed by Zena’s family, after she had refused to marry one of her 
cousins in Pakistan; 
 The case of 32 –year-old doctor Humayra Abedin, who was rescued from forced 
marriage in December 2008, where she was held captive by her parents since 
arriving in Bangladesh to visit them in August 2008;
100
  
 ‘Noreen’ who at the age of 14 was forced to travel to Bangladesh to attend a family 
wedding, only to find out that it was her own. Noreen suffered from physical and 
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emotional pressure from her grandmother. Three months after the wedding, pregnant, 
and with her education disrupted, Noreen was allowed to return home on the 
understanding that she agree to sponsor her husband’s application for entry into the 
UK as a spouse. Upon returning to Britain and refusing to sponsor his application, 
she was disowned by her family, deprived of all contact with her brothers and sisters, 
and lives in fear of retribution from the family.
101
  
There are many incidents and events relevant to forced marriage where coercion and 
compulsion are practiced by deception, lying and the threat of kidnapping or murder, 
alongside all other means of physical and psychological  pressure. This is in addition to the 
murder cases which took place in UK and beyond its borders. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that forced marriage can involve physical, psychological, emotional, financial and sexual 
abuse including being held unlawfully captive, assaulted and raped.
102
 
Many young people in forced marriage concluded a marriage contract because of repeated 
threats to be harmed or killed. Therefore, this threat and pressure, without any doubt, 
destroys the reality of consent and the will of the individual.
103
 However, as a result of all of 
these negative practices, a law was passed to criminalise forced marriages in United 
Kingdom on 16
th
 June 2014, with its introduction stating: ‘The new legislation introduced on 
16 June 2014 by the UK government… is designed to help people in England and Wales. It 
also applies to UK nationals overseas who are at risk of becoming the victim of a forced 
marriage. The maximum penalty for the new offence of forced marriage is seven years 
imprisonment’.104 A new law was needed for England and Wales, because Scotland had 
already passed a law criminalising forced marriage under an Act issued on 11
th
 November 
2011, which provided for the following: 
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1- Courts can issue protection orders specifically tailored to a victim's needs, for 
example by ensuring they are taken to a place of safety or by helping those in danger 
of being taken abroad for marriage. 
2- Breaching such an order is a criminal offence, punishable by a fine, a two-year 
prison sentence or both.
105
 
2.12 Muslim Responses to Forced Marriage 
It is necessary for the members of Muslim communities in the UK –especially those who 
acquired the right of its citizenship- to respect the laws, customs and regulations. This is one 
of the challenges that face Muslim communities when they find themselves obliged to live 
according to the law under the obligations which they obtained through citizenship, either by 
birth or by giving an oath and covenant to respect the laws and regulations of the country. 
This also includes the person who enters the United Kingdom by visa as he is also under a 
pledge not to violate the laws of the country, as the Qur’an commands of the fulfilment of 
the requirements of the covenants in the verse, “O you who have believed, fulfil [all] 
contracts” (Q., 5:1) and, “And fulfil [every] commitment. Indeed, the commitment is ever 
[that about which one will be] questioned” (Q., 17:34). Therefore, the European Council for 
Fatwa and Research discussed topics related to ‘Citizenship and its requirements’, and one 
of the recommendations which was directed at Muslim communities living in Europe was 
‘the compliance with the prevailing laws’. Resolution No. 2/17 from the 17th session of the 
council’s meetings stated:  
1- The importance of knowing the language, custom and laws of the European 
community and accordingly committing to the general law. 
2- Compliance with laws and regulations set by official authorities.106 
In confirmation of this call by the Council, it discussed the issue of forced marriage which is 
practiced by some Muslims in Europe. The members of the Council covered the subject with 
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research and studies of its legal aspects and social effects. Accordingly, a fatwā (legal 
opinion) by the European Council for Fatwa and Research on this subject was issued, which 
reads as follows: 
The most sound opinion that must be followed and practiced is that parents 
and guardians must seek the permission of the girl in her marriage; if she 
approves it then the contract is valid, otherwise it is not with the evidence of 
the ḥadīth from the Prophet, “The virgin shall not be married until her 
consent is sought, nor a previously married woman until she overtly states 
her acceptance”. They (the people) asked ‘What is her permission?’ He 
replied “it is by her keeping silence” and the ḥadīth ‘A virgin came to the 
Prophet and mentioned that her father had married her against her will, so the 
Prophet allowed her to exercise her choice’ and in another narration, ‘the 
Prophet rejected her marriage’.107 
It is worthwhile to mention that in regard to forced marriage in the United Kingdom, 
Muslim communities in Britain currently have three authorities that are engaged in resolving 
marital conflicts:  
1- Country law (courts),  
2- Informal mediation institutions (such as The Sharīcah Council),  
3- The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal.108 
Moreover, It is worthy of note a question that was presented to the Islamic Jurisprudence 
Academy in India (majma
c
 al-fiqh al-Islāmī al-hind) from an organisation based in the 
United Kingdom that is involved in addressing and solving problems in relation to marriage 
and the provisions of the Muslim family. The question was regarding forced marriages in the 
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UK. Among what this organisation presented were cases in Britain related to forcing girls to 
marry someone chosen by the father, the mother or the brother where they take the girls 
back to their home countries, such as India or Pakistan, for the apparent purpose of visiting. 
After their arrival, they insist that the girls marry one of their relatives and threaten them 
with burning their passports, not taking them back to Britain and cancelling their British 
citizenship if they refuse to comply. This way the guardians forced the girls to marry while 
they dislike the marriage in reality. 
The question added that many Muslims live in Britain, Europe and United States of 
America. Their numbers are increasing by the day and many of them have lived in these 
countries for generations, whilst their children are learning and embracing the culture of 
those countries without longing for their home countries where their fathers originate. Thus, 
the young men and women find it inappropriate that they choose their husbands and wives 
from amongst Muslims. On the other side, mothers and fathers try their best to keep the 
marriage of their sons and daughters within the family or they prefer to choose their 
husbands and wives from their home countries such as India or Pakistan, which turns into a 
conflict between the parents and their children, which often leads to dire consequences, 
especially in the case of girls. The question then raised the point that the main purpose of 
such marriages is to for the men who marry such girls to acquire British citizenship and, 
after returning to Britain, the girls refuse the marriage or to live with their husbands, some of 
them seeking the help of Muslim organisations such as the Sharīcah Council to annul the 
marriage in order to find a way out. 
Finally, the question referred to some facts relating to the problem of forced marriage in the 
UK and the way in which the government deals with such issues, adding that when the 
percentage of these cases increased the government ordered the preparation of reports about 
it. Such cases gave a negative image for the reputation of Muslims and distorted the image 
of a tolerant Islam. The media highlighted those events frequently, until organisations 
supporting the liberation of women and human rights claimed that Islam stripped women of 
their rights and even if she is mature, very well-educated and very aware she is still forced to 
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marry according to her guardian’s wishes without her wilful consent. The question 
concluded: 
You should put into consideration that the Islamic legislation granted the 
guardians the right of disposal in their children’s affairs which requires 
them to show mercy and compassion and to choose the best for them and 
their future.  
The Islamic Fiqh Academy of India held its 13
th
 conference on the issue of ‘The parents who 
force their children to marriage according to their wishes in Britain and Western countries 
and the dreadful events it led to’. The participants decided in this regard in a range of 
important points, (see the summary of the fatwa in the appendices). The fifth paragraph of 
the answer states that:  
If it was proved to the judge and the judicial authorities that the guardians 
used coercion in the marriage of a major woman and they forced her to utter 
her consent while she was discontented with this marriage and she asks for 
annulment while the husband refuses to voluntarily leave her through divorce 
or khul
c
, then the judge has the right to annul this marriage in order to repel 
oppression.
109
 
The Fatwa has decided that the woman who is married off without her consent has the right 
to seek annulment from the Muslim judge or the legal counsel in order to repel oppression. 
However, The Sharīcah Council in the UK has specified eighteen situations that can be 
reasons for the issuance of a divorce or separation between the spouses at the Muslim 
Tribunal or the Sharīcah Council in a non-Islamic country; we will mention here those points 
which are closely related to the research topic. 
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2.12.1 Judicial separation because of dissension and harm  
This can take many forms like: 
a- When a girl seeks refuge in shelters –whether governmental or not- that are allocated 
for women who suffer from dissension and domestic violence. This causes the 
acceleration in the process of separation between the spouses so the woman escapes a 
life of harm and injustice with someone who she is reluctant to live with  
b- The difference in the cultural and educational level between the spouses: like when a 
woman is born and raised in a European country and then forced to marry her cousin 
or one of her relatives who grew up in a Muslim country with an eastern culture. 
Therefore, compatibility between the spouses becomes difficult and the marital life 
becomes almost impossible. 
c- Marrying off the women in a Muslim country like Pakistan, for example, while the 
intent of marriage is to bring the husband to Britain in order for him to settle with her 
family and where there are opportunities for him to find a job but the British 
authorities refused to grant him a visa, arguing that the marriage is not authentic –
zawaj maṣlaha. The woman then, submits a request to appeal or challenge the 
decision of rejection of the visa. If the request to appeal is rejected and the wife at the 
same time refuses to move from Britain to the country of the husband because of the 
different environment or the financial conditions of the husband, then the woman is 
entitled to apply for a request in order to get a divorce.
110
 
The council considered such reasons as good enough to permit the request of divorce and 
with a sound enough basis to grant separation between the spouses through the practical 
experience of the council. It is worth noting that the council did not state clearly that forced 
marriage is a reason that can warrant judicial separation. However, it has been mentioned in 
the second paragraph that when girls or boys have had marriage forced upon them with 
someone who is from a different culture or where there is a gap in education between them 
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and their spouses, termination (faskh) can be granted. Furthermore, it is the view of the 
present author that the council should state their view clearly regarding the issue of forced 
marriage.   
In addition to the laws that deal with forced marriages, the British government established 
the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in 2007, which is authorised to deal with civil cases in 
Muslim communities such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, domestic violence and forced 
marriage in accordance with Sharīcah Law but within the framework of the laws of the 
country, similar to the rights granted to the Jewish minority.
111
 Therefore, The Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal is modelled on the Jewish ‘Beth Din’ which has operated under the 
auspices of arbitration legislation for many decades, to deal with private disputes in matters 
like business transactions and religious divorce.
112
 Furthermore, the main purpose behind the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal is to enable Muslim communities to resolve disputes in 
accordance with Islamic Law instead of using the traditional courts and other tribunals.
113
  
The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal has presented a proposal to solve the problem of forced 
marriage; this came after the introduction of the Civil Protection Act which provided civil 
protection against forced marriages and any form of violence against women as well as the 
means of protection, particularly for those who are at risk of being subjected to forced 
marriage. However, critics of this act raised objections such as: what about women who 
were compelled to marry and are already married? What about women who seek to 
terminate such a marriage? What about women who were tricked into accepting the forced 
marriage? What about when the victims are males and not females?  
2.12.2 The proposal to solve the problem of forced marriage presented by the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal 
In the introduction to the proposal presented to solve the problem of forced marriage in the 
UK, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal clarified that, in the opinion of the judges working 
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with it, the arranged marriages (which were arranged by families) have a legal basis and 
origin whereas forced marriage has no legal basis and, therefore, it should be considered 
invalid according to Islamic principles.
114
  However, their proposal to resolve the problem 
carried no procedures in ruling the forced marriage as invalid, as they claimed; rather their 
proposal was as follows: 
There is no doubt that there are some marriages which take place under the influence of 
compulsion and coercion in the UK but, most of the time, one or both of the spouses at some 
point in the process there is consent and approval from at least one of the spouses’; there is 
an opinion in the beginning but that opinion might change after some time. The proposal 
depends on the fact that many cases where coercion and compulsion are exercised are often 
exposed and then dealt with by teachers at schools, social service staff or by people who 
came to know of this problem and offer to help. This perception has something of a lack of 
realism, and gives priority to the perception that forced marriage happens only outside the 
United Kingdom so a foreign party participates in the marriage process, be it the husband or 
wife. Accordingly, the proposed solution focused generally on the existence of a British 
citizen, whose interests must be prioritised, and the foreign party. Based on that, the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal made the issue of ‘Application for settlement in the UK on the basis of 
marriage’ as a basis for the treatment of this problem as follows: 
1- When the British citizen returns to Britain, coercion and compulsion are exercised on 
her/him in order to apply for a visa for a party located outside the United Kingdom. 
2- He then submits the request to the relevant authorities.  
3- A personal interview is conducted in the United Kingdom Consulate for the foreign 
party. 
4- After the request for uniting the spouses and the completion of the required 
procedures after a personal interview, a visa for a period of two years is granted to 
the husband or wife and then another interview is conducted in order to grant him/her 
permanent residence.  
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The problem in this case is that it might be too late to know whether this marriage has taken 
place with full consent and approval, or under the influence of coercion. In case the visa 
application is rejected, the British citizen appeals the decision of the British authorities but 
in any case the appeal proceedings are very expensive. Furthermore, the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal admits that the foreign party is more concerned about entering the United Kingdom 
and improving his financial situation than whether his marriage took place though forcing 
the British party to the marriage. Not surprisingly, most failed marriages are those built on 
the vested interests of family and personal gains with a complete absence of any attention 
given to the interests of the individual and the extent of his benefit and enjoyment of the 
marriage. However, how can the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal admit that the foreign party is 
more concerned with the financial situation while then making him/her a part of the 
proposed solution? How will he answer truthfully when asked whether the marriage took 
place under the influence of coercion and compulsion when all what he seeks is his personal 
interest?  
The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal confirms again that the interest of a British citizen is of its 
priorities in legal procedures to resolve the problem of forced marriages. It says: 
 
1- The British citizen will be invited to appear before the Tribunal voluntarily and with 
her/his choice if she/he accepts to provide a testimony in front of the judges. It 
stresses that this testimony is voluntary and not obligatory from a legal perspective. 
2- If the judges succeed in taking an acknowledgment from the British citizen that the 
marriage did not take place under influence, coercion or duress, they submit a written 
proclamation declaring that they are satisfied and convinced that there is no 
compulsion or coercion in this marriage. 
3- The British citizen can then use this declaration as evidence to help support her/his 
request for a visa or residence for foreign citizens in the United Kingdom. 
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2.12.2.1 The Decision of the Judges in the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
It is worth mentioning that all of the interviews and sessions of the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal take place under the observation of cameras for the protection of witnesses from 
any accusations from a third party. In addition, all the decisions of the judges are recorded in 
order to enhance confidence and transparency in the procedures. When the judge gives his 
decision he does not mention in his statement the reasons and motives but only clarifies 
whether the marriage took place under the influence of duress, coercion or not in his 
opinion. The judge may also issue a warning to the offender that his action may leave him 
exposed to investigations by the police and the judicial proceedings. Furthermore, he might 
also give some advice and guidance in this context and may request for the help of a 
prominent figure within the Muslim community in which the British citizen belongs in order 
to provide advice for the family and warn them of the consequences of violating the law. 
The involvement of such a figure might be a means to cause embarrassment for the family 
involved, and as a result stop them from exercising pressure on the British party in this type 
of marriage.
115
  
 
However, in the final outcome the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal acknowledges that it does 
not have the final word with regard to forced marriages, cannot help the victim affected by 
forced marriage and cannot provide a legal solution by judging the dissolution and 
annulment of this marriage as decided in the forefront of the proposed solution. It wrote in 
bold under the section of providing guidance and advice: 
How to make an application to bring about the termination of the marriage 
under UK laws and under the laws of the foreign country? It should be noted 
that the current legislation under the Forced Marriage Act 2007 does not 
provide for the process of the termination of marriage in cases where it is 
found that marriage was entered into by coercion or force. It simply allows 
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for the protection of the victim from continuing with marriage but leaves the 
marriage itself in a vacuum.116 
They then said, ‘it is clear that the process envisaged by the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
will not give an absolute solution to the problem of forced marriage’.117 Again, the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal has admitted that it cannot provide a practical solution for this problem 
but it could take the role of providing a legal opinion on this problem and other family 
problems by giving an opinion on the dissolution or annulment of the marriage according to 
the provisions of the legislation and the personal status laws in Islamic countries and with 
reference to the family laws in the United Kingdom which approve the annulment of the 
marriage contract if coercion is proven.  
In its preamble of the reasons for its establishment the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal stated 
that its mission is to find solutions for the Muslim minority in accordance with the 
provisions of Islamic law. However, what we have seen is not a solution to the problem but 
only a series of advice and recommendations before passing the case to the English court to 
give its verdict regarding forced marriages. Therefore, if the case eventually returns to the 
state court’s ruling and the decisions of its judge, what is the benefit received by the victim 
of a forced marriage? According to Marnia Lazreg, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal does 
not provide any effective protection for the victim, with the exception of voluntary 
declaration that no coercion or compulsion was exercised in the marriage.
118
 
2.12.2.2 Critique of the Outcome of the Report the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
The following are some points related to the criticism to the outcome of the report made by 
the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal: 
1- How voluntary submission can be the key factor in tackling forced marriage with 
foreign spouses. 
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2- How a community based court would be better placed to deal with the intricacies of 
community issues, as the community would be intolerant of state intervention. 
3- One of the primary objections of their report is what is described as the limited 
effectiveness of Protection Orders on Forced Marriage.  
4- The report does not sufficiently address the issue of power and power relations with 
the context of the family and home. 
In regard to point 3, it is still too early to judge the impact of the forced marriage legislation 
only one year after it was introduced by the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in 2008. Moreover, 
there were no changes or updates to the original law after the introduction of the new law 
which criminalises forced marriage in England and Wales, which has been effective since 
June 2014. 
As for point 4, it can be argued that the issue of the powerlessness of many female victims 
of forced marriage has long remained a central issue in the challenge to eliminate this 
practice. In reality, the concept of dialogue, discussion, compromise and cooperation has a 
negative impact on the safety of female victims of forced marriage who do not occupy an 
equal position in the family in terms of the power, respect and prestige that are often granted 
to male members of the same household.
119
 However, Bano raised a very good point in her 
argument against the report of The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal with the question: Should 
we mediate in cases of forced marriage? The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal emphasises the 
community initiative on the basis that it encourages and promotes family and community 
cohesion and provides empowerment for all individuals who wish to resolve such issues 
within the framework of family, home and local community. Bano argued, ‘the mediation 
process can increase rather than reduce the level of harm and possible violence directed to 
women’.120 
Furthermore, Marnia Lazreg criticised the outcome of the report from the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal regarding forced marriage problem by saying, ‘the Muslim Arbitration 
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Tribunal does not propose any efficient protection from coercion. It basically acts as a tool 
to keep Muslims in the fold of the community’.121 
When a victim of forced marriage resorts to the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and Sharīcah 
Council, she/he seeks a ruling in her/his case and a way out from his ordeal. This can only 
be achieved through the judicial authority which has the power to bind its provisions that are 
then executed by the executive authority. We also know that the Arbitration Tribunal and 
Sharīcah Council process no such authority but they acquire their strength from the voluntary 
consent of both opponent parties in order to accept the verdict and oblige themselves to it.
122
 
Therefore, there is no way to oblige any of the Muslims in the minority outside of Muslim 
countries to anything issued by the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and Sharīcah Council. The 
matter is left to their consciousness of Allah, their fear of God and their desire to refer to the 
provisions of the Islamic religion in their arguments. 
The case of forced marriage is different from other family disputes, such as maintenance for 
the house, or maintenance for children, the father’s right to see his children and other issues 
that are presented before the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and Sharīcah Council. Forced 
marriage is an issue that is related to Human rights, honour, and the legality of cohabitation 
between the spouses (which is accompanied by having children) and other marital rights and 
issues. Perhaps an even greater issue that is linked to forced marriage is the emergence of 
enmity and hatred between the spouses. 
For Gupta and Sapnara, the preferred solution for many victims of forced marriage is not 
divorce, because of its resulting social stigma. Rather the most simple and straightforward 
solution for nullifying a forced marriage is by having it declared invalid because of coercion, 
according to act 12 (c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act  (MCA) 1973, on the grounds that if 
one party of the marriage does not correctly accept the marriage as a result of coercion, 
mistake, unsoundness of mind or otherwise at the time of marriage though he/she capable of 
                                                     
121
 See Lazreg, Forced Marriage: Introducing a Social Justice and Human Rights Perspective, p. 744. 
122
 See Hassan, Judicial separation through the channels of the Sharīcah Council,  p. 258. 
 43 
 
giving valid consent or if he suffers from any mental disorder within the criterion of the 
mental health Act 1983, then he is declared as unfit for marriage.
123
 
The solution however should not be through conciliation between the spouses, or by boards 
of reform, or by the influence of some members of society by pressurising the women to 
accept and be satisfied with the situation when she is reluctant to it while the husband 
refuses to release her voluntarily or through khul
c
 (the right of a woman to seek a divorce 
from her husband in Islam for compensation, usually monetary, which is paid back to the 
husband from the wife). This occurs in the event that the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and 
Sharīcah Council are unable to find a solution and a way out of this problem, which is indeed 
the reality as they do not have the authority to issue a judgment and to oblige anyone to 
accept their rulings. In this context, Hasan says: 
The Council has no binding authority legally but it tries as much as possible 
to provide solutions to the conflicts between people; whether they are private 
family matters or other issues. It usually faces reluctance from the victim’s 
side, a violent confrontation sometimes, or even a threat to raise a lawsuit 
against the Council before the courts [i.e. State courts in Britain].
124
 
If a Muslim who lives in a European country experiences injustice and he/she cannot resort 
to any authority which can remove that injustice apart from the legal authorities in the 
country in which he lives, then he/she is allowed to resort to them in order to get rid of that 
injustice. Therefore, if a woman is pressured into marrying a man through coercion and asks 
him for divorce because she dislikes living with him, but he refuses and she is aware that the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and Sharīcah Council has no power to remove the oppression 
because they have no binding authority, can such a woman resort to a non-Muslim judge to 
grant her a way out or shall she remain with her husband while suffering from the 
oppression of having to live with him while she dislikes it? Before we answer this question, 
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it is worth mentioning   that we focus on women more than men, as we know that Islamic 
Law provides men with the right to issue divorce in order to terminate their marriage. 
However, there are always some cases where the man can find it difficult to do so under 
pressure from families and his community. Generally, the Islamic law commands justice, it 
does not command the protection of the oppressors and does not approve the actions of 
wrongdoers, as the Qur’an said, “Indeed, Allah orders justice, good conduct and giving to 
relatives, and forbids immorality, bad conduct and oppression” (Q., 16:90). Women in 
situations such as domestic violence or forced marriage have no power and aid but from the 
authorities in the countries in which they live and shelters in the shadow of its laws which 
seek justice in the investigating procedures and judicial rulings. The urgent need leads them 
to this solution and allows her to resort to the non-Islamic judiciary. 
Ordinarily, Muslims are required by Sharīcah to seek judgements from a Muslim judge. One 
of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (qācidah fiqhiyyah) is ‘the cases of necessities 
permit the unlawful’ (al-ḍarūra tubīḥ al-maḥḍūrah) and -in this case- the physical or 
psychological  harm befallen on women who were compelled to marry is considered to be a 
necessity that allows seeking the ruling of a non-Muslim judge and the acceptance of their 
verdict. In this context, al-
cAmrānī quoted from Badawī his saying: ‘if the necessity forces a 
Muslim to seek the ruling of a non-Muslim judge then the verdict of that judge is approved 
so the interests of Muslims are not hampered’.125 
However, one of the important issues that concern European Muslims was discussed by the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research surrounding the issue of ‘the divorce issued by a 
non-Muslim judge’.126  
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The European Council of Fatwa and Research issued a resolution in this regard that states:  
The principle is that a Muslim only resorts to a Muslim Judge or any suitable 
deputy in the event of a conflict. However, and due to the absence of an 
Islamic judicial system in non-Muslim countries, it is imperative that a 
Muslim who conducted his marriage by virtue of those countries' respective 
laws, to comply with the rulings of a non-Muslim judge in the event of a 
divorce. Since, the laws were accepted as governing the marriage contract, 
then it is as though one has implicitly accepted all consequences, including 
that the marriage may not be terminated without the consent of a judge. This 
case is similar to that in which the husband gives authority to the judge to do 
so, even if he did so implicitly, and which is considered acceptable by the 
vast majority of scholars. The principle of Islamic jurisprudence applicable in 
this case is that whatever is normal practice is similar to a contractual 
agreement. Furthermore, implementing the rulings of a non-Muslim judiciary 
is an acceptable matter, as it falls under the bringing about of what is 
considered to be of interest and to deter what is considered to be of harm and 
may cause chaos, as stipulated by more than one of the most prominent 
Islamic scholars, such as al-
c
Izz b. 
c
Abd al-Salām, Ibn Taymiyyah and al-
Shāṭibī’.127 
In conclusion, forcing young people into marriage will lead to harm befalling family 
members or anyone else who practice the forced marriage of those over whom they have the 
right of guardianship. An established principle (qācidah thābitah) in Islamic jurisprudence is 
the issue of ‘consequences of acts’ (Ma’ālāt al-afcāl). This refers to the effect resulting from 
an act, whether good or bad, and whether intentional or not. It means for the act to result in a 
ruling that is in accordance with its consequences.
128
 Thus, the consequences of the act are 
the effects and implications that result from the ruling; which might even lead to an allowed 
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act becoming forbidden because of the harm it leads to, as indicated in Qur'an: “And do not 
insult those they invoke other than Allah, lest they insult Allah in enmity without 
knowledge” (Q., 6:108).129   
Thus, the crime of ‘forced marriage’ is an impediment towards the human being’s freedom 
to choose her/his life partner and an aggression towards her/his dignity by forcing her/him to 
live with someone she/he dislikes. Such an act is not in accordance with the tolerance of 
Islam and incompatible with its just legislation. In Islam the actions of the Muslim, who is 
an adult of sound mind, are only considered if they were issued with free will and approval 
without the influence of any physical or psychological coercion.  
Abū Zahrah said, when he stressed that any form of coercion is considered a crime which 
cannot be a means to approve a right for the one who commits it, ‘If we are to accept the 
contract or the statement that takes place under the influence of coercion –which usually 
approves rights for the compeller- then we would be approving a right which is an effect of a 
crime’.130  
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Chapter 3 
Marriage in Islam  
3.1 Introduction 
Marriage as an anthropological notion is cohabitation, sexual access, affiliation of children 
and food sharing. It is the creation of new social relations, not only between husband and 
wife, but also between kin groups of both sides.
131
 In Islam, marriage is defined as a strong 
bond (ribāṭ wathīq) between a man and a woman that is lasting and continuous, and is 
contracted with each party’s full consent and acceptance according to detailed Sharīcah 
rulings.
132
 The objective of the institution of marriage in Islam is to be a means for 
procreation, to preserve chastity, to satisfy sexual desire (which is considered to be a part of 
human nature), to form a family and to create links and ties between members of the 
community. Therefore, Islamic legislation affords great care to the issue of marriage, 
considering it one of the greatest aims due to its position as the point of origin of the family. 
Furthermore, Islamic law is attentive to the means and methods of contracting a marriage in 
order to ensure the consent of the woman and her family for the contract (from the woman’s 
side) and the good intent of the man in seeking a permanent marriage with sincere 
affection.
133
 
This chapter will reflect upon the role of marriage in the preservation of lineage (nasab) and 
honour (
c
irḍ) as marriage’s primary functions, as expounded in Islamic legislation. 
Moreover, we will mention the most important components of the marriage contract in order 
to give a general view of marriage in Islamic jurisprudence, leaving behind some details that 
are not relevant to the subject of this research. We do not, of course, claim that the Islamic 
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view of marriage makes considerations that are unprecedented in previous divine 
legislations. Indeed, marriage has long been a means for organising various communities 
that are concerned about the welfare of families, which are borne out of the marital 
relationship. 
3.2 Islam as a Regulator of Sexual Relationship 
 
With regard to marriage amongst Arabs in the pre-Islamic era, historical studies illustrate a 
picture of chaos and lack of discipline with regard to sexual relations. The advent of Islam in 
Mecca was in the midst of this complete sexual liberalism and, as such, began to organise 
such relations and control the situation of chaos through divine guidance.
134
 An example of 
one of the earliest revelations concerning the regulation of sexual relations is found in the 
Qur’anic text: “And do not approach unlawful coitus. Indeed, it is ever an immorality and is 
evil as a way” (Q., 17:32). This is a Meccan chapter (revealed in Mecca) in the opinion of 
the majority of interpreters (mufassirūn)ً of the Qur’an.135 According to al-Bukhārī, this 
chapter was amongst the first to be revealed in the Meccan period based on the narration of 
Ibn Mas
cūd that, “chapters al-Isrā’ (Q., 17), al- Kahf (Q., 18) and Maryam (Q., 19), are 
amongst the first revealed to Muḥammad in Mecca”.136 The second verse, in which the 
prohibition of unlawful sexual intercourse is mentioned, is al Furqān, (Q., 25), a Meccan 
chapter in its entirety in the opinion of the majority of interpreters. This is further 
corroborated by Ibn 
cĀshūr who said ‘the style and purpose of the chapter confirms that it is 
Meccan’.137 
The prohibition of unlawful sexual intercourse and the regulation of relationships between 
the two sexes by Islam did not come suddenly. Instead, Islam transformed people gradually 
from one state to another and progressed in legislative rulings from one step to another 
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during the thirteen years in Mecca and for a further ten years in Madina. During that period, 
the Qur’an was revealed both in response to events and incidents, and also to prepare 
Muslims to receive rulings that would require great adaption on the part of the faithful. This 
gradual process of legislation is one of the most important reasons why the Qur’an was 
revealed over a twenty-three year period. 
cĀ’isha the wife of the prophet said:  
The first Qur’anic revelations were the concise chapters, al-mufaṣṣal which 
made mention of Hellfire and Paradise when the people embraced Islam and 
their beliefs became firm. Then the orders of lawful and unlawful were 
proclaimed. If the first revelation of the Qur’an had been ‘do not drink wine’ 
the people would have said ‘we are never going to stop drinking’ and if the 
first thing that was revealed from the Qur’an was ‘do not commit unlawful 
sexual intercourse’ the people would have said ‘we are never going to stop 
committing unlawful sexual intercourse’.138  
All sexual relations that were common amongst the Arab in the pre-Islamic era were either 
modified and regulated, or forbidden by Islam. This left marriage as the only acceptable and 
legitimate means by which a man and woman could engage in an intimate relationship.139 
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A woman becomes sexually lawful for a man by one of two reasons: 
- A marriage contract 
- Possessing through purchase contract or for a woman to be of the war captives  
The latter reason was amongst the regulations known to previous nations in the old ancient times when the 
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3.3 The Purpose of Marriage 
Muslim scholars recognise the sexual instinct is innate in humans and therefore does not 
ignore it; rather they seek its fulfilment in a manner which preserves and benefits both the 
individual and society at large, which in turn leads to the benefit of mankind in general.
140
  
Hence, the points that jurists and Muslim intellectuals mention when discussing the wisdom 
and purpose behind marriage are shared and can be summed up as: 
1- Preserving lineage and reproduction: Marriage was legislated to become a social 
system through which lineage is preserved and the human race continues.  
2- Restraining sexual desire: Marriage becomes a means by which to prevent an 
individual from falling into the sin of unlawful sexual intercourse and thereby 
protecting a central tenet of Islamic legislation which is preserving the honour of 
each person. 
3- Housekeeping: the wife is the main agent in managing the house’s affairs as the 
house is the place of living, comfort, tranquillity and intimacy.  
4- A structure within which to provide for the family, take care of raising and educating 
it and to fulfil the rights of the wife and the children.
141
 
It is generally agreed that appeasing sexual desire is not the only purpose of marriage in 
Islam, but that there are other social, psychological and religious meanings behind, as 
mentioned by Abū Zahrah. These include: 
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a- Marriage is the main foundation upon which to form a family, which is the first step 
towards building a community and the first environment that the human is brought 
up in. 
b- Marriage is the place where the rights and duties which are imposed by religion meet 
and the one who is engaged in the marriage contract is  compelled to appreciate it as 
a great and respectable bond that goes beyond merely satisfying sexual desire. 
c- Marriage brings psychological comfort and stability for the spouses, as expressed in 
Qur’anic verse (Q., 30:21) which employs the words tranquillity, affection and 
mercy. 
d- Marriage includes responsibilities, consequences and social duties to which spouses 
are obliged with regard to their nuclear families, wider families, which include in-
laws and other relatives, and the community in general.
142
 
Marriage in Islam has been seen as a way for human societies to adjust aspects of their civil 
life in order to fulfil human sexual desire and form the family, which results in kinship, 
paternity, maternity, son-ship, fraternity, paternal relations, lineage, in-laws relations and 
other more distant kinship ties.
143
  
Abū Zahrah discussed the jurists’ definitions of marriage and criticized them regarding 
understanding the purposes of Islamic legislation when the definitions of jurisprudents does 
not express the purpose of this contract as the legislator intended. He then defined it with a 
definition that expresses its real meaning, and the purpose of the Wise Legislator is a must. 
Perhaps the definition that is most clear is that ‘it is a contract that means the lawfulness of 
association and cooperation between a man and a woman and which determines the rights 
and duties of both of them’. The rights and duties inferred by this definition are defined by 
the legislator (Allah) and not subject to the conditions of the two parties. That is why the 
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marriage contract, in most nations, comes under a religious guise in order for its 
consequences to gain sanctity in that the spouses willingly accept the rulings of the 
religion.
144
  
Abū Zahrah shows great courage in criticising the familiar definitions of the marriage 
contract given by jurisprudents who described it as a means by which a woman gives the 
right to a man to benefit from her private parts, in return for which the man pays a dowry. 
Whereas we see that the Qur’an made domestic stability, which is an integral part of 
establishing tranquillity in marital life, a purpose of the marriage contract. If the whole 
matter is confined only to granting sexual enjoyment in return for dowry, then the objectives 
of marriage mentioned in the Qur’anic verse (Q., 30:21), which are to achieve comfort, 
stability and participation in martial life, are made void. 
The link between the marriage contract and the sexual pleasure a man gets from a woman in 
the opinion and views of some jurisprudents and commentators is nothing but the focussing 
on a very narrow aspect of this great social system and a stripping away of the great 
meanings and purposes of this great blessing that Allah has bestowed upon his servants as 
granted by the verse:  
And Allah has made for you from yourselves mates and has made for you 
from your mates sons and grandchildren and has provided for you from the 
good things. Then in falsehood do they believe and in the favour of Allah 
they disbelieve? (Q., 16:72)  
It seems that jurists have been concerned about the limits and nature of the contract (i.e. 
from the legal aspect); therefore, they dealt with it as any other contract without considering 
the components that might attach to it later.
145
 This means they didn’t pay attention to the 
social and psychological aspects of the marriage contract, and this one criticism against the 
definitions of early jurists to the marriage contract. 
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3.4 The Sharīcah’s Rules of Marriage 
The defining law (al-ḥukm al-taklīfī) among jurists is for the marriage to be: permissible 
(mubāḥ), recommended (mandūb), obligatory (wājib), disliked (makrūh) or prohibited 
(ḥarām).146 Therefore, a legitimate description of marriage differs depending on the situation 
of the competent and legally obliged person (the mukallaf) and whether he is capable of 
fulfilling the duties and rights that he is obliged to by the marriage contract, as well as 
whether he fears falling into the sin of unlawful sexual intercourse.
147
 Islamic legislation 
classifies the defining law of marriage in a way that considers the interests and benefit 
(maṣlaḥah) for each individual, and seeks to prevent harm (mafsadah) -either personal or 
public-. It is on this basis that legislation prevents the marriage if it becomes a means of 
bringing about harm to one or each of the spouses; as the legal principle states: preventing 
harm (mafsadah) is prior to bringing benefit (maṣlaḥah). 
If marriage becomes a cause of harm to one or each of the spouses and becomes like a door 
for evil instead of tranquillity, affection and mercy which were mentioned in the verse (Q., 
30, 21), then the legislation forbids it because of the harm which results from it and the evil 
it might cause to the two parties of the marriage contract. The period of the marriage 
contract only ends in one of two ways; divorce or death. That is why anyone committing 
him/herself to a marriage contract must have sufficient knowledge of the other party’s rights, 
and this can be achieved in the stages preceding the marriage contract, which is the prelude 
to the contract itself, i.e. the engagement period.  
3.5 Engagement (Khiṭbah) 
Any contract is usually preceded by some kind of initial agreement. In the case of the 
marriage contract, this agreement is the engagement (khiṭbah). Khiṭbah is an introduction to 
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marriage and a way for the suitors to become familiar with one another by coming to know 
the ethics, temperament and tendencies of one another. If agreement and harmony is 
achieved and some common qualities attract the suitors to each other and encourage them to 
proceed to marriage then they do so with reassurance and confidence. Thus, khiṭbah is the 
stage that precedes the marriage contract and it can be described as any statement or action 
by the suitor through which he expresses his desire for marriage leading him to propose to 
the family of the woman, explaining his situation and expressing his desire to marry, 
negotiate with them in regards of the marriage contract, listen to their demands and explain 
his demands in regards of the contract and the marriage.
148
 
Engagement is approved by Sharīcah and is an ancient custom found in various traditions 
and cultures through history and across the world in various forms. Amongst the important 
legal considerations related to engagement which is intrinsically relevant to forced marriage 
is that both suitors see each other in order to ascertain whether they wish to become engaged 
or not.
149
 The Prophet encouraged the suitor -and the fiancée- to look at that which might 
help him/her make their decision regarding marriage. The fact of the permissibility for the 
suitors to see each other takes into account that the main intention behind marriage which is 
that  they must be absolutely clear when choosing and accepting the person they want to 
marry. This plays an important role for each party in finding what he/she likes and therefore 
encourages them to get married; the Lawgiver is keen for the marriage to take place in an 
atmosphere of satisfaction. Therefore, the Lawgiver considers the desire for marriage and 
the engagement as a means that lead to marriage. This demonstrates that forced marriage 
contradicts the objectives which the Sharīcah sought from the khiṭbah and marriage.   
Ibn Baṭṭāl (d. 449 AH / 1057AD) mentioned in his explanation of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, quoting 
from al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321 AH / 933 AD), that amongst the Ḥanafi evidence regarding the 
permissibility of seeing before marriage, there is a report by Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. Abī 
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Ḥathamah, who said: ‘I saw Muḥammad b. Maslamah intensely chasing Thubayitah bint al-
Ḍaḥḥāk (who was on the roof of her house) with his eyes. I said: ‘Are you doing that when 
you are one of the companions of the Prophet?’ He replied: ‘I heard the Prophet saying “If 
the desire of marrying a woman is placed in someone’s heart then there is no harm if he 
looks at her”’.150 It seems as though this Companion of the Prophet, Muḥammad b. 
Maslamah, understood that engagement and the desire for marriage is a reason to permit 
looking at a woman and trying to see of her that which might encourage him to marry her, as 
the Prophet declared in the ḥadīth narrated by Jābir. Jurisprudents sought to limit that to the 
face and the hands, whilst some added the feet, and noted that the face indicates the beauty 
of the woman and the hands indicates the build of her body, which is enough for he who 
wants to know the woman.
151
 He can also seek the help of a trusted woman who can give 
him a description of the woman he wants to marry with any specifics that he may wish to 
know. All of what has been mentioned is precautions taken by the jurisprudents to subvert 
any means that may lead to immoral behaviour.
152
  
When the Prophet encouraged the man to look at the woman until he saw that which might 
encourage him to marry her, the Prophet did not specify the face and the hands, but Jābir 
said ‘I engaged a woman from the people of Bani Salamah, so I kept hiding until I saw from 
her that which I liked’.153 Therefore, if the face and the hands are amongst what is exposed 
of a woman usually then there was no need for Jābir to hide between palm trees to see them, 
rather he must have been trying to see what is beyond them. Therefore, the ḥadīth did not 
specify what exactly to look at but left this to the discretion of the one who is looking with 
the intention of marriage.  
The opinion that achieves the purposes of harmony and coherence, in addition to facilitating 
an inclination towards one another for the purposes of marriage, is confirmed by what the 
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Prophet said to al Mughīrah b. Shucbah when he engaged a woman: “Go and look at her 
because this will be a reason for matching and harmony”. Al-Tirmidhī said: ‘This is a good 
ḥadīth (ḥasan) and some people of knowledge commented on this ḥadīth by saying: “there 
is no harm to see of her that which is not forbidden”’.154  
It might be assumed from these ḥādīths that a woman should also be able to see the man she 
wishes to marry; just as he should be pleased by her appearance, so should she be pleased by 
his.
155
 Therefore, this ruling is not limited to men only but it is confirmed for women as 
well, so she is allowed to see and like of him that which he would like to see of her. 
According to Sayyid Sābiq, the modest opinion which is for the man to see of the woman 
that which she usually exposes in front of her father, brother or family and for him to see of 
her that which the suitor likes to see in his future wife.
156
  
Generally, the opinion of the majority of jurists is that engagement is a proposal for marriage 
and an introduction to it. Engagement, as has been mentioned before, is the first step into 
marriage; a time for introducing, assessing the others’ qualities and a chance to establish 
affinity and affection between the future spouses. Being forced into an engagement and the 
completion of marriage without being given the chance to annul the engagement would be 
an arbitrariness that is unfair to the party that disapproves of the marriage, compelling 
him/her to do that which he/she does not desire and compromising the very purpose of 
marriage which aims to find love and intimacy between the spouses.
157
  
Abū Zahrah  says, ‘the fulfilment of the promise of engagement is not binding because 
doing so -against the will of one party- will lead to ratifying a marriage contract with a 
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person he/she is not contented with. Judiciary has no authority to force such dangerous 
contracts’.158  
3.6 The Marriage contract 
For Joseph Schacht, Marriage in an Islamic context is a contract of civil law. This contract is 
the only legally relevant act in concluding a marriage which leads to privacy (khalwa) 
between husband and wife and consummation (dukhūl).159 
Islam seeks to make sexual relations between a man and woman permissible through the 
establishment of the marriage contract. As made evident in the previous discussion, a 
contract is an expression of intent to commit between two people as a result of mutual 
consent.  As intention is something intangible, the contract provides a tangible expression of 
this intent. The Qur’an calls it cuqdat al-nikāḥ, the tie of marriage (Q., 2:235).  
According to Esposito, Islam considers marriage to be an important safeguard for chastity 
and it regards marriage to be central to the growth and stability of the society. Also, marriage 
(nikāḥ) in Islam is a highly respected contract; however, it is not religious in the sense of a 
sacrament as it is in other religions.
160
 The Qur’an describes marriage as a ‘solemn 
covenant’ (Q., 4: 21). This Qur’anic expression gives a clear indication of the importance of 
the marriage contract and of its high status in the life of the individual, family and society. 
An examination of the Qur’an reveals that the only other times the word ‘covenant’ is 
mentioned is when an issue of the utmost importance is being announced, and where the  
addressee is required to pay heed. For example when God commands monotheism and 
worship of Him Alone or where He orders the acceptance of divine law and the application 
of its legislation.
161
 Therefore, a solemn covenant indicates that the marriage contract is 
made with a sincere intention to show long-lasting affection, as women take a covenant from 
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men to treat them kindly.
162
 Riḍā (d. 1865 AH / 1935 AD) said, ‘it means a firm covenant 
that joins you to them [women] in the strongest way’.163 
According to Ibn 
cĀshūr, Islam commands the spouses to deal kindly with each other, for the 
woman’s rights to be taken care of and for men to be in charge of women in everything that 
protects and secures her interests. For this purpose, Islam considers the failure to do so a 
valid reason to grant an annulment of the marriage contract through divorce if any harm is 
proven.
164
 Esposito notes that the marriage contract in Islamic jurisprudence is a civil 
contract which legalised the relationship between a man and a woman. It is a mutual 
voluntary contract between two parties based on mutual consent to bind two parties to its 
legitimate provisions which are the rights and obligations established by the contract in a 
particular subject.
165
  
3.7 Legal Objectives of the Marriage contract 
Marriage is seen by jurists as the means by which lineage is protected and honour is 
preserved. In reaction to the various forms of relationships that may take place between a 
man and a woman in the Arab in pre-Islamic era, Islamic law saw to differentiate the 
marriage contract from all other forms of relationship between men and women which 
would cast doubt to lineage. Jurists believe that contracting marriage prevents doubt 
regarding lineage in three ways: 
1. The guardian of the women shall manage the execution of her marriage contract in 
order to make it clear that the woman does not seek to marry herself without the 
knowledge of her family. This constitutes the difference between marriage and 
unlawful sexual intercourse, secret affairs and prostitution. The wisdom behind this 
is that, generally speaking, the guardian would not accept the latter kind of 
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association between a man and a woman. Therefore, the guardian of a woman 
carrying out her marriage contract allows him to take care of her interests and to 
have the support of his extended family and neighbours in defending this honour.
166
 
2. A dowry (mahr) shall be paid by the husband to his wife. Marriage in its legitimate 
form takes the form of contracts because of the existence of the offer, the acceptance 
and some form of dowry which gives it an incidental feature and certainly 
differentiates between it and other types of contracts like sales. However, it must be 
noted that the dowry is not compensation for the enjoyment of the private parts like 
some jurists might say.
167
 Mahr (ṣadāq) wherever it is mentioned in early 
jurisprudence text books it always has been described as compensation for the 
enjoyment of the private part. However, generally, late jurists seemed to disagree 
with this description given to mahr, and therefore, they preferred to defined it as a 
bridal gift. Ibn 
cĀbidīn (d. 1252 AH / 1836 AD) stated that mahr defined in al-
cināyah as ‘the sum of money due to woman in the marriage contract upon husband 
as a compensation for the enjoyment of the private part’.168 Ibn cĀshūr totally 
disagreed with this description and therefore he stated that dower in Islam is neither a 
substitute for the husband’s exclusive relationship and sexual enjoyment with the 
wife nor as an approximate comparison as expressed by certain jurists.
169
   (This will 
be discussed later under sub-section 3.8.4). 
3. The announcement (ishhār) of the marriage means that the marriage cannot be 
hidden, which if done would make it more like unlawful sexual intercourse and 
might be a reason for people to not defend or respect the marriage. It also brings 
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doubt to the lineage identity (nasab) of its offspring and detracts from the principle 
of the woman’s chastity.170 
We will show the most important components of the Islamic marriage contract in the 
following sections. 
3.8 The Cornerstones and Conditions of a Marriage contract 
Generally speaking, for every contract to exist there are fundamental requirements which 
can be described as follows: 
1. The two parties 
2. The objectives of the contract 
3. The subject of the contract 
4. The principles of the contract, which make up the components of the contract itself 
A contract cannot exist without these basic elements, whether they were principles in 
technical terms, i.e. essential parts of the contract itself, or those required by logical 
inference, such as the existence of the two parties and the object of the contract, as the 
existence of any contract is not imagined without these particulars.
171
 
The Lawgiver may declare that a set of facts must exist or an act must take place before the 
cause can take effect and invoke the related rule (ḥukm). The existence of such a set is called 
a condition (sharṭ). The condition is considered a sign or an indication on which the 
existence of another thing depends. For example, the marriage contract legalises sexual 
enjoyment between the spouses; however, this is on the condition of the presence of two 
witnesses or public declaration.
172
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The legal consequences of a contract is not fully realised without the fulfilment of its 
necessary conditions. A cornerstone (rukn) of a contract is that element which establishes the 
contract; without it, a contract does not exist. A condition also differs from a cornerstone in 
that the latter is part of the essence of a thing. This would mean that the rule (ḥukm) could 
not exist in the absence of its rukn.
173
 Therefore, when the whole or even a part of the rukn 
is absent, the hukm collapses completely, with the result that the latter becomes null and void 
(bāṭil). While, on the other hand, the condition (sharṭ) is not part of the essence of a ḥukm, 
although it is a complementary part of it. Thus a cornerstone and a condition converge in 
that both of them are a requirement for the legal existence of a contract, but they differ in 
that cornerstone is an intrinsic part of the matter that is being contracted, while the condition 
is not.
174
  
Generally, Jurists disagree on what they consider a cornerstone and what they consider a 
condition. The distinction between what is considered a cornerstone and what is considered 
a condition in any contract is based upon what causes the contract itself to be valid or invalid 
and whether it can take place or not. 
Generally speaking, the cornerstones (arkān) for a valid marriage contract are as follows:  
a. The formula (ṣīgha): which consists of the offer (ījāb) and the acceptance (qabūl) 
b. The subject matter (i.e. the spouses) 
c. The dowry (mahr) 
d. The guardian (walī) 
e. The witnesses. (shuhūd) 
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However, some jurists prescribe some of the above as arkān while others stipulate some of 
them as conditions and the rest as cornerstones. Nevertheless, all agreed that the main 
feature of the form of the marriage contract is the mutually understood expressions of 
intention by the two parties or their representatives.  
3.8.1 The Formula (ṣīgha) 
In view of this, the form comprises of two parts; offer and acceptance (ījāb and qabūl). 
Generally, the jurists have set certain requirements to be observed in the formula (ṣīghah) of 
offer and acceptance to enable the contract to be concluded, among the most important of 
which is that the offer should be an expression of the desire and intention of one party to 
marry the other, while acceptance should be an expression of agreement by the other party. 
However, the expressions used in the contract should be definite in the meaning in which 
they indicate the desire to marry. The expression may be strictly literal, meaning marriage 
(zawāj or nikāḥ), or they may be in the form of metaphor supported by the context in such a 
way that they become clearly an expression of this desire.
175
 
Also, jurists are agreed that the expressions used in the formula (ṣīgha) should indicate 
permanence. Therefore, the formula of ījāb and qabūl must not include any indication that 
restricts the marriage to a specific period or attaches the marriage to a condition. The 
formula must indicate the instant establishment of a contract and for the woman to be lawful 
for the man. The jurists have, therefore, ruled certain kinds of contracts invalid because they 
contradict the principle of permanence. These include mut
c
ah and mu’aqqat marriages.176 
3.8.2 Witnesses (shuhūd) 
Because the marriage contract has such importance attached to it due to its role in preserving 
lineage and honour (
c
irḍ),177 and for the implications and rights which result from it, it is 
necessary to document it with a testimony of witnesses. The presence of witnesses to the 
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marriage contract is required when carrying out the offer and acceptance in order to 
underline the importance of the marriage contract and to eliminate any accusation of 
unlawful sexual intercourse.  
Generally jurists are agreed that the presence of witnesses in the marriage contract is  a 
condition for the marriage to be valid, as is the declaration of marriage, and therefore this is 
considered a dividing line between what is lawful and what is unlawful. Witnessing is a 
condition which is required in many transactions, especially money lending. The jurists 
conclude that if witnesses are required in financial matters, therefore, by analogy they must 
be a condition for marriage. They also found that the Qur’an (65:2) instructs that witnesses 
are required for divorce and reconciliation so there is all the more reason why they should be 
required in marriage.
178
  
However, the presence of witnesses has the effect on differentiating between what is lawful 
and what is unlawful. According to Ibn al-Mundhir (d. 318 AH / 930 AD), ‘there is no 
authentic evidence for the requirement of two witnesses’.179 Ibn Taymiyyah’s opinion is that 
declaring the marriage is the intended purpose and that the Prophet commanded that when 
he said, “Declare the marriage” because not declaring the marriage can introduce doubt 
about unlawful sexual intercourse. Therefore, he states that the presence of witnesses 
without declaring the marriage is a reason to reconsider the validity of the marriage. By this 
opinion they agree with the Maliki School in their opinion regarding the issue of declaring 
the marriage.
180
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, there is no doubt the marriage is valid if it was 
declared even without the two witnesses, but if it was the other way around (witnessing the 
marriage but not declaring it) then it should be reconsidered.
181
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3.8.3 Social Equity (Kafā’a) 
Many communities and cultures see that suitability and social equity is required when marry 
their daughters, in order to avoid being the subject of mockery because of their 
intermarriages and their approval of the marriage requests from people of a lower status. We 
can see this in conventional marriages which are based on patriarchal values, such as: 
bloodline, piety, modesty, caste, sect/religion, consanguinity, family background, family 
honour, etc. Controlling theses values is believed to enhance family honour and these values 
could be seen as causes and factors for forced marriages.
182
 
As for considering social equality as a condition for marriage based on a practice from 
ancient societies, although many communities still practice this a way of preserving the 
structure of their society, family sect, religion or customs, the question is whether or not the 
jurists have evidence from the Qur’an or Sunna to support the request of social equality as a 
condition for the validity of the marriage. Jurists who considered suitability to be a condition 
for marriage believe that both customs and experience prove that any abuse to the condition 
of kafā’a causes damage to marital life. Therefore, in order to repel this social 
embarrassment and to preserve the marital bond that serves a great purpose in Islamic law 
which is preserving lineage, the jurists stipulate kafā’a in marriage.183 Abd al-Wahhāb 
Khallāf commented upon the consideration given by the jurists to the requirements of kafā’a 
in the marriage, and his comments as follow: 
a. The issues of kafā’a is not a religious matter. Therefore, if a woman and her guardian 
approves a non kuf’ husband then the lawgiver has no objection to the marriage.  
b. Objection is a right for either the woman or her guardian if she/he does not approve 
in order to avoid harm as well as social embarrassment. 
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Khallāf claims that, this clarifies the mistake in affirming that Islam considers kafā’a and 
thus becomes a religion devotes social class and making Muslims divided.
184
 Khallāf 
decides, therefore, that the issue of kafā’a is legally considered for social reasons only, in 
order to preserve the interests of marriage and family associations. However, Islamic law did 
not introduce the issue of kafā’a to make it a condition for the validity of marriage contract. 
It is worth mentioning, for the sake of argument, that the prophet gave his daughters in 
marriage to some of his companions while none of them matched his religious status. 
Moreover, al-‘Ashqar claims that the evidence quoted by those who considered suitability to 
be a condition in marriage are either explicit but not authentic, and if they are explicit they 
do not indicate that it is required.
185
 
Jurists make social equality a right for the wife and her guardians. It is a mutual right 
between them because the consent of either side does not negate the right of the other, as the 
consent of everyone is required. In the case of a woman who married herself to someone 
who is not kuf’ with full knowledge and consent, but without the consent of her guardians, 
the contract is considered invalid (bāṭil). However it is considered to be suspended (mawqūf) 
until the consent of the guardian is granted. In the case that she marries herself to someone 
who she thinks is socially equal (kuf’) or she is tricked by someone who describes his as 
kuf’ but who is not, then she has the option to either annul the marriage or to continue it. The 
guardian has the right to object to the contract if the husband is not socially equal (kuf’) or 
he does not fulfil the requirements of social equality (kafā’a).186 Hence, we see how the 
Ḥanafi jurists dealt with the issue of kafā’a where they gave the woman her freedom of 
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choice but at the same time they place the principle of Kafā’a as a condition for the validity 
of her marriage.  
Thus, if she uses that right properly they approved her choice and the marriage is considered 
valid, on other hand, if her guardian sees that she misuses that right then they give the 
guardian right to take this case to the court, and the judge (qāḍī) must investigate whether 
the man misrepresented his social status to the bride’s family, as well as whether the 
guardian was responsible for contracting the marriage or whether the woman contracted the 
marriage herself. The judge must then exercise his own discretion in deciding whether to 
annul the marriage (faskh) on the basis of the investigation, if he finds that the marriage is 
not consummated and the woman is not pregnant and that no more than a year has elapsed 
since the inequality was discovered.
187
 If all of these considerations are verified, her choice 
is not approved and the marriage is considered invalid. This indicates the comprehensive 
consideration from Ḥanafi jurists when they make the element of social equality a common 
right between women and her guardian, yet, the final decision is made by the court.
188
 
3.8.4 Dowry (mahr/ṣadāq) 
After the consent and approval of the marriage between the spouses and their families takes 
place, the dowry is agreed upon as it is essential in the marriage contract. It is unacceptable 
for a marriage to take place without a dowry paid by the husband to the wife. It is a gift 
given by the husband to his wife due to the marriage contract. The dowry is a right for the 
woman based on the Qur’an (Q., 2:236). Generally speaking, the jurists believe that the 
reasoning for this is that no blame is attached to the husband who divorces his wife before 
consummation in the case where the dowry is not specified in the contract.
189
  
According to Ibn Rushd (d. 595 AH / 1198 AD), all jurists agreed that the ruling of dowry 
(mahr) is a condition for the validity of the marriage and agreeing to drop it is impermissible 
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because of the verse “And give the women upon marriage their bridal gifts graciously/as free 
gifts” (Q., 4:4) and “So marry them with the permission of their people/guardians and give 
them their due compensation according to what is acceptable” (Q., 4:25).190 Kecia Ali states 
that in most societies throughout history, marriage transferred wealth. Dower (mahr or 
ṣadāq) was the primary male obligation resulting from marriage. Moreover, dower has 
historically served as an important source of economic capital for women.
191
 
Ibn 
cĀshūr states that dower in Islam is not a substitute for the husband’s exclusive 
relationship and sexual intercourse (buḍc) with the wife, as expressed by some jurists. 
Moreover, Ibn 
cĀshūr argues that if dowry were a substitute, the amount of the benefit that it 
would compensate should have been taken into account. However, this should, in turn, have 
required that another sum of money must be paid by the husband when it is clear that the 
previous sum has already been exhausted by the benefits that he has enjoyed during the time 
he has spent with his wife, just as in a contract of hire (ijārah).192 
According to Abū Zahrah, dowry was approved as an obligatory gift, not as recompense. He 
quotes from Ibn al-Humām his saying:  
‘It was legislated as a condition for the validity of the marriage contract not 
as recompense, like a price or a fee, otherwise it must be defined. The Qur’an 
called it ṣadāq and niḥla (free gifts) in the verse “And give the women [upon 
marriage] their [bridal] gifts graciously/as free gifts” (Q., 4:4). This 
expression indicates that dowry was legislated to be a gift from the husband 
to his wife, but an obliged gift that can be postponed without any addition or 
subtraction and without causing difficulty’.193    
However, jurists are in agreement that dropping the dowry or having a condition to drop it is 
impermissible. It is recommended that dowry is defined when concluding the contract and it 
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becomes obligatory either when concluding the contract or at the time of consummation (al-
dukhūl). The wife is entitled to her dowry, either as defined in the contract or mahr al-mithl 
(the marriage dowry received by similar brides) if the dowry is undefined in the contract.
194
  
3.8.5 Guardianship (wilāya) 
The requirement of a guardian in the marriage contract is the majority view of jurists, with 
the exception of Abū Ḥanīfah, who stipulated it only for the marriage of the young and the 
insane.
195
 
Jurists disagreed whether guardianship is one of the conditions for the validity of marriage. 
Mālik (d. 179 AH / 795 AD), Shāficī (d. 204 AH / 820 AD) and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241 
AH/ 855 AD) stipulate that there is no marriage without a guardian and that guardianship is 
a condition of validity. Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150 AH / 767 AD) rules that if a woman contracts 
her marriage with someone of equivalent status (kuf’) it is permitted to do so without a 
guardian.
196
 More explanation and detail regarding the issue of guardianship (wilāya) is 
provided in the next chapter. 
3.9 The Marriage contract and its Legal Description (al-waṣf al-Sharcī) 
Validity (ṣiḥḥah), irregularity (fasād) and invalidity (buṭlān) are Sharīcah values that 
describe and evaluate legal acts incurred by the competent person who is in possession of his 
faculty of reason (mukallaf). These descriptions result from the examination of the act of the 
mukallaf whether or not he fulfils the essential requirements cornerstones (arkān) and 
conditions (shurūṭ) that the Sharīcah has prescribed for it, and whether or not there exist any 
obstacles (mawānic) to deter its appropriate conclusion.197  
The valid (ṣaḥīḥ) contract is: the contract where all its cornerstones and conditions are 
fulfilled and therefore it results in its intended rulings and the invalidity (buṭlān) of a 
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contract is: the legal consequence of the contract being unfulfilling of all of its cornerstones 
with all of their conditions met.
198
 
Therefore, validity in regards of the marriage contract means the resulting of the legal 
effects like the permissibility of the sexual enjoyment between the spouses, the wife’s 
ownership of half of the defined dowry before consummation and the full defined dowry 
after it and other rulings that become binding by the marriage contract. Invalidity in regards 
of marriage means stripping off the rulings from the contract so it loses the description of 
being a reason for the approval of the resulted rulings.
199
  
However, Ḥanafīs distinguished an intermediate category between the valid and invalid, 
namely the irregular (fāsid). Generally, Invalid (bāṭil) and irregular (fāsid) have the same 
meaning in the opinion of the majority of scholars (Mālikīs, Shāficī s and Ḥanbalīs). Both 
terms can describe any action that takes place not in accordance to the Sharīcah and therefore 
no legal effects result from it.
200
 
Ḥanafis differentiate between the invalid (bāṭil) and the irregular (fāsid) and consider them 
as two different types. For example, an irregular contract is a contract when the deficiency is 
in a condition only, therefore, this contract according to Ḥanafis is fāsid but not invalid. The 
irregular (fāsid) contract is a level of invalidity (buṭlān) known only to the Ḥanafis. Other 
schools of law do not distinguish between the invalid and the irregular as both of them are 
invalid (bāṭil); they call it bāṭil sometimes and fāsid some other times.201  
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The Ḥanafīs judged that the irregular (fāsid)) marriage contract must be annulled before 
consummation and that consummating the marriage depending on a irregular (fāsid)) 
contract is invalid but if this happens then the legal punishment (ḥadd) of unlawful sexual 
intercourse is cancelled and the resulted legal rulings mentioned before become binding.
202
 
Al-Kāsānī said, ‘Marriage can only be either valid (ṣaḥīḥ) or invalid (bāṭil)’.203 
Jurists agree upon the unlawfulness of carrying out the irregular contract (fāsid). Therefore, 
the lawgiver grants the right for the judiciary to intervene in order to terminate the invalid 
(bāṭil) or irregular (fāsid) contract.204    
To conclude, jurists of the main four Sunnī schools of law agreed not to distinguish between 
the invalid (bātil) and the irregular (fāsid) marriage. Therefore, they all approved legal 
effects that result from such marriage if consummation takes place. Ibn Taimiyyah (d.728 
AH / 1328 AD) said, ‘when someone consummates the marriage with a woman depending 
on what he thinks of as marriage then that approves lineage/paternity and the unlawfulness 
of intermarriage with the agreement of all scholars as far as I know although the marriage is 
considered as invalid (bātil) with the Lawgivers (Allah)’.205 
However, it is argued that based on practical implementation, the opinion of the jurists 
related to the irregular (fāsid) and invalid (bāṭil) marriage contract is still a controversial 
issue. The jurists dealt with such incident, from the judicial aspect. Therefore, if the 
marriage was consummated it becomes associated with an invalid (bāṭil) or an irregular 
(fāsid) contract. In this case, a practical incident requirs practical effects and legal rulings 
like cancelling the punishment [of an unlawful sexual relation], the approval of lineage, the 
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obligation of 
c
idda (the period a woman must observe after the death of her spouse or after a 
divorce) and dowry (mahr).
206
 
In conclusion, this chapter presents the most important components of the marriage contract. 
It also underlines the essential objective related to the institution of marriage in Islam and 
the role of marriage in the preservation of lineage (nasab) and honour (
c
irḍ).  
Marriage definitions given by jurists have been criticised in the light of understanding the 
purposes of Islamic legislation when early jurists did not express the purpose and objectives 
of this contract in their definitions.  
Islamic legislation classifies the defining law of marriage in a way that considers the 
interests and benefit (maṣlaḥah) for each individual, and seeks to prevent harm (mafsadah) -
either personal or public.  If marriage becomes a cause of harm to one or each of the 
spouses, it becomes like a door for evil instead of tranquillity, affection and mercy which 
were mentioned in the verse (Q., 30:21). 
 
 
  
                                                     
206
 See Al-Sanhūrī, Maṣādir al-Ḥaqq, IV, pp.138-40. 
 72 
 
Chapter 4 
Guardianship (wilāya) in Marriage contract 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we will discuss the subject of guardianship (wilāya) in Islamic jurisprudence 
with regard to marriage contract in order to clarify issues related to forced marriages. 
Perhaps the most important issue surrounding discussion about forced marriages is the role 
of guardianship in marriage and the conduct of guardians toward those who are under their 
guardianship from sons and daughters. Accordingly, we will introduce the meaning, concept 
and the legal objectives (al-maqṣad al-sharīcah) of guardianship, as well as legal judgements 
(al-ḥukm al-sharcī) surrounding guardianship (wilāya) in the marriage contract. Moreover, 
this chapter will reveal whether it is a cornerstone or a condition of the contract, as well as if 
it is required only to achieve certain purposes and benefits for the marriage. All of this will 
be after the production of evidence from Qur’an and Sunna, used by jurists to support their 
reasoning (ijtihād).  
4.2  The Concept of Guardianship (wilāya) in Islamic Jurisprudence 
Islamic legislation takes into account the personal and financial affairs of wards in order that 
they be raised properly, with all of their rights preserved, protecting their property to ensure 
a stable life in which they live safely and are taken care of exactly like majors. The 
legislation also takes into account the weakness of wards and does not oblige them to fulfil 
any legal responsibilities until they attain legal maturity (bulūgh) and it appoints the 
guardians (the father, grandfather, custodian, judge, etc.) to fulfil this duty on their behalf. It 
also grants custody rights to the mother or female relatives because they are considered to be 
naturally more compassionate towards wards than men.
207
 
It is well known that the humanbeing  passes through different stages in his/her life, starting 
with the embryonic stage in his/her mother’s womb until he/she becomes capable of 
managing his/her own affairs and is qualified to fulfil his/her legal duties and 
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responsibilities. This status is called legal capacity (ahliyyat al-‘adā’, lit. ‘capacity to 
exercise’) and one who has not reached this stage is described as a ward (qāṣir). Minors are 
in constant need of someone to take care of them and their interests as they are considered to 
have an incomplete legal capacity (nāqis al-ahliyya).208 For this reason, divine law agreed 
upon the principle of appointing someone to take care of wards in order to ensure the 
achievement of their needs.
209
 Therefore, guardianship in Islamic jurisprudence (wilāya) 
starts as soon as children are born and there is no wilāya over them for anyone before their 
birth.
210
 Therefore, the principle of wilāya is based on an essential foundation of 
representing the other in order to achieve their interests. Regarding this, al-Zarqa said, 
‘wilāya, in its real meaning, is a form of representation which generally means for someone 
to represent someone else in managing his/her affairs’.211   
Accordingly, the guardian (walī) is regarded as the legitimate representative of the ward who 
shall take his place in all matters where representation is accepted such as performing 
contracts. Moreover, this act of representation can be optional, like in the case where 
someone authorises another person to represent him in performing certain contracts or 
followingup some of his affairs and it can be compulsory when commissioned by the law or 
the judicial authority in order to act in the interest of the ward.  
Therefore, wilāya is where a mentally mature major manages the personal and financial 
affairs of a ward (qāṣir). The reason for the existence of the authority of wilāya is the 
absence of capacity (ahliyya), either fully or partially, so it is necessary to clarify the 
meaning of ahliyya and some of its rulings; this will be briefly explained in sub-section 
4.8.1. 
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4.3 Definitions 
4.3.1 Guardianship (wilāya) in Literal Terms 
Wilāya in Arabic literally means: to support, to be close and to take charge of a matter.212 
Thus, these combined meanings were taken into account when scholars of Islamic 
jurisprudence defined wilāya technically. The word wilāya also gives the sense of measure, 
capacity and the ability to act. Therefore, whoever who does not acquire these qualities does 
not fulfil the requirements of wilāya. Accordingly, the guardian of an orphan is the one who 
is in charge of his affairs and care and the walī of a woman is the one who is in charge of her 
marriage contract.
213
 
Guardianship (wilāya) in Technical Terms 
As a legal term wilāya means representation, the power of individual to personally initiate 
an action. It is the power of a walī to represent his ward.214 
Al-Jurjānī (d. 861 AH / 1456 AD) provides in his book ‘al-Tacrīfāt’ a definition of wilāya 
that is hardly missed by any other book addressing the issue. He says, ‘It is to apply the 
judgment on others; with or without their approval’.215 This is a general definition that 
includes all general types of wilāya (like governance and the judiciary) as well as specific 
types of wilāya (like wilāya cala al-nafs, which is over a person, and wilāya cala al-māl, 
which is over property). He has defined it with its requirements and provisions that in this 
sense include all kinds of guardianship in Islamic Jurisprudence. Therefore, al-Zarqa 
criticised the definition al-Jurjānī gave to wilāya, saying: ‘This definition is incorrect 
because it defines wilāya according to its ruling not its real meaning’.216 Al-Zarqa thereafter 
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defined wilāya, as: ‘it is for a mentally mature major to manage the personal and financial 
affairs of a ward’.217 
However, it seems this definition is more appropriate, because guardianship is about care, 
protection and managing the minor’s affairs by an adult not just an emphasis on the 
authority of the guardians, as it is in Jurjāni’s definition. Therefore, Shalabī defines wilāya 
as an authority that proves for the one who is capable of it the ability to initiate 
contracts/actions and to implement them.
218
 
Thus, guardianship is about taking care of the rights and interests of the ward. These 
definitions serve one meaning, which is that wilāya is a form of authority given by the 
legislation or judicial authority for a qualified person who is able to fulfil the need of a 
relative ward who is unable to be in charge of his personal affairs (like conduct, transactions 
and contracts) with the condition that the person who takes the position of guardian must 
always take into account the benefit of the ward. 
This will become yet clearer as we continue the analysis of the concept of wilāya in Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
4.4 Guardianship (wilāya) in Marriage contract and Its Divine Purposes (al-Maqāṣid 
al-Shar
c
iyyah)  
It is widely believed among Muslim jurists that rulings in Islamic legislation were 
introduced in order to achieve the interests of people, so when the Lawgiver (i.e. Allah) 
prescribes a ruling, then He intends for that ruling to be a law that organises human beings 
conduct as well as his every speech and action towards himself or others. The Legislator 
prescribed marriage to preserve the human race by a bond that intends to safeguard the 
individual's psychological and social interests.  
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The purpose of appointing a guardian in the marriage contract is to achieve the interest of 
the ward by approving that which achieves the purposes of the marriage; the essential 
foundation of the concept of guardianship in Islamic jurisprudence, as previously discussed. 
Repelling harm, encouraging that which bring benefit and doing that which is best must be a 
priority for the walī without necessarily being a condition imposed by the law. However, 
what if the guardian fell short in fulfilling that responsibility; in this case, the judiciary 
interferes in order to protect the interests of the individual as well as the public right.  In this 
light, it is important to note that according to 
c
Izz al-Dīn b. cAbd al-Salām (d. 660 AH / 1262 
AD), uprightness (
cadālah) is a condition in any form of wilāya for it to prevent any 
deficiency in seeking interests and preventing harm.
219
  
The guardian is usually the father, his father (the grandfather) or a paternal male relative if 
both of them are missing. Therefore, the bond of lineage and fatherhood must be the 
deterrent that motivates the walī to properly take care of the ward and for him to be upright  
(
 caḍl), so he should fulfil the duty of guardianship as prescribed by the lawgiver when he 
seeks to achieve the interest of the ward. 
The bases for the condition of guardianship in the marriage contract are three: 
1- The woman is believed to be modest and unable to cope in a domain dominated by 
men if she takes charge of her own marriage contract. 
2- The presence of a guardian in the marriage contract maintains the status of the 
women and highlights her honour and status in her family in the community. 
3- The concept of guardianship is based on the principle of solidarity in social 
responsibility in regard to this important contract which makes the unlawful (sexual 
intercourse) lawful.
220
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As for Ibn 
cĀshūr, the lawgiver made the marriage contract different to all other sexual 
relations known to the Arabs in the pre-Islamic era. The legislating of marriage in Islamic 
law was based on distinguishing between marriage and any other relations that might cause 
doubt to the lineage. Removing doubts about lineage, according to Ibn 
cĀshūr, can be 
achieved by three things; however, we will only mention the one which is related to the 
issue of wilāya in the marriage contract.221 He claims that a walī should take charge of a 
woman’s marriage contract to make it clear that she did not choose the man alone without 
the knowledge of her family, because that is the first difference between marriage from one 
side and unlawful, secret affairs on the other side. When a walī takes charge of the woman’s 
marriage contract, he then becomes a guard of her interests and against sexual immorality 
and it is for his clan and family to help in defending this honour.
222
 
With such justifications of the purposes of the legislation, jurists interpreted the reason for 
requiring the condition of wilāya in the marriage contract. Now we shall explore the link 
between wilāya and marriage. However, before that, we should clarify some important rules 
related to guardianship issue, such as: the ruling and effect of guardianship, the guardian 
(walī) and the legal capacity (ahliyya). 
4.5 The Ruling and Effect of Guardianship (wilāya) 
Generally speaking, the reason for the legitimacy of guardianship (wilāya) over others is to 
protect the interests of the wards and guard their personal and financial rights due to their 
inability and weakness, so that their property does not get damaged or looted and their rights 
are maintained.
223
 All the actions taken by the guardian under the right of guardianship are 
approved as long as the duty of wilāya fulfils all of its legal requirements. With regards to 
this point, jurists have different views on the issue of whether or not the ward has the right 
(khiyār al-bulūgh) to oppose the action of the walī after he/she attains full legal capacity. 
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Generally speaking, jurists hold different views regarding who has the right to act as walī to 
contract the marriage of a ward. Mālik grants this right exclusively to the father, or to his 
executor (waṣī), whilst Abū Ḥanīfah permitted this to all guardians, but he granted the ward 
the right of option (khiyār) after attaining puberty, while Mālik did not give the ward this 
right if the guardian who concluded marriage contract was the father. Moreover, some jurists 
also have disagreements over distinctions between the minor boy and the minor girl. 
However, it can be argued that, the male possesses the right to divorce when attaining 
puberty, while the female does not. For this reason Abū Ḥanīfah has granted both the option 
upon attaining puberty.
224
   
4.6 The Guardian (walī)  
 
The walī in Islamic jurisprudence is normally a kinsman and there are specific 
circumstances which mean he is allowed to exercise the duties of wilāya over others. These 
circumstances create a relationship between the walī and the ward and give him the ability to 
take care of his/her interests, and can be called a legal bond between the walī and the ward. 
They include the following: 
 
1- Family relationship: the lineage relation as a result of birth; it includes the father, 
son, brothers and uncles, and so on.  
2- Judicial authority: the jurists call it the authority of the state (imāmat al-sulṭān) as 
mentioned in the ḥadīth: ‘The sulṭān (ruler) is the guardian (walī) of that who does 
not have a guardian (walī)’.225 Judicial authority is a description of the relationship 
between the state authority and the Muslims in a Muslim state as the state is the 
protector of peoples’ interests, guarding them and their rights, but it has no authority 
in this respect unless no parental relatives from the male consanguinity (
c
aṣabah) 
exist, as mentioned in the ḥadīth above. 
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3- Testamentary will (waṣiyya): where a relative of the ward (such as the father) 
entrusts someone else with the wisdom and ability to take care of his family after his 
death so that ‘custodian’ or ‘executor’ manages their financial affairs or gets them 
married, but only after the death of the relative.
226
  
4- Religion: because the Islamic religion links its followers by the bond of religious 
brotherhood as the Qur’an says “The believers are but brothers” (Q., 49:10) and “The 
believing men and believing women are allies of one another” (Q., 9:71).227  
Through these circumstances, the walī must be someone who meets the meaning of the 
diligence and ability. That is why legally wilāya is the right for the nearest relative to the 
ward, such as the father or the son of the mentally insane, as relatives and family members 
are the nearest people to their ward and the ones who are given priority in guarding his 
personal and financial affairs. Therefore, the father who is the head of the family is usually 
the most eager relative in respect of the future of his children, followed by the paternal 
grandfather (al-jadd al-
cāṣbī ), so the legislation gives them priority in managing the affairs 
of the wards in that order. Wilāya as described by al-Zarqa is ‘Firmly related to the family 
system and its interests; its main foundation is for the walī to have the ability and the 
eagerness to take care of the ward and guard his rights’.228 
Thus, wilāya is a responsibility and a trust and requires the necessary experience to act in a 
way that achieves the interest of a ward. It requires the fulfilment of certain conditions in 
order to achieve its objectives. Therefore, by the authority of the lawgiver the walī acquires 
the rights to be a guardian of the interests of the ward; these rights are approved in order to 
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achieve both his rights and the ward’s rights. We will give an example of those rights in the 
issue of wilāya over others in marriage.229 
4.6.1 The Rights and Duties of the Guardian (walī) 
4.6.1.1 The Rights of the walī: 
Here we will give two examples of the rights of the guardian that are related to marriage. It 
should be pointed out that wilāya in this context relates only to a female ward. 
1- Achieving the interest of the ward, like choosing a suitable husband for the girl; 
known by jurists as the concept of Kafā’a in marriage. They justified that with the 
argument that a suitable (kuf’) husband is important for a healthy marriage and 
therefore important to achieve the purpose of the marriage. Jurists claim that finding 
a suitable husband cannot be done without the involvement of a walī as he has more 
knowledge of men and is more able to choose a suitable husband. Hence, he has the 
right to choose the right husband for the sake of the interest of the ward. 
2- Achieving the interest of the walī himself by granting him the right to indulge in 
intermarriage relationships with a socially equal man from a noble family in the 
community because, from a social point of view, marriage is not limited to the bond 
between the spouses, but it also creates relationships between the families through 
intermarriage. Therefore, the jurists give the guardian the right to choose a suitable 
husband from a noble family for the sake of safeguarding the interests of the family 
in the form of the intermarriage relationships.
230
 
Jurists then differed in their consideration of these rights; some gave the walī a full right to 
choose and obligated that the wards act according to his opinion in order to fulfil their 
mutual interests, because of his apparent compassion and care. They limited this to two 
persons only: the father and the paternal grandfather, which is the opinion of the majority. 
However, other jurists gave the walī the right of wilāya over minors only, allowing them to 
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choose after they attain maturity. This group of jurists did not give the walī the right of 
wilāya over the one who is adult and of sound mind (al-bāligh al-caqil), which is the opinion 
of Ḥanafis. 
4.6.1.2 The Duties of the (walī) 
The duties of the walī can be extracted from his rights. He is legally obliged to seek the 
interests of the ward; to not harm him/her and to not misuse the rights granted to him by the 
legislation. Therefore, if the walī does not fulfil his duty then the state, which is represented 
by the judiciary, has the right to intervene to prevent any harm being inflicted on the ward. 
An example for that is the issue of prevention (
caḍl), when a walī prevents the woman under 
his wilāya from marrying a suitable husband, whom she wants to marry, for no legal or 
accepted excuse, or when a walī prevents the divorcee from going back to her husband. We 
can see this illustrated in the Qur’anic verse which states: ‘Do not prevent them from 
marrying their former husbands, if they mutually agree on reasonable basis’ (Q., 2:232) and 
also in the verse (Q., 4:19) and other cases mentioned in Islamic jurisprudence. For this 
reason, some jurists like the Shafi’is put conditions for the walī to be able to marry off the 
woman under his wilāya; one of which is for him not to have hostility with her, and another 
is that the guardian must make sure there is no hostility between the woman and the 
prospective husband, so he does not harm her.
231
 
We can conclude from all of this that wilāya has three requirements: 
1- The presence of compassion and care, 
2- Consideration of the interests of the ward, and 
3- Seeking the suitability (kafā’a) of the prospective couple. 
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Thus, if the walī is disobedient (fāsiq) in a way that brings harm to the ward or if his harm 
and not seeking the interest of the ward is proven, then the right of wilāya will be transferred 
from him to the authority of the judiciary.
232
  
4.7 Divisions and Types of Guardianship (wilāya)  
Wilāya in Islamic jurisprudence is generally divided into two types: 
1- Restricted guardianship (wilāya qāṣira): the authority of the person over himself 
(like getting himself married) and over his property or over one of them. It is also 
called personal guardianship (wilāya dhātiyya) and is described as restricted (qāṣira) 
because it cannot be extended over others.  
2- Unrestricted guardianship (wilāya mutacaddiya): the authority imposed by the 
legislation or judiciary under which a person’s statements and actions over others are 
approved, with or without their approval. Some examples for this are when a father 
marries off his daughter or when he uses his son’s property. It is also called complete 
guardianship (wilāya tāmma) because it can be extended over others. 233 
Unrestricted guardianship (wilāya mutacaddiya) is divided into two categories: 
1- General and unrestricted (mutacaddiya  cāmma): the authority is for a general reason 
like the wilāya of the judge. In other words, it is the wilāya of the general authority 
and any authorities ensued from it. 
2- Specific and unrestricted (mutacaddiyya khāṣṣa): the authority in respect to the 
individuals which is not caused by a general reason, like in the former case. This 
type takes effect on individuals and property, and so it can be also divided into: 
a- Specific and unrestricted over the person (mutacaddiya khāṣṣa calā al-nafs): it 
gives the walī the ability to carry out actions that are related to wards, for 
example marrying them off. 
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b- Specific and unrestricted over the property (mutacaddiya khāṣṣa calā al-māl): it 
gives the walī the ability to initiate contracts and transactions that are related to 
the ward.
234
 
Therefore, wilāya includes an authority of two parts: 
a- Wilāya over the person (calā al-nafs): an authority over the affairs of the ward 
which is related to personal affairs, such as getting married, educated, medically 
treated and working. 
b- Wilāya over the person’s property (calā al-māl): authority over the financial 
affairs of the ward like contracts, transactions, savings and spending.
235
 
The type that concerns us here is the guardianship over the person, specifically guardianship 
in marriage (wilāya al-tazwīj) which is the authority to marry.236 They mean: the person’s 
capacity to initiate a marriage contract for him/her-self or others; this will be discussed in 
the next sections. 
4.8 The Reason for Guardianship (wilāya) Over Others in General, and Specifically in 
Concluding the Marriage contract 
Generally in Islamic jurisprudence, a person’s conduct is judged to be valid or void, 
depending on whether the person who carries them out is legally qualified to do so. If he is 
not, then they are considered void as one of the conditions for the soundness of contracts are 
for the person to possess full legal capacity. Accordingly, there is no wilāya over anyone 
unless the person is of either no or partial legal capacity (ahliyya).  
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4.8.1 Definition of (ahliyya) 
4.8.1.1  In literal Terms 
Ahliyya is absolute fitness or ability.
237
 It is a processed verbal noun from the word ‘ahl’ 
which literally means suitability and competence to carry out an action.
238
 
4.8.1.2 As a Technical Term 
As for Al-Jurjāni, ahliyya is the eligibility of a person to establish rights for him and 
obligations upon himself.
239
 According to Nyazee, it is the ability or fitness to acquire rights 
and exercise them and to accept duties and perform them. It is the Legal Capacity.
240
 As for 
El-Alami, ahliyya it is the fitness of a person to enter into obligation, that is, to bind and be 
bound.
241
  Al-Zarqa tried to give a comprehensive definition to ahliyya, and he defined it as 
‘a quality that the Lawgiver estimates in the person which makes him eligible to receive the 
legal addresses’.242 
Ahliyya is the criterion of obligation (taklīf) and the existence of that character in a person 
makes him eligible to be legally addressed by the lawgiver. As long as ahliyya is a 
characteristic of the human personality, it makes him eligible to earn rights and perform 
duties when they exist.
243
 Al-Ashqar favoured the definition given by al-Jubūrī who 
reviewed the definitions of ahliyya given by most of jurists then said:  
Although definitions of ahliyya differed in words, they are all consistent in its 
significance which means: the eligibility of a person for his rights and duties after 
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fulfilling the required conditions in the competent person (mukallaf) for the validity 
to establish rights for and obligations upon himself.
244
  
Ahliyya is a quality gained by the person through the stages of his physical and intellectual 
growth, starting with the fetal stage in his mother’s womb until he reaches the stage of 
maturity. It is a gradual integration through which he moves from one stage to another; he 
gains rights first then becomes incompetent to bear them, then he becomes eligible for his 
actions then he becomes accountable for his actions and obligations. The criterion of ahliyya 
is for the person to be physically free of any objections that might make him incompetent to 
take care of his own affairs or implement the rulings of the legal address, and for him to be 
free of any mental illness that might prevent him from acting with sanity. Moreover, ahliyya 
is something that accompanies the person and grows with him so it has the nature of 
growing, expanding and becoming complete like all other talents.
245
  
Generally, there are two Types of (ahliyya) 
a- The eligibility for duty (ahliyyat al-wujūb), to receive rights and obligations.  
b- The executive capacity (ahliyyat al-adā’), the active exercise of rights and 
obligations. 
Scholars of principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) say: these two types of ahliyya are due 
to every human being. 
a- The eligibility for duty (ahliyyat al-wujūb): the eligibility of a person to acquire 
rights and obligations. It is the eligibility for the person to be obliged and for him to 
commit. Ahliyya al-wujūb is a legal description given to the human being because of 
the advantage he was granted over all other creatures which is called (dhimma) 
human status that makes him eligible for rights and duties.
246
 This type of ahliyya is 
approved to the human being as long as he is alive, male or female, young or old, 
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foetus or infant with more details given by the scholars of Usūl and jurists. In law, it 
is called the legal personality.
247
 
b- The executive capacity (ahliyyat al-adā’): for the human himself to be legally 
competent. The criterion of this type of ahliyya is intellect and distinction, clarity and 
rationality (tamyīz), as well as the attainment of the age of reason, and is not 
restricted to the human who is alive. Accordingly, it becomes complete if his 
intellect is complete (at the age of maturity) and incomplete if his intellect is 
incomplete. In other words, if he is fully rational he has the executive capacity in 
full, but if he is a ward or not of sound mined it does not apply. Ahliyyat al-adā’ 
means for the human being’s speech, action and conduct to be approved legally, so if 
he performs a contract then the contract is legally approved and results in legal 
effects. If he/she causes harm or commits a crime then he/she will be accounted for 
with regard to it. In other words, this type of ahliyya means ‘responsibility’ and its 
criterion is intellect and distinction, clarity and rationality (tamyīz) as mentioned 
above.
248
  
Therefore, the person who is an adult of sound mind (al-bāligh al-caqil) has the legal 
capacity to exercise rights and obligations (ahliyyat al-adā’). Some jurists added the 
condition of rushd (discrimination, maturity of actions) and others made it a condition for 
financial transactions only. It appears that when a person reaches a particular stage of 
growth he/she becomes eligible to acquire the description of legal capacity in exercising 
rights and obligations (ahliyyat al-adā’) in addition to the legal capacity of exercising rights 
and obligations which is legaly approved for every living person. Therefore jurists believe 
that the types of complete ahliyya are approved to the adult with sound mind; ahliyya al-
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wujūb and ahliyyat al-adā’ so he/she becomes eligible to fulfil legal duties and to be 
accountable for his/her conduct.
249
 
However, a woman is said to obtain incomplete legal capacity. Those who hold this view 
deny her the right to practice certain duties, such as; to be a judge (qāḍī), to be the head of 
state, and the right to testify in cases being tried under legal punishments (ḥudūd and qīṣāṣ). 
Nyazee claims that this led certain Orientalists to believe that the ‘woman is half a man’ and 
he tried to give an explanation of some important issues concerning them -Orientalists-.
250
 
What concerns us with this issue is why the majority of jurists (except Abū Ḥanīfa) prevent 
women from concluding a marriage contract for herself. Is it because she possesses 
incomplete legal capacity? According to Kecia Ali, legal capacity for males is a simple 
matter: before maturity they are subject to their guardians, after it they are not. Any major 
male who is of sound mind has the right to control his marital affairs. In terms of a woman’s 
capacity to contract a marriage, jurists have a disagreement over the issue of whether her 
consent is necessary in order for a valid marriage to be contracted for her. For this reason, 
Kecia Ali considers this subject to be complicated.
251
 
Jurists considered reaching the age of maturity to be a reason to gain full legal capacity to 
exercise rights and obligations, because a mature person usually has complete physical and 
mental capacity. The age of maturity, which is usually constituted by puberty, is called 
bulūgh which means ‘attainment’ in Arabic, because the person at this age reaches a 
complete physical and mental capacity and is not considered being a minor anymore, 
meaning that he/she has attained the capacity to endure legal obligations. The Qur’an says, 
“And when Joseph reached maturity (balagh ashuddah), we gave him wisdom and 
knowledge” (Q., 12:22) al-Qurṭubī (d. 671 AH / 1272 AD) explains the word (balagh 
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ashuddah) as reaching a complete capacity, and Mālik explains the phrase (balagha 
ashuddahu) as reaching puberty.
252
 
Maturity (bulūgh) is the stage in the human’s life in which he moves from childhood to 
being adult and as soon as he/she enters the stage of maturity he/she becomes able to fulfil 
his/her legal duties and responsibilities. According to al-Zarqa, jurists agreed that as soon as 
the person reaches maturity then he becomes included in the legal address issued by the 
Lawgiver (khiṭāb al-shāric) and so becomes obliged to fulfil all duties issued by that address 
with their legal conditions.
253
 
Jurists assessed maturity by physical signs, normally menarche for a girl and the first 
nocturnal emission for a boy, though other signs of physical maturation could be taken into 
account.
254
 In the case of the absence of these signs, bulūgh can also be presumed at the age 
of fifteen in both males and females according to the majority of jurists, whereas the Mālikis 
the age of eighteen for males and females is considered and Ḥanafis consider eighteen for 
males and seventeen for females. This indicates that it is a matter of ijtihād (personal 
reasoning) as there is no legal text to state which year a person should attain the age of 
maturity, even to indicate certain signs. However, Nyazee argues that attaining bulūgh alone 
is not sufficient for a person to acquire complete legal capacity of exercising rights and 
obligations (ahliyyat al-‘adā’) and states that in addition to puberty, the possession of rushd 
(discrimination; maturity of actions) is stipulated as well.
255
 
This is what most modern legislation takes into account; the maturity of action which is 
based on reaching a special age -in the UK it is 16-  The Qur’an mentions: ‘Make trial of 
orphans until they reach the age of marriage (maturity); then if you find sound judgment in 
them (rushd) (i.e. maturity of action), release their property to them…’ (Q., 4:6). Nyazee 
argues that this verse lays down clearly that there are two conditions that must be fulfilled 
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before the wealth of orphans can be handed over to them. These are: puberty (bulūgh) and 
maturity of action (rushd). However, some jurists specify this rule only for financial matters, 
while Shāficī jurists define rushd as maturity of actions in matters of finance as well as dīn 
(religion). In their view, a person who has attained puberty and is adept in dealing with 
financial matters cannot be called rāshid, unless he obeys the rules of the law of Allah 
(aḥkām al-sharīcah) in other matters like acts of worship (cIbādāt).256 
So, the legal address (khiṭāb al-shāric) is directed to the competent person (mukallaf) only 
and the person does not become suitable for legal responsibility unless he fulfils two 
conditions:   
1- Maturity (bulūgh) 
2- Intellect (caql) 
Maturity of action may be added as well, as mentioned above, because we may need other 
signs to prove a person’s maturity.257  The evidence for seeking other signs that is the saying 
of the Prophet, “The pen has been lifted from three: the insane until he regains his sanity, the 
sleeper until he wakes up, and the child until he reaches puberty”.258 The meaning of ‘the 
pen has been lifted’ is that the person is not accountable or legally responsible for his 
actions.
259
 
Accordingly, as soon as the person attains the full legal capacity to exercise rights and 
obligations, the executive capacity (ahliyyat al-‘adā’) through which he can initiate 
contracts and conducts, he becomes eligible to gain rights and be obliged to duties because 
of him/her being an adult of sound mind. Accordingly, his/her acts of worships and civil 
actions, like contracts, will have no legal effect unless he/she has the intellect and perception 
to realise the consequences of his/her actions and therefore there is no legal capacity of 
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exercising rights and obligations before he/she becomes capable to understand the legal 
rulings and fulfil legal duties.
260
 
To conclude, guardianship is a legal authority the purpose of which is to provide protection 
and safeguard the interests and rights of someone who has incomplete or no legal capacity 
(i.e. minor or insane). The person who has reached the age of maturity and discernment, in 
that he/she is an adult of sound mind, has full legal capacity, specifically, has full executive 
capacity. Therefore, the question here is; does the person with full legal capacity still need a 
guardian (walī) in order to manage his/her affairs and carry out certain action like marriage 
contract and so forth.  This is what is known as personal authority (wilāya dhātiyya), which 
applies to a person who has full legal capacity, who has the capacity to act in their own right 
in all matters; whether personal or financial, including the right to conclude marriage 
contract. Ḥanafis gave this right to everyone who is adult of sound mind male or female, 
while the majority of jurists restrict personal authority (wilāya dhātiyya) with regard to 
women in general, specifically the virgin girl (bikr), and for those  previously married 
(thayyib).
261
  
Therefore, what has restricted the freedom of women with regard to concluding a marriage 
contract? Is it the Sharīcah itself (i.e. Qur’an and Sunna), the jurists who are influenced by 
their time and communities, or it is a matter of capacity or incapacity with regard to women? 
If it is a clear rule from the Sharīcah, jurists would not have differed; however, it may be a 
problem of understanding the text whilst under the influence of customs and traditions found 
in their context which may reinforce notions regarding the capacity or incapacity of women. 
Generally speaking, an essential element in the marriage contract is  the authority of the 
individual to conclude the contract. According to El-Alami, this depends upon the individual 
legal capacity which is essentially the fitness of a person to enter into obligations. With 
regard to marriage, it is the status of the legal capacity of the individual that decides the form 
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of guardianship which is appropriate.
262
 Why did jurists stipulate guardianship (wilāya) in 
the marriage contract? Answering this question and an explanation of the link between 
guardianship and marriage contract will be the topic of the following section. 
4.9 The Relation between Guardianship (wilāya) and the Marriage contract 
The definitions of guardianship (wilāya) with regard of the marriage contract is  defined by 
some modern jurists as ‘an authority granted to the parental relatives (caṣba) or those who 
represent them, which allows marrying off the one who is not suited to performing his/her 
own marriage contract’.263 
Marriage in Islam is a contract and it requires contracting parties who perform the contract 
and issues contractual formula i.e. the offer (ijāb) and the acceptance (qabūl) as previously 
discussed in chapter three. Because amongst the purposes of the legislation are the 
preservation of property, lineage and honour, the jurists believed that not everyone is 
suitable to be a contracting party, from whom offer and acceptance are approved as there are 
four types of people in regard to the initiation of contracts:  
1- Those whose statements are disapproved; so they do not initiate the contract and the 
contract has no legal effects, such as the insane (majnūn) and the idiot (mactūh)  
2- Those whose statements are approved in some contracts and conducts only, such as 
the ward (ṣabi) who can accept a gift (hibah) for example, but cannot conclude a 
financial transaction contract unless his/her guardian approved it, which is the next 
point. 
3- Those whose statements are dependent or independent on the approval or consent of 
his/her guardian. 
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4- Those whose statements are approved in all contracts and conducts without the need 
of the consent of any other party. This is for one who has attained complete capacity 
(adult of sound mind).
264
 
According to Zaydān, this difference in regards to peoples’ conducts and statements in their 
contracts are due to the extent of their legal capacity (ahliyya) and whether they have the 
right to full, partial or no legal capacity. The one who has no legal capacity and guardianship 
will have his/her statement disapproved and any who have partial legal capacity and 
guardianship (or at least one of them) will have his statement partially approved. The one 
who fulfils all requirements for ahliyya and wilāya will have his statement fully approved in 
all contracts and conducts.
265
 
Therefore, no contract becomes effective unless two conditions are fulfilled in the 
contracting party:  
1- To have full legal capacity to exercise; so the contract is initiated, the conduct is 
approved and the effects of the contract are implemented. 
2- To possess the full guardianship (wilāya) which ensures the implications of his 
conduct and therefore effects are implemented.
266
 
Jurists considered the legal capacity (ahliyya) and guardianship (wilāya) in judging the 
person’s conduct and they also considered whether the contracting party –who is an essential 
foundation in the contract- possesses the means of legal capacity for his/her contract to be 
approved and effective. Therefore, ahliyya means for the person to be capable of acting 
correctly in a way that doesn’t bring harm to him/herself or others and for his/her actions to 
be legally correct and accepted. Wilāya dhātiyya (personal Authority) requires for the person 
to be in possession of the legal authority over himself and his property, so effects result from 
his/her actions in case he uses that authority. 
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Accordingly, the person with full legal capacity (ahliyya) has the full right to willingly 
initiate a marriage contract as stated by Islamic jurisprudence which respects the wish and 
choice of the person to marry whoever he likes and wants to be connected to by the bond of 
marriage.  As we have learned from above that only the person with full legal capacity is the 
one whose conducts and contracts are approved without the need of approval from any other 
party as al-Juday
c
 stated that the adult of sound mind fulfils a full eligibility to acquire rights 
for and upon him (ahliyyat al-wujūb) and the eligibility to execute or discharge his/her right 
and duties in a manner recognised by law (ahliyyat al-‘adā’) so he/she is eligible to fulfil all 
of his/her legal duties and to be responsible for all of his/her conducts.
267
 
However, jurists found in the legal texts –Qur’an and Sunna- the requirement for the 
authority of a guardian (walī) in the marriage contract. Some of those texts are explicit and 
some are not, so they tried to extract the ruling of the condition of having a walī in the 
marriage contract from non-explicit texts, depending on the explicit texts in order to support 
the idea of guardianship which exists in culture, custom and tradition in Muslim society. 
Thus, guardianship (wilāya) in the marriage contract is  a legal authority mostly caused by 
ties of kinship. It grants the person the right to marry off those under his wilāya (those with 
either no or partial ahliyya). There are certain conditions which may affect legal capacity 
(executive capacity); if a person is affected by one of them he/she will be subjected to a type 
of guardianship called ‘compulsion guardianship’ (wilāyat al-‘Ijbār).268 
Jurists stipulate that only the adult of sound mind (al-bāligh al-cāqil) has the right to initiate 
a marriage contract for him/herself. Therefore the ward (al-ṣaghīr) or the insane (al-majnūn) 
does not acquire the legal capacity that allows him/her to take an action by him/herself, so 
the lawgiver appointed a walī to represent him/her; this wilāya is called wilāya cala al-nafs 
(over the person).
269
 Therefore, for a marriage contract to be fully effective and legally 
recognised, jurists place the condition that it must be performed by someone with full legal 
capacity or initiated by one of his/her representatives. This representation is acquired by 
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legislation and the representative of the one concerned in initiating the marriage formula for 
him/her. 
Compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-ijbār) means that the walī is entitled to conclude the 
marriage contract for the ward without her/his consent, which is called compelling 
guardianship. Jurists approved this type of wilāya over wards and therefore granted the right 
to the guardian to marry them off, whether they are male or female. They disagreed on 
which guardian can be granted this right and other specific rulings related to this issue. The 
opinions of jurists in the issue of marrying off wards can be summarised as follows: 
- No one has a right to marry off wards because they don’t benefit from it and they do 
not understand the concept of marriage. This is the opinion of Ibn Shubruma and 
Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm. 
- The guardian has right over ward females only excludes ward males. This is the 
opinion of al-Ẓāhiriyya. 
- The guardianship is approved over all wards; males and females. This is the opinion 
of the majority of jurists; the Ḥanafis, Shafi’is, Mālikis and Hanbalis.270 
This will be discussed in more detail later in sub-section 4.12. 
4.10 The Legal Sources (al-dalīl al-sharcī) Supporting Guardianship (wilāya) in the 
Marriage Contract 
It is clear from the previous discussion that the Ḥanafis stand on the opposite side of the 
majority (Mālikis, Shāficis and Ḥanbalis) with regard to the authority of the guardian in 
marriage contract and regarding the requirement of the guardianship for the validity of the 
contract. Why did the two groups disagree? Ibn Rushd suggested that the reason for their 
disagreement is based on the fact that no verse from the Qur’an or clear ḥadith from the 
Sunna stipulates wilāya in marriage, let alone an explicit text (naṣṣ ṣarīḥ). All of the verses 
and ḥadīths which they usually use in their arguments are open to possible interpretations as 
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to whether to approve or disapprove of the conditioning of wilāya in the marriage contract. 
As for ḥadīth, in addition to the fact that they are open to interpretation, there is also 
disagreement in regard to their authenticity.
271
 
The methodology of argument used by both groups (Ḥanafis and al-Jumhūr) is open to all 
possibilities in their implication of legal texts. For example, it can be argued that if the 
woman is sane, mature and of good conduct, then it is acceptable for her to conclude her 
marriage contract on her own just as she has the right managing her property, as in the 
opinion of the Ḥanafis. The majority (al-jumhūr) claim that we do not need to prevent the 
woman from performing the marriage contract on her own while she is sane and major but, 
despite that, we consider the significance of the legal texts (ḥadīth) that request guardianship 
in the marriage contract such as “A woman may not give a woman in marriage, nor may she 
give herself in marriage”.272 Also, the ḥadīth: “There is no marriage without a guardian”.273 
Therefore, guardians should be allowed to practice their duty of protecting the woman, 
which is similar to the duty of ḥisba (guarding against infringements),274 and therefore they 
have the right to seek the annulment of the contract if they have objections to the woman’s 
conduct by taking the whole matter to the authority of the state (judiciary).  
This is what is meant by saying the issue of guardianship in marriage is open to a number of 
possibilities. However, the group who prevent a woman from concluding a marriage contract 
by herself, also claim that it is the law which is in legal texts such as:  “There is no marriage 
without a guardian”, which allow us to stipulate from it that guardianship is considered to be 
a condition of validity of marriage.
275
  
According to Ibn Rushd, if the lawgiver (al-shāric) intended to make the guardian (walī) a 
condition of marriage, then he would have specified the gender, types and levels of 
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guardians in the same text, because delaying the clarification from the time of necessity is 
impermissible. Marriage is common in communities, so it is considered an issue of public 
affliction (
cumūm al-balwā), so the legislation must come up with a clear and explicit rule to 
remove any uncertainty and confusion.
276
 
Before we go on to clarify the position of jurists regarding the requirement of guardian in the 
marriage contract and his authority in concluding the marriage contract of his ward, and the 
legal texts which have been used as evidence, it is worth delineating the  methodology which 
jurists adopt when dealing with legal texts, especially texts from the Sunna (ḥadīths). 
Schacht states that 150 A.H. (A.D.767) marked the beginning of the development of 
technical legal thought.
277
  Moreover, during this period legal activity was based only on the 
Qur’an and on what was thought to be the practice of the Prophet and his Companions 
(ṣaḥābah) and the following generation named the Successors (tābicūn). Accordingly, 
knowledge in this period was the knowledge of the Qur'an and the traditions and example of 
the Prophet, and its opposite was ra'y, considered opinion. One can claim that up to 100 
years after the hijrah, legal issues were limited to those who had knowledge and who 
associated with the Prophet or with his Companions.
278
  In the second century of Islam, the 
term Sunna of the Prophet became a legal term for Iraqi scholars. They defined the term 
Sunna as the idealised practice of the local community and the doctrine of its scholars. 
However, by the time of al-Shāficī took another definition; the words of the Prophet or his 
acts (al-ḥadīth).279  As for Hallaq, in the end of the first century, the term Sunna signifies the 
source of Muslim conduct.
280
  
However, the time of the Ṣaḥābah came to the end between the years 90 and 100 A.H., and 
was followed by the time of the Tābicūn, whose scholars became responsible for fiqh and 
dealing with legal issues. Jurists came after the period of the tābicūn and took the ḥadīth of 
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the Prophet, the legal verdicts of the Ṣaḥābah and the Tabicūn (fatwa al-ṣaḥābah wa fatwa 
al-tabi
cūn) and also the third generation, and produced their own reasoning (ijtihād).281 
Perhaps this may have become the time of the emergence of two schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence; the rationalists (ahl al-ra’y) and the traditionalists (ahl al-ḥadīth), and the 
appearance of differences between them concerning source methodology and legal issues.  
Nevertheless, these two schools claim that they have a strong connection with the 
approaches of the preceding two generations, although in this time the differences (al-
‘Ikhtilāf) in issues of fiqh became clear. Writers on Islamic legal history emphasise that the 
rationalists’ school was an extension of the school of the Companion cAbd Allah b. Mascūd 
(the companion who used rā’ī most extensively), al-Nakhacī (d. 96 AH / 714 AD) and 
Ḥammād (d.120 AH / 738 AD) who was the teacher of Abū Ḥanīfah.282 According to al-
Awani, the school of traditionalists (ahl al-ḥadīth) was based on the methodology of those 
Ṣaḥābah who were fearful of contradicting the texts (nuṣūṣ), which made them careful not to 
go any further than the texts themselves. This was the case with 
c
Abd Allah b. 
c
Umar b. al- 
Khaṭṭāb and cAbd Allah b. cAbbās.283 Thus, the school of ahl al-ḥadīth became widespread 
in the Ḥijāz (Makka and Madina) for many reasons, of which perhaps the most important 
were the great number of ḥadīth narrators, as well as this being the place of the emergence 
of Islam.
284
 The school of ahl al-ra’y, on the other hand, gained currency in Iraq. The 
scholars of this school believed that the legal interpretations of the Shari
cah’s texts should 
have a basis in reason, should take into account the best interests of people, and should be 
backed by discernible wisdom.
285
  
Through their methodology the rationalists criticised the traditionalists for having little 
intelligence and less understanding (fiqh), while ahl al-ḥadīth claimed that the opinions of 
ahl al-ra’y were based on no more than conjecture, and that they had distanced themselves 
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from the necessary circumspection in those matters of religious significance which could be 
ascertained only through recourse to the source texts. However, ahl al-ḥadīth agreed with 
ahl al-ra’y on the necessity of having recourse to reason wherever a matter occurred for 
which there is no specific ruling in the source texts. Rationalists generally agreed that the 
one who has clearly understood the Sunna, may not reject it in favour of someone’s opinion. 
Their reason in all those cases in which they were criticised for contradicting the Sunna can 
be outlined as follow: 
a) They did not know any ḥadīth with reference to the matter in dispute,  
b) -or that they did know a ḥadīth but did not consider it sound enough owing to some 
weakness in narrators or some other fault they found in it,  
c) -or that they knew of another ḥadīth which was considered sound and which 
contradicted the legal purpose of the ḥadīth accepted by others.286  
Abu Ḥanīfah was the leading figure of the Iraqi school, whereas Mālik, and after him al-
Shāficī, led the Ḥijāzī school of legal thought.287 Abu Ḥanīfa is known for his reliance on 
ra’y and qiyās (personal opinion and analogy respectively), which is widely believed to be 
one of the features of theoretical Ḥanafī jurisprudence.288 However, among the traditionalists 
is Mālik b. Anas, who would rely on a solitary ḥadīth on conditions such as the soundness of  
its  chain of transmission (isnād) and that it did not disagree with the practice of the 
Medinans (
c
amal ahl al-madīnah ).289  
The difference in the methodology of both schools is typified by attitudes to one of the types 
of ḥadīth known as aḥad ḥadīth (a solitary ḥadīth, also known as khabar al-wāḥid) which is 
a ḥadīth which is reported by a single person or by odd individuals from the Prophet. This 
type of narration, in the view of traditionalists does not impart positive knowledge on its 
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own unless it is supported by circumstantial evidence, like two of the other types of 
narration; the mutawātir  (continuous) and the mashhūr (well-known) ḥadīths.290 
Generally speaking, traditionalists accept and rely on an aḥad ḥadīth with certain conditions. 
Rationalists (mainly the school of Abū Ḥanīfa) set additional conditions, one of which is 
that: the narrator’s action must not contradict his narration, as we will see later how the 
Ḥanafis did not act on a ḥadīth of cĀ’ishah when she narrates that the Prophet said: “Any 
woman who marries without her guardian’s permission, her marriage is void”, which is one 
of the main ḥadīths about the issue of guardianship in marriage contract. The Ḥanafis argue 
that 
cĀ’ishah acted to the contrary when she contracted the nikāḥ of her niece, the daughter 
of her brother 
c
Abd al-Raḥmān, while he was absent in Syria.291 We will see later that 
Ḥanafis entitle an adult woman of age to conclude her own marriage contract, a ruling which 
is different from that of the majority of other schools. Their argument was because 
guardianship over the person must accordingly be restricted to the needs of the ward and 
there is no such need after the ward has attained the age of maturity. Moreover, Ḥanafis 
argue that since the Sharīcah grants an adult woman full authority over her property, there is 
no reason why this should not be the case with regard to her marriage.
292
  
As mentioned above, jurists disagreed whether or not guardianship in the marriage contract 
is  a condition (sharṭ) for the validity of the marriage and whether it is a cornerstone (rukn) 
of the contract or not. The origin of this disagreement in this issue was that many evidence 
in the Qur’an and Sunna stipulated the presence of a walī in the marriage contract, so jurists 
understood those evidence differently and therefore built rulings depending on their their 
independent reasoning (ijtihād). Accordingly, the four main Sunnī schools of law were 
divided into two groups with regard to this issue; the majority group is represented by the 
Mālikis, Shafi’is and Hanbalis, and the Ḥanafis represent the other group. The majority 
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consider wilāya as a condition for the validity of the marriage. Some of them said that it is a 
rukn and that the marriage is invalid without the presence of a walī. Therefore, the woman 
has no right to conclude marriage contract for herself or for others or to assign someone 
other than her walī to perform the marriage contract on her behalf. The opinion of the 
Ḥanafis is that wilāya is not a condition (sharṭ) for the validity of the marriage of the adult 
woman of sound mind and not a rukn either. Therefore, the woman has the right to marry to 
conclude marriage contract for herself or for others or to assign someone other than her walī 
to perform the marriage contract on her behalf.
293
 Abū Ḥanīfa rejected any compulsion for 
majority females, both virgin and non-virgin.
294
  
This is what distinguishes the Ḥanafi school when they granted women freedom regarding 
the marriage contract as well as in every contract. 
4.11 Rational Evidence (dalīl caqlī)  
The Ḥanafis argue that the marriage contract have purposes in respect of the woman which 
none of her guardians share with her. This requires that she takes charge of this contract 
which fulfils these purposes because of what becomes due to her as a result of the marriage 
contract, such as dowry, the right to housing (sukna) and financial maintenance (nafaqa) and 
other things she acquires as a result of the marriage contract. The legal starting point with 
regard to such a contract is that it should be performed by the person who acquires these 
benefits and purposes. The other can only object to her conduct in case he thinks that she has 
caused harm to herself, has neglected some of her rights or violated the right approved to 
him by legislation, by taking the matter to the judiciary.
295
 
The main requirement in the matter of wilāya is maturity (al-bulūgh) and sanity (al-caql) as 
a sane major person has full legal capacity over him/herself and his/her property. This 
ahliyya is approved for the woman as well as the man with no difference. Therefore, this 
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approved ahliyya allows the woman all actions including performing the marriage contract 
like any other contract. The Ḥanafis then accepted that the guardians have the right for their 
permission to be required in regard to the marriage of the woman under their wilāya. They 
can also perform the marriage contract but only with her approval and consent. This is an 
implementation of what the ḥadīths regarding the issue of wilāya approved and of the 
practice of the Prophet when he wanted to marry off one of his daughters he would sit 
behind her veil and say, “so and so [the name of the man] is mentioning (i.e. propose to 
marry) so and so [the name of the daughter]” If she speaks and expresses her unwillingness 
he would not marry her off and if she remains silent he would.
296
 
According to the Ḥanafis, attainting maturity removes incapacity and completes intellect. 
Therefore, the full legal capacity is approved for the mature woman and she becomes 
eligible for legal rulings and duties. They explained the permission they granted for the 
female adult of sound mind to perform the marriage contract on her own, or with her 
permission or authorisation as if she acted in something of her own right. Because she is 
allowed to exercise her right because of her maturity and sound mind, her actions cannot be 
restricted as long as that restriction is not from the lawgiver. No one has wilāya over her and 
exactly as she has the absolute right to act on her property in selling and purchasing she also 
has the right to choose her husband as well as accepting and rejecting the marriage.
297
 This 
is the case, whether or not the woman is a virgin. That is because the main reason for the 
wilāya in the first place is necessitated by the need to protect the ward because of his/her 
weakness and inability to take charge of his/her affair when he/she is young so the wilāya of 
the father over his daughter in respect of her property is removed from him and approved to 
her as soon as she attains maturity and complete intellect and her wilāya over herself is 
approved.
298
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They further considered the guardianship over such as woman who attains maturity and 
complete intellect as recommended (mustaḥabb), meaning that it is recommended for a 
woman to leave the issue of the marriage contract between her guardian and her husband 
because customs and traditions might cause her embarrassment because it requires her to 
attend the gathering of men when the contract is performed. Therefore, they restricted this to 
customs and traditions only which is why it is considered to be recommended but not a rukn 
(cornerstone) or a sharṭ (condition) for the validity of the marriage contract, supporting their 
opinion with the interpretations of verses and the significance of ḥadīths which granted the 
woman the right of being consulted for her permission of approval and that she should not 
be forced into the marriage contract without her consent.
299
   
Jurists of other schools argued that, how Ḥanafis give the woman freedom to conclude her 
marriage contract just as she is free in concluding any financial transactions, while, they 
granted her guardian the right to ask for her marriage to be annulled if she married someone 
who is not suitable (kufu’)?  They see this from Ḥanafis as a contradiction, because if 
someone has freedom to perform a contract for him/herself while someone else has a right to 
object and ask for the contract to be annulled can be evidence for the invalidity of the 
contract in the first place. Moreover, the majority claim that the marriage contract is a 
partnership (mushārakah) contract not an exchange (mucāwaḍah) contract, so it cannot be 
measured against the latter. However, it can be claimed that the Ḥanafis see it as a sale or 
exchange contract when they allow the formula of the contract (ṣīgha) to include 
expressions such as sale, gift and milk (ownership), which would appear to be a 
contradiction.
300
  
For the majority of jurists, the marriage contract also has important legal effects which 
distinguish it from any other type of contract and it differs from the sale contract. Al-Qarāfī 
(d. 684 AH / 1285 AD) states that the marriage contract is much more important than 
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contracts regarding property, no matter how great the value of property. Financial contracts 
are based on measure and quantity (mukāyasa), whereas the marriage contract is based on 
virtue and quality, honour and kindness (mukārama).301 In addition to that, there is a 
difference between the nature of the man and the nature of the woman which might cause 
her to give up some of her rights and also the harm which might befall the guardians as a 
result of indulging in intermarriage relations with a husband who is not suitable (kuf’).302 
The Ḥanafis response to the majority’s argument was that they did not measure marriage 
against sale contracts; however, their main consideration is the validity of the action. Just as 
the sane major person with full legal capacity has the absolute freedom in all of his/her 
actions, the sale contract performed by a sane major woman is also valid, so her marriage 
contract is valid when she performs it on her own. The legal starting point is that everyone 
who has the right over his/her property also possesses the right over him/herself. The 
majority claim that the emotional nature of the woman might cause weakness to her which 
may lead her to marry someone who is not suitable (kuf’) and that will bring shame to both 
herself and her guardian. However, we can say that the harm or shame is not caused by 
every woman who marries herself without her walī and the rule should not relate to women 
only. Moreover, the occurrence of the harm or shame the majority talk about is only a 
possibility and the mere occurrence of that possibility does not oblige it. Furthermore, if the 
walī experiences any of that he can always take the whole matter to the judiciary. The 
likelihood of a walī finding any kind of embarrassment in it is small. Therefore, as long as 
the possibility of the occurrence of harm or shame is small and admitting it after its 
occurrence is also small then that possibility is negated so the woman has the right to marry 
while she has full legal capacity. This is why the Ḥanafis said that she has the freedom of 
choosing her husband so she does only marries the one she accepts.
303
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Ibn Qudāmah (d. 620 AH / 1223 AD) claimed that because the woman is not trusted on the 
matter associated with sexual intercourse (buḍc) because of the incompleteness of her 
intellect (nuqṣān caqlihā) and easiness of her being deceived, she isn’t given the authority 
over her own sexual relationship (buḍc) exactly like the one who is a spendthrift in regard to 
property.
304
 However, the Ḥanafis believe this type of incompleteness (naqṣ) does not 
prevent a woman from knowing the interests behind marriage so it does not strip her of the 
right to conclude the marriage contract. This is why her legal capacity vis-a-vis financial 
conduct is not stripped of her unless it is proven that her conduct caused some kind of harm, 
although financial transactions always include some kind of risk, hazard or uncertainty 
(gharar) that cannot be discovered except by careful appraisal. Her recognition of limits and 
retribution is also valid and she is also addressed (mukhāṭaba and mukallafa sharcan) by the 
address from the lawgiver (khiṭāb) (i.e. she is legally a competent person) which indicates 
that she has enough intellect. The evidence for that is that it considered her intellect in 
choosing the husband so if she asks her walī to marry her off to a suitable person (kuf’) then 
he is obliged to do so otherwise the judge (qāḍī) will marry her off.305 
It seems that the response from the Ḥanafīs about what Ibn Qudāmah has claimed is strong, 
because he generalised the ḥadīth of the Prophet when he said:  
‘I have not seen anyone more deficient in intelligence and religion than you. 
A cautious sensible man could be led astray by some of you.’ A woman 
asked, ‘O Allah's Messenger! What is deficient in our intelligence and 
religion?’ He said, ‘Is not the evidence of two women equal to the witness of 
one man?’ They replied in the affirmative. He said, ‘This is the deficiency in 
her intelligence. Isn't it true that a woman can neither pray nor fast during her 
menses?’ The women replied in the affirmative. He said, "This is the 
deficiency in her religion.’306 
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He has made it a general rule regarding women’s actions, which seems incorrect as it 
contradicts the practice of the Prophet (sunna) when he consulted his wives and sought their 
opinions, like with Umm Salama she was privilege of being consulted on matters of very 
important concern to the community, for example; when he took her advice in the incident 
of al-ḥudaybiya.307 Also, the status of his wife cĀ’isha in his life and after his death, where 
people used to take legal statements (fatwa) from her and ask her about the Sunna of the 
Prophet, and she used to correct the understanding of many narrations. Moreover, history 
has proven that many women played an important role in different aspects of many 
communities.
308
  
4.12 The Legal Sources Supporting the Concept of Guardianship in the Marriage 
Contract  
In this section we will present the sources of both groups, how each group reasoned their 
understanding of the texts from Qur’an and Sunna and how each group used these sources in 
order to support their argument against the other group. We will mention some examples 
and we will not go through evidence where the process of deducing the rule (istidlāl) is 
unclear, to avoid prolonging the discussion by indulging in unnecessary detail. 
4.12.1 Evidence from the Qur’an 
1- “And do not marry polytheistic women until they believe. And a believing slave 
woman is better than a polytheist, even though she might please you. And do not 
marry polytheistic men [to your women] until they believe. And a believing slave is 
better than a polytheist, even though he might please you”.309 (Q., 2:221) 
The majority of jurists understood from this verse (‘āya) the presence of the walī is a 
condition for the validity of the marriage contract. Al-Qurṭubī said, ‘this ‘āya is evidence 
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that no marriage is valid without a walī’.310 Ibn cAṭiyyah (d. 546 AH / 1151 AD) 
furthermore notes that some scholars said “wilāya in marriage is approved by text in this 
verse”.311 According to Ibn Ḥajar al-cAsqalānī (d. 852 AH / 1448 AD), the significance of 
this verse is that the Qur’an addressed the men but not the women. It is like if it said, ‘do not 
marry –O guardians- the women under your guardianship (wilāya) to polytheistic men’.312  
which is what was understood by the majority. If the matter of marriage is related to women, 
then the address would have been directed to them not to their guardians and it indicates that 
the woman has no authority (wilāya) in marriage. Therefore, the majority used this verse as 
evidence that the woman is not allowed to perform the marriage contract herself and she 
cannot choose her husband alone without the approval of her guardian even if she is an adult 
of sound mind. Accordingly, they stipulated the presence of the walī in marriage and 
therefore it is invalid, in their opinion, for a woman to perform her marriage contract and to 
marry off herself or others.  
However, it can be argues that there is no clear evidence in this ‘āya to supports the opinion 
of the majority. Al-Alūsī -Ḥanafi scholar- (d. 1270 AH / 1853 AD) states that the 
significance of this ‘āya is unclear because the verse forbids the committing and permitting 
of marrying polytheistic men to Muslim women, and all Muslims (i.e. the community) are 
considered as guardians in this matter.
313
   
Ḥanafis considered the expression of marrying ‘tunkiḥu’ used in this ‘āya (verse) is in 
accordance with the prevailing custom and that marriage is assigned to women with explicit 
texts in other places in Qur’an such as the verse “And if he has divorced her [for the third 
time], then she is not lawful to him afterward until after she marries (tankiḥ) a husband other 
than him” (Q., 2:230), and in case of the widow: “And those who are taken in death among 
you and leave wives behind – they, [the wives, shall] wait four months and ten [days]. And 
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when they have fulfilled their term, then there is no blame upon you for what they do with 
themselves in an acceptable manner” (Q., 2:234). 
 Ḥanafis argue that the Qur’an has assigned the action of marrying to women as noticed in 
the verse which is an explicit indication that the statement of the woman is sufficient enough 
for the contract and that her contract is considered valid and effective because the verse 
assigned the action of marrying without involving anyone else. They also suggest that 
everyone agrees that the origin of the legitimacy of wilāya calā al-nafs (over the person) is 
to achieve the interests of those under the guardianship (wilāya) and, therefore, the interest 
of the woman is to be free in her actions. There is no harm in restricting her action in 
marriage so she marries a suitable person (kuf’) and get a dowry (mahr) like similar women 
of her age and similar status in the society. Meanwhile, the Ḥanafis stipulate that the 
guardian has a right to object to the conduct of the woman in her affairs with judiciary in 
case she misused that right.
314
 It can be said that, Ḥanafi jurists granted women freedom in 
their actions and at the same time they preserved the right of the guardians, taking into 
account the social aspect of guardianship. 
Thus, one can see that each group sought to use the ‘āya as an evidence to prove the validity 
of their opinion and Ijtihād, in order to argue against the opinion of the opposite group. The 
reason for that is that the ‘āya is not an explicit text in stipulating the presence of the walī in 
marriage contract, as al-Alūsī suggested. To support this, many scholars of Qur’anic 
exegesis (tafsīr) did not mention this verse as evidence for stipulating the presence of the 
walī in marriage contract, including Ibn Kathīr (d. 774 AH / 1372 AD), al-Shawkānī (d. 
1250 AH / 1834 AD) and al-Baghawī (d. 516 AH / 1122 AD), but their commentary 
focussed on issues of legal issues surrounding ‘the marriage of a Muslim man to a 
polytheistic woman’ and ‘the marriage of a Muslim woman to polytheistic man’.315  
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Al-Rāzī (d. 606 AH / 1209 AD) questioned whether this verse initiates a new ruling, or 
whether it is related to the issue of marrying off orphans, which was mentioned in verse (Q., 
2:220) prior to the verse used by the majority as evidence (Q., 2:221). He stated: ‘Know that 
scholars of Qur’anic exegesis disagreed with regard to that, therefore, we can understand 
from this the significance of the verse is unclear about the condition of a walī in the 
marriage contract using this text.’316 According to Ibn cĀshūr, the meaning of the verse (Q., 
2:221) that; do not marry a Muslim woman –O Muslims- to a polytheistic man, which is the 
apparent meaning of the text and therefore it can be calimed that it came to establish this 
ruling only.
317
 As for Ibn Rushd, the following verse: “Then there is no blame upon you for 
what they do with themselves in an acceptable manner (ma
crūf)” (Q., 2:234), is a stronger 
argument that the woman can perform her marriage contract than arguing using the verse 
“And do not marry polytheistic men [to your women] until they believe” (Q., 2:221) to 
prove that the walī is the one who performs it.318 
It seems that the Ḥanafī jurists’ opinion regarding this verse is sounder than the opinion of 
the majority, because the disagreement between the two groups revolves around specifying 
who is addressed by the phrase ‘lā tunkiḥu’ ‘do not marry polytheistic men [to your 
women]’ and whether it is addressing the guardians or the community. Ibn Rushd’s 
interpretation of this verse is the more sound opinion because the address is directed to the 
general Muslim community first of all then to the ruler and the judge because the state and 
the authority has the right to take care of the implementation of the provisions of the 
legislation as well as the right to legislate laws and regulations that achieve the purpose of 
the legislation behind rulings like the ruling of prohibiting marrying a Muslim woman to 
polytheistic man.
319
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2- “And when you divorce women and they have fulfilled their term, do not prevent 
them (ta
cḍuluhunna) from remarrying their [former] husbands if they agree among 
themselves on an acceptable basis. That is instructed to whoever of you believes in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is better for you and purer, and Allah knows and you 
know not” (Q., 2:232).320 
Al-Shāficī believed that this verse is the clearest ‘āya in the Qur’an which indicates that a 
woman cannot marry herself off and that the marriage is done with the consent of their walī 
as well as the consent of the prospective husband and wife.
321
 However, it is important to 
note here that al-Shāficī confirms that not only the consent of a woman’s guardian is 
required for the marriage contract, but also the consent of the prospective couple. 
Al-Bukhārī (d. 256 AH / 869 AD) reported:  
‘Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī narrated: Macqil b. Yasār told me that in fact this verse 
was revealed concerning him. He said, ‘I've married my sister to a man, then 
that man divorced her. So when the 
c
iddah has passed, the man (ex-husband) 
came to ask for her hand back, i.e. to remarry her, I told him: ‘I have married 
her to you and I have honoured you, then you divorced her, now you come to 
ask for her hand? No! By Allah, she will never be returned to you. He was a 
good man, and the woman wanted reconciliation with him so Allah revealed 
this verse “do not prevent them (women) from remarrying their [former] 
husbands” (Q., 2:232), so I said, ‘Now I'm going to do it (return my sister to 
her ex-husband) O Messenger of Allah.’ Then Macqil b. Yasār marries his 
sister to him’.322 
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Ibn Ḥajar claimed that it is clear evidence for approving the presence of the walī because; 
otherwise, there will be no meaning for his prevention.
323
 Although, Ḥanafī jurists 
considered this ‘āya (Q., 2:232) as evidence to support their opinion that the presence of the 
walī is not a condition for the validity of the marriage and then the adult woman of sound 
mind can perform the marriage contract for herself. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370 AH / 980 AD) believes 
that this verse indicates -from different aspects- the validity of the marriage when the 
woman performs the contract without her walī or his permission. Amongst what he 
mentioned of the aspects of this process of deducting the rule (istidlāl) are: 
a- The verse attributed the contract to the woman without conditioning the permission 
of the walī. 
b- The verse forbade the walī from prevention (caḍl) in case the spouses agreed (to go 
back to each other) 
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ also discussed the opinion of the majority by assuming their sayings: 
a- If they say: If it is not a right for the walī to prevent the woman from marriage 
then he wouldn’t have been prevented from doing so.  
Answer: Because the prohibition in the ‘āya  denies any right for the guardian 
in that which he is prohibited from so how can that be used to approve that 
right for him.  
b- If they say: the Qur’an prohibited prevention (caḍl) in case they [the spouses] 
agree among themselves on an acceptable or reasonable basis (‘Idha tarāḍau 
baynahum bil-ma
crūf) so it is not of acceptable or reasonable basis that 
someone other than the walī performs the marriage contract.  
Answer: It is unacceptable that ‘reasonable basis’ (bil macrūf) here means that it is 
impermissible for the woman to perform the marriage contract without the permission 
of her walī because that denies what the ‘āya actually approves. This will be the case 
                                                     
323
 Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al-Bārī, IX, p. 234. Also, See Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmic al-Bayān, IV, pp.195-96. 
 
 
 111 
 
only if the ruling was abrogated, which is not possible as the ruling of al-nāsikh wa al-
mansūkh (the abrogating and the abrogated) cannot be combined in one statement 
(khiṭāb) because abrogation can only take place after the first ruling is well established 
and acted upon. This confirms that the reasonable basis conditioned by the ‘āya is 
absolutely not the guardian (walī).324 
The two groups of jurists differ in the understanding of this text because it does not 
explicitly provide clear evidence for the requirement of wilāya in the marriage contract. The 
majority believe that the Qur’an in this ‘āya (Q., 2:232) has addressed the guardians and 
prohibited them from preventing the women under their guardianship. If the issue of 
marriage is not their right, then there is no meaning in preventing them from something they 
do not possess in the first place. They argue that the prohibition in the verse came in regard 
of a right that is possessed by the guardian that is marrying off the women under their 
guardianship, otherwise there will be no meaning for the verse and that is nonsense and 
should not be attributed to the Qur’an. In the personal reasoning of the majority, the 
addressed party in the ‘āya are the guardians who were prohibited from preventing women 
from going back to their ex-husbands after the end of their 
c
iddah if they wanted to. 
Ḥanafis opposed this by saying that attributing the feminine pronoun to the word yankihna 
(remarrying) in the ‘āya “do not prevent them from remarrying their [former] husbands” (Q., 
2:232) is evidence that the woman has the right to marry herself off. Therefore, the 
prohibition of prevention in this ‘āya approves the woman’s right to act in something which 
is purely her right, i.e. performing her own marriage contract, because the marriage contract 
is  purely a specific right of the woman and no one else can share it with her. That is why her 
offer (ijāb) and acceptance (qabūl) must be valid in the marriage contract as in any other 
transaction. Moreover, Ḥanafī jurists believe that everyone who has the right to execute an 
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action in regard to his property also has the right to execute an action in regard of 
him/herself (nafsih). This is a juristic rule of the Ḥanafis in the field of transactions.325  
The Ḥanafis also believe that the address in the ‘āya is directed towards husbands and not to 
guardians. Therefore, the meaning of the ‘āya will be: if you divorce women- O husbands- 
and their 
c
iddah has passed then do not prevent them (la-ta
cḍuluhunn). Therefore, the 
statement: ‘la-tacḍuluhunn’ (do not prevent them) is directed to the one who possess the 
right to divorce, i.e husband, which makes the meaning of (
caḍl) in the ‘āya preventing 
woman from getting married by lengthening her 
c
iddah, as the Qur’an states in other verses 
in the case when the husband divorces his wife, and she completed her 
c
iddah ‘do not keep 
them, intending harm, to transgress [against them]” (Q., 2:231).326 
However, al-Rāzī mentioned that scholars of Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr) differed in specifying 
who is addressed by this ‘āya. As previously mentioned, the majority consider it to be 
addressing the guardians, whilst others said it is the husbands. He then said, ‘this is the 
sounder opinion’, meaning that the address is directed to husbands not to guardians. Then al-
Rāzī argued the validity of this preference as follows: 
- The ‘āya is formed of protasis (condition - sharṭ) and apodosis (answer - jawāb). The 
protasis is “And when you divorce women and they have fulfilled their term”, and 
the apodosis is the part “do not prevent them” (la-tacḍuluhunn)  
- There is no doubt that the protasis (sharṭ) in “And when you divorce women” is an 
address directed to husbands so the address in its apodosis (jawāb) in “do not prevent 
them” (la-tacḍuluhunn) must be directed to husbands also. 
- If the address is not directed to husband then the verse will mean: “if you divorce 
women -O husbands- then do not prevent them [from going back to their ex-
husbands] -O guardians-” and therefore there will be no connection between the 
protasis (sharṭ) and the apodosis (jawāb) so the context of the speech will be 
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See Al-Kasānī, Badā'ic al-Ṣanā'ic, III, pp. 375-76; Al-Zuḥayli, Sharṭ al-Wilāya fī cAqd al-Nikāḥ, pp.19-20; 
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 See Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, II, p.103.     
 113 
 
inconsistent and unorganised which is unsuitable description to the words of the 
Qur’an.   
Then, al-Rāzī supported the validity of his opinion by the argument that the address in the 
context of the speech starting from the first verse (i.e. from ‘āyah: (Q., 2:226) regarding the 
rulings of divorce was directed to husbands when the Qur’an commands them to treat their 
wives kindly; the guardians were never mentioned in those verses.
327
 
Al-Kāsānī -Ḥanafi jurist- (d. 587 AH / 1191 AD) extracted the following from the verse (Q., 
2:232): 
- The Qur’an attributed marriage to women by using the feminine pronoun in the 
address which indicates that their statement is sufficient to approve the validity of the 
marriage without the need of conditioning the presence of the walī. 
- The Qur’an prohibited guardians from preventing women from remarrying their ex-
husbands in case the spouse agreed. Prohibition requires assuming the prohibited act 
(which is prevention (
c
aḍl) in this case).328 
The majority responded to this argument of the Ḥanafis by suggesting that this interpretation 
is incorrect. The correct interpretation is that the address is directed to the guardians with the 
evidence of the reason of the revelation (sabab al-nuzūl), for this verse which was revealed 
in regard to the issue of prevention (
caḍl) committed by guardians. Ibn Jarīr (d. 310 AH / 
923 AD) and other scholars of tafsīr mention that the reason for revealing this verse was the 
story of Ma
cqil b. Yasār.329 Ibn Ḥajar commented on the ḥadīth of Macqil saying: 
‘This is a clear indication that the reason of the revelation of this verse is this 
story. This cannot be denied by the fact that the apparent address is directed 
to husbands in “And when you divorce women” as the verse goes on to say 
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 See Al-Rāzī, Mafātiḥ al-Ghayb, VI, p.120. 
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 See Al-Kasānī, Badā’ic al-Ṣanā’ic, III, p.373. 
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 See Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmic al-Bayān, IV, pp.187-88 ; Ibn al-cArabi, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, I, p. 272. 
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“from remarrying their [former] husbands” which clarifies that the issue of 
prevention ('aḍl) is related to guardians’.330 
Ibn 
c
Abd al-Barr (d. 463 AH / 1070 AD) claims that opening the verse with an address 
(khiṭāb) to husbands then turning it to guardians represents something common in the usage 
of Arabic language. He gave an example of this in the verse “And bring to witness two 
witnesses from among your men” (Q., 2:282) where the address is directed to the two 
contracting parties, then the verse continues “from those whom you accept as witnesses” 
where the address is directed to judges. Then Ibn 
c
Abd al-Barr said: ‘and this is often’ 
meaning: turning the address (khiṭāb) to differed recipients in the same text often takes place 
in the Qur’an and the usage of Arabic language. By this he responded to the Ḥanafis’ claim 
of denying the possibility of addressing different recipients in the same text.
331
 
The Ḥanafis responded to this argument by claiming that the ḥadīth of Macqil b. Yasār, 
which is used by the majority to support their opinion that the presence of the walī is a 
condition in the marriage contract is indeed disapproved by the scholars of knowledge in the 
field of the narration of ḥadīth because it included an unknown man in its isnād (chain of 
narration) which makes the ḥadīth ḍacīf (weak).332 Some Ḥanafī jurists argue that even if we 
assumed the validity of the ḥadīth of Macqil and the soundness of its chain of narration, it 
still does not prevent the approval of wilāya for the woman in the marriage contract. This is 
because Ma
cqil prevented his sister from getting married so the Qur’an prohibited him from 
doing so; therefore, his right of prevention (
caḍl) was disapproved. The disapproval of 
prevention (
caḍl) with regards to the woman approves her right in performing the marriage 
contract on her own. This is the apparent meaning of the verse (ẓāhir al-naṣ) where the 
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 Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ Al-Bārī, IX, p. 234. Also, See Al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, IX, p. 39. 
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 See Yusuf b. 
cAbd Allah Abū cŪmar, Ibn cAbd al-Barr, al-Tamhīd lima fī al-Muwaṭṭa' min al-Macānī wa al-
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 See Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad Badr al-Dīn, al-cAaynī, cUmdat al-Qārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 1st edn (Beirut, 
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Ibn Ḥajar respond to this claim from Ḥanafis by stating that, the saying of Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, ‘Macqil b. Yasār 
told me’ is clear to elevate the rank of this ḥadīth. Then he mentioned that this ḥadīth is Mawṣūl (ḥadīth with a 
connected chain of narrators) by the following of 
cAbbād b. Rāshid who narrated this ḥadīth connected from 
another chain of narration which also clarified that Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī has heard it from Macqil b. Yasār. See 
Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al-Bārī, IX, p. 233. 
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address was directed to husbands not guardians because the verse prohibits the husbands 
from prevention (
caḍl) of marriage after the end of ciddah.  
Al-Ṭaḥawī (d. 321 AH / 933 AD) also hinted to that when he commented on the ḥadīth of 
Ma
cqil by arguing that when the Qur’an commanded the guardian not to commit prevention 
(
caḍl) it indicates that the walī has the right to perform the marriage contract so both 
meanings are possible. It is also possible that the prevention (
caḍl) which has been done by 
Ma
c
qil was in the form of encouraging his sister not to go back to her ex-husband so he was 
commanded to abandon that (prevention).
333
 For al-Bayhaqī however, prevention (caḍl) 
cannot be in the form of discouraging.
334
 
Ibn Rushd assumed another response for the Ḥanafis which is that if it is accepted that the 
‘āya (Q., 2:232) is directed toward guardians –as the majority say- we cannot accept that the 
address proves that the presence of the walī is a condition for the validity of the marriage 
contract as the address only prohibited guardians from prevention (
caḍl). He then said that, 
‘the part of the ‘āya (Q., 2:232) “la-tacḍuluhunn” (do not prevent them) only prohibits the 
family and 
caṣaba (parental relatives) from preventing the woman’s marriage. Prohibiting 
them from (
caḍl) prevention does not mean the conditioning of their approval for the 
contract if it is to be considered valid, either in its metaphorical or actual meaning.
335
  
Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751 AH / 1350 AD) used another verse to prove that the address is 
directed towards husbands not guardians where the word prevention (
caḍl) was mentioned 
“And ‘la-tacḍuluhunn’ do not make difficulties for them in order to take [back] part of what 
you gave them [i.e. the dowry]” (Q., 4:19). He claims that this verse is evidence that the 
prohibition from 
caḍl is directed towards the husband who makes it difficult for the woman 
in order for her to pay him off for divorce (khul
c
); by doing so he becomes a transgressor 
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335
 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, II, p.10. 
 116 
 
and whatever he takes from her is unlawful and he cannot possess it.
336
 Therefore, Ibn al-
Qayyim inclines to the opinion that the prohibition of prevention (
caḍl) in the Qur’an is 
directed toward the husband who seeks to harm his divorcee. It implies that this ‘āya can’t 
be used as evidence to stipulate that guardianship is a requirement for the validity of 
marriage contract. 
3- “And marry the unmarried among you (wa-a-nkiḥu al-Ayāma minkum) and the 
righteous among your male slaves and female slaves. If they should be poor, Allah 
will enrich them from His bounty, and Allah is all-Encompassing and Knowing” (Q., 
24:32) 
Again, the two groups differed in their understanding of the text of this verse in determining 
who is addressed by it. The majority believe that this address in ‘wa ankiḥū ‘and marry’ is 
directed to men only, which is evidence that the Qur’an addressed the guardians of the 
women to marry her off.
337
 According to al-Qurṭubī, the ‘āya is addressing guardians; he 
also mentions a view that it was directed towards husbands.
338
 Therefore, for the majority, 
what is meant by ‘marrying’ in the verse is providing support, easing off the matter of 
marriage and allowing it to men and women who seek chastity and to guard their private 
parts from falling into unlawful relations. However, the Ḥanafis responded to this by 
suggesting that the term ‘ayāma’ (the unmarried) is a plural form of the word ‘ayyim’ which 
is a general term that includes men as well as women, so it is not possible that the addressee 
here are the guardians otherwise men would have to have guardians too. In all,  it is highly 
improbable that we do not accept that the address in the verse is directed to guardians; rather 
it seems more likely it is directed either to husbands to marry the unmarried women when 
the need arises, or to people in general to marry off any one who does not have a spouse. 
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Therefore it cannot be used as evidence by those who say that there is no marriage except 
with the presence of the walī.339 
Al-Kāsānī -a Ḥanafī jurist- chose an opinion similar to the opinion of the majority, agreeing 
with them that the address in the verse is directed to the guardian to marry off the women 
under their wilāya not as the rest of the Ḥanafis argued. However, he still didn’t see in that a 
valid piece of evidence to claim that the presence of the walī is a condition for the validity of 
the marriage. He decided that the ‘āya (Q., 24:32) came according to the prevailing customs 
and traditions of the people in that time, which prevented women from performing their 
marriage contract on their own because that might bring embarrassment to the woman when 
she attended a place full of men. Al-Kāsānī suggested that the woman’s modesty and 
timidity usually prevents her from doing so and she might even be accused of boldness, so it 
seems that the address in the verse is directed to guardians to perform the marriage contract 
for women with their consent. Therefore, he said in this matter: ‘The address of 
commanding to marry off came in accordance with customs and traditions in the form of 
recommendation (nadb/istiḥbāb), not in the form of obligation (‘ījāb)’.340 
The above verses were among the clearest evidence used by the two groups in order to prove 
the validity of their reasoning (ijtihād) on this issue. In addition to that, the Ḥanafis used the 
following verses to support their opinion: 
1- “And a believing woman if she gives herself to the Prophet [and] if the Prophet 
wishes to marry her, [this is] only for you, excluding the [other] believers” (Q., 
33:50) 
2- “And if he [husband] has divorced her [for the third time], then she is not lawful to 
him afterward, until [after] she marries a husband other than him. And if the latter 
husband divorces her [or dies], there is no blame upon the woman and her former 
husband for returning to each other if they think that they can keep [within] the limits 
                                                     
339
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of Allah. These are the limits of Allah, which He makes clear to a people who know” 
(Q., 2:230) 
3- “And those who are taken in death among you and leave wives behind – they, [the 
wives, shall] wait four months and ten [days]. And when they have fulfilled their 
term [
c
idda], then there is no blame upon you for what they do with themselves in an 
acceptable manner (ma
crūf). And Allah is [fully] Acquainted with what you do” (Q., 
2:234) 
Ḥanafis believe that the first ‘āya (Q., 33:50) indicated that the validity of the marriage is 
with the statement of the woman as there was no walī present at the time of the incident in 
the context of which this verse was revealed, so it is evidence for the validity of the marriage 
contract if the woman performs it on her own.
341
 This deduction (istidlāl) from the Ḥanafis 
was argued against by the majority with suggestions that there is no evidence in this verse 
for the validity of the woman marrying herself off to someone other than the Prophet as the 
woman gave herself to him without mahr (dowry) or walī (guardian); this is a specific 
characteristic (khāṣṣ) of the Prophet, i.e. marrying without the presence of a walī. Ibn Kathīr 
reported Qatada’s statement: ‘a woman has no right to give herself to a man without a walī 
(guardian) or mahr (dowry) except to the Prophet’.342  
The argument of the Ḥanafis was proven by this verse, while the argument of the majority is 
that this verse is only for the Prophet. However, al-Bukhārī seems to agree that a woman can 
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Al-Jassas said, ‘an indication for that is the Prophet’s reply –in the ḥadīth of the reason of the revelation of this 
verse- “I have no need in women”. A man stood up and asked him to marry her to him so the Prophet married 
her to that man without asking her whether she had a wali or not and he did not condition the presence of a 
wali for the validity of her marriage contracts’. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’an, II, p.102. This incident was 
mentioned in some ḥadīths such as: ‘A woman came to Allāh’s Messenger and said, ‘O Allāh’s Messenger, I 
came to offer myself to you,’ Allāh’s Mesenger looked at her from feet to head and from head to feet, then 
Allāh’s Messenger stooped his head. When the woman saw that he had not made a decision regarding her she 
sat down’. See Ibn Ḥajar, Bulūgh al-Marām, ḥadīth number: (832), p. 345. Some Commentators think this 
applies to Zainab bint Khuzaima who had dedicated herself to the poor and was called the mother off the poor 
(Umm-ul-masākīn), others think it is applies to Maymūna bnt al-ḥārith. See al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmic li Aḥkām al-
Qur’ān, XIII, pp. 134-35.   
342
 See Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-cAẓīm, V, p.198 ; Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, IX, p.218 ; cAli b. 
Khalaf, Ibn Baṭṭāl, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 1st edn (Riyad, Saudi Arabia: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2000), VII, pp. 
220-221.
 
 119 
 
offer herself to a righteous man using ḥadīths narrated by Sahl b. Sacd, Anas b. Mālik343 and 
cĀ’isha as evidence, the latter of which comes under the title in his Ṣaḥīḥ: ‘Is it permissible 
for a woman to gift (tahabu) herself to someone (in marriage)’, to which he narrates the 
following:  
cĀ’isha said: “Doesn't a lady feel ashamed to gift (tahabu) herself to a man?” But when the 
verse: “(O Muhammad) You may postpone (the turn of) any of them (your wives) that you 
please,” (Q., 33:51) was revealed, “cĀ’isha said, “O Allah's Messenger! I do not see but that 
your Lord hurries in pleasing you”.344 
This therefore implies a number of things, including that the answer to the question given in 
the title is “yes”. Al-Ṭaḥāwī -a Ḥanafī jurist- stated in relation to this, that the unique case 
(khuṣūṣiyya) mentioned in the verse (Q., 33:50) is specifically to do with the dowry, because 
the Prophet can accept a woman in marriage if she gifts herself to him (i.e. with no mahr). 
This is in contrast to the view of the majority who claim that the specificity (khuṣūṣiyya) of 
this event is in relation to guardianship. It would seem, therefore, that the Ḥanafī view is 
very coherent as they have taken into account the linguistic features of the evidence and 
drawn rational conclusions from them, while the majority dealt with this on the basis that 
there are many unknown factors surrounding the incident, clinging on to the principle that 
wilāya is a requirement of the contract. 
It may be argued that the khaṣā’iṣ (unique cases) of the Prophet is a very problematic issue, 
because it challenges the idea of Sunna and specifiying the unique cases of the Prophet 
without evidence, specifically from the Qur’an, the Sunna or the consensus, causes 
disruption in its implementation. Thus, whether or not the address in the Qur’an to the 
Prophet is for him alone, it is still a matter of disagreement between the scholars of the 
principles of jurisprudence (
c
ulamā’ al-uṣūl). Scholars of Uṣūl believe that the address in the 
Qur’an to the Prophet is also an address to the nation, not by the format of the text, but by 
the significance of his being a messenger who is ordered by Allah to convey the message 
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and explain the rules. However, when it is stated in the text of the Qur'an that the address is 
only for him alone, such as the words ‘this is only for you’ (as in the verse under discussion) 
then the text cannot be generalised.   
As for the second verse (Q., 2:230), the Ḥanafis used it to support their claims, from two 
aspects: 
a- The Qur’an attributed marriage to the women in the verse, which requires the 
validity of the woman to perform her marriage contract on her own. 
b- The term yatarājacā ‘returning to each other’ means ‘marry each other’ so marriage 
was attributed to the spouse without mentioning the walī.345 
They also used the same method of deduction (istidlāl) with regard to ‘āya (Q., 2:234), as 
the Qur’an attributed marriage to woman so that gives them the right to marry themselves 
off. It is also indicates the validity of the marriage contract with their statement as the ‘āya 
“Then there is no blame upon you for what they do with themselves in an acceptable 
manner” (Q., 2:234) clarifies that the woman has the right to marry herself off without the 
presence of the walī and approving the condition of the presence of a walī actually denies 
what the verse approves.
346
 Furthermore, according to the Ḥanafī scholar cUthmān b. cAli ً
al-Zayla
cīً  (d. 743 AH / 1343 AD), the phrase ‘ḥattā tankiḥ’ (until she marries) makes it 
clear that marriage is concluded by a woman. The phrases ‘fīma facalna fī anfusihinna’ 
(what they do with themselves) and ‘yatarājcā’ (returning to each other) are clear that the 
woman is the one who does and return. According to al-Zayla
cī, those who claimed that 
marriage by the woman’s statement is invalid have rejected a Qur’anic text.347 
The majority challenge these arguments from two aspects: 
a- What is meant by removing the blame from women in the verse is that they shouldn’t 
be prevented from marriage in case they want it, but that doesn’t mean that the 
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woman can conclude the marriage contract on her own without the presence of the 
walī. As she cannot conclude the marriage contract without the presence of the 
witnesses she also cannot perform it without the presence of the walī. 
b- The verse “What they do with themselves in an acceptable manner” (Q., 2:234) 
requires that the marriage contract should be carried out according to the acceptable 
manner known between people and it is not acceptable manner that a woman marries 
herself off without the presence of the walī.348 
These are the most important verses from the Qur’an which have been used by each group in 
order to support their personal reasoning (ijtihād). Now we will present their evidence from 
the ḥadith in order to see how they have used those ḥadīths to stipulate the condition of 
guardianship wilāya in marriage contract.  
4.12.2 Evidence from the Sunna (ḥadīth) and narrations from the companions 
We have chosen two ḥadīths from a multitude of ḥadīths used by jurists to support their 
opinions in the issue of ‘wilāya’ guardianship in the marriage contract, to exemplify how the 
jurists of each group dealt with the evidence presented by the other group. Also, we will add 
to that some narrations from the companions. 
Ḥadīth 1: “No marriage (nikāḥ) (should be performed) without a guardian (walī)”.349  
Ḥadīth 2: “Any woman who marries without her walī’s permission, her marriage is 
void, her marriage is void, her marriage is void. If he (i.e. the husband) performs 
intercourse with her, the mahr (dowry) becomes her right because he consummated 
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 See Al-Māwardī, Al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, IX, pp. 42-43. 
349Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abū Dāwūd, ḥadīth number: (2085); al-Tirmidhī, Jāmic al-Tirmidhī, ḥadīth number: 
(1101); Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah, ḥadīth number: (1881). Ibn Ḥajar said, ‘the well-known (mashhūr) 
version is the ḥadīth reported by Abū Musa al-Ashcarī which is elevated and attributed to the Prophet (marfuc) 
in regards of its text, it was also reported by Abū Dāwūd, al-Tirmidhī and Ibn Mājah and al-Ḥakim judged it as 
authentic (ṣaḥīḥ)’ See Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al-Bārī, IX, p. 229. Al-‘Albānī said about it, ‘Authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) and 
came from the ḥadīth narrated by Abū Musa al- Ashcarī, cAbd Allāh b. cAbbās and Abū Huraira’. Al-‘Albānī, 
Irwā’ al-Ghalīl, VI, pp. 235-36. 
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the nikaḥ.  And if they dispute, the ruler would then be the walī of the one who does 
not have a walī”.350 
The majority consider that ḥadith 1 clarifies that the presence of the (walī) is a condition in 
the marriage contract and the marriage is considered invalid without his presence which 
leads to the negation of legal reality of the marriage (haqīqa sharcīyya), which means that 
the contract was not performed in a valid way because of the absence of the (walī). 
Therefore, the apparent meaning of this ḥadīth indicated the disapproval of the marriage 
without a (walī) and its significance indicated that it is impermissible for the woman to 
perform the marriage contract for herself or others.
351
 
The Ḥanafis questioned the chain of narration (isnād) of this ḥadīth. Amongst the challenges 
they put forward is the view of Ibn al-Humām (d. 861 AH / 1457 AD) about its narration. 
He claimed that it is muḍṭarib ḥadīth (confused) for being connected (mawṣūl) and broken 
(munqaṭic).352 As evidence he used the statement of al-Tirmidhī (d. 279 AH / 892 AD) who 
commented that ‘There is disagreement in regard to this ḥadīth’. He also states that it is 
mursal.
353
 According to Abū Jacfar al-Ṭaḥawī, this ḥadīth is invalid as evidence because 
more proven narrators who were better known for memory, like Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161 
AH / 778 AD) and Shu
c
ba (d. 160 AH / 777 AD), have reported it in a broken form 
(munqaṭic)’. He then continued responding to all attempts by the other group to prove that 
the ḥadīth is a connected (mawṣūl) ḥadīth.354 
The response of the majority was that this ḥadīth was proven to be authentic (ṣaḥīh), 
connected (mawṣūl) and elevated (marfūc) in many ways. They also confirmed that many 
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 Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abū Dāwūd, ḥadīth number: (2083); al-Tirmidhī, Jāmic al-Tirmidhī, ḥadīth number: 
(1102); Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah, ḥadīth number: (1879). 
351
 See al-Zuḥaylī, Sharṭ al- al-Wilāya Fī cAqd al-Zawāj, p. 23; cAllām, al-Wilāya Fī cAqd al-Nikāh, pp. 68-69; 
Abū Snaina, al-Wilāya Fi al-Nikāḥ, pp.57-159. Also See Ḥamad b. Muḥammad, al-Khaṭṭabī, Macālim al-
Sunan (Aleppo, Syria: Matbaat Muhammad Raghib al-Tabbakh, 1933), III, p. 198.
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 Muḍṭarib is a ḥadīth whos contents are inconsistent with a number of other reports, none of which can be 
preferd over the others. iḍṭirāb in ḥadīth can be in matn (subjet-matter) or isnād (transmission). For more see 
Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 65, 111. 
353
 Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ Al-Qadīr, III, p. 259. The narration of successor (tabici) when he directly attributed to 
the Prophet without mentioning the last link.  
354
 See al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ Macānī al-‘Āthār, VIII, p.10. 
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reputable imams have proven that this ḥadīth is elevated (marfūc) to the Prophet, like Al-
Ḥākim (d. 405 AH / 1015 AD) in al-Mustadrak where he said about the ḥadīth: ‘This is the 
original narration that Bukhārī and Muslim (al-shaikhān) could not help but include in their 
collections’. Then he presented his narration of this ḥadīth through Isrā’īl b. Yunus (d. 160 
AH / 777 AD) to Abu Isḥāq al-Sabīcī (d. 127 AH / 745 AD) and said, ‘All of these narrations 
are authentic and proven to be connected by the early Imāms’.355 According to Ibn cAbd Al-
Barr this ḥadīth was reported from Abū Burda as mursal so whoever accepts the mursal 
must accept it. As for those who do not accept the mursal ḥadīth, they must accept the 
ḥadīth of Abū Burda here because those who considered it as connected mawṣūl are of the 
people of memorisation and reliability. Isrā’īl and those who followed-up his narrations are 
considered to be of the best memorisers (ḥafaẓa) whose addition is accepted especially if it 
was supported by authentic origins.
356
 Ibn 
c
Abd al-Barr here is indicating to an issue that 
forms part of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence; the disagreement between jurists in 
regard to the validity of acting upon a mursal ḥadīth as mentioned above.357  
Scholars have different opinions with regard to the validity of arguments using a mursal 
ḥadīth, the most famous of them are: 
1- It is valid, with the condition that the one who elevates it is known for his reliability 
and uprightness (
c
adl) with the scholars of the science of criticizing and praising the 
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 Abū cAbd Allah al-Ḥākim, al-Naysabūrī, al-Mustadrak cAla al-Ṣaḥīḥayn, 1st edn (Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-
Haramayn Publishers, 1997), II, pp.201-03. For more details See Ibn Ḥajar al-cAsqalānī, Talkhīṣ al-Ḥabīr, IV, 
pp. 323. Al-‘Albānī said, ‘the approved version reported by Shucba and Sufyān from Abī Isḥāq from Abī Burda 
is (mursal)’. He also said, ‘there is no doubt that the opinion of al-Tirmidhī that the most authentic narration 
reported by Shu
cbah and Sufyān from Abū Isḥāq from Abū Burda from Abū Musa al-Ashcarī is elevated 
(marfūc) which is correct because the chain of narrations is apparently authentic and that is why a group of 
scholars authorised it like 
c
Ali b. al-Madīnī and al-Dhahbī and al-Ḥākim also reported. But it can be argued 
against them that Isḥāq al-Sabicī reached a stage when he started to mix [in his narration] and it is unclear 
whether he reported the ḥadīth as connected (mawṣūl) before or after that stage’. Al-‘Albānī, ‘Irwā’ al-Ghalīl, 
VI, pp. 236-37; and also See Aḥmad b. cAlī  al- cAsqalānī, Ibn Ḥajar,  Talkhīṣ al-Ḥabīr, 1st edn (Saudi Arabia: 
Qurtubah Publishers, 1995), IV, pp.322-23. 
356
 See Ibn 
c
Abd al-Barr, al-Tamhīd, VII, pp. 59-60. 
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 The mursal ḥadīth is ‘the ḥadīth where the successor (tabicī) elevates to the Prophet by saying, ‘the Prophet 
said’ without mentioning the chain of narration (al-isnād) so, if the successor (tabicī) attributed ḥadith directly 
to the Prophet without mentioning the last link in the chain, namely the Companioning (al-Ṣaḥābī) who 
narrated it from the Prophet. According to Kamali this is the definition of the majority of jurists. See Kamakli, 
Principles of Islāmic Jurisprudence, p.108. 
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narrators of ḥadīth (al-Jarḥ wa al-Tacdīl). The people of this opinion consider the 
mursal ḥadīths amongst the authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) ḥadīths. This opinion is related to al-
Awzācī (d. 157 AH / 774 AD), Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 
AH / 798 AD) and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (d.ً 189 AH / 804 AD), as well as Mālik 
and the scholars of Madina. The companions of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal also mentioned 
that sounder opinion related to him is the validity of arguments using a mursal 
ḥadīth. 
2- It is invalid: as it is considered of the weak (ḍacīf) ḥadīth because of the broken chain 
of narration (isnād). This opinion is related to cAbd Allah b. al-Mubārakً(d. 181 AH / 
797 AD), al-Shāficī, another narration of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and most of the people of 
the science of ḥadīth.358  
3- There is another opinion in accepting the mursal ḥadīth related to al-Shāficī who 
states certain conditions to approve the validity of acting upon the mursal ḥadīth.  
To conclude, Ibn 
c
Abd al-Barr said, ‘so the mursal narration of he who is known for 
accepting the narration of weak narrators is disapproved whether he was a successor (tabi
cī) 
or lower, whereas the mursal and concealed (mudallas) narrations of the one who is known 
for accepting only from a trustworthy (thiqa) narrator is accepted’.359 
However, there is no general agreement among scholars with regard to using a ḥadīth 
mursal. Therefore, it can be claimed that there are two methods of dealing with it. The first 
is the method of scholars of ḥadīth who concentrate on the isnād (chain of narration) of the 
ḥadīth and whether it is connected or broken. The second is the method of jurists who 
concentrate on the significance of the ḥadīth. Therefore, if the meaning of the ḥadīth mursal 
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 See 
cAbd Allah b. Yūsuf, al-Judayc, Tahrīr cUlūm al-Ḥadīth , 1st edn  (Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Rayan, 2003), 
II, pp. 941-43. 
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 Ibn 
c
Abd al-Barr, al-Tamhīd, I, p.155. Al-Albānī sated that this ḥadīth is unquestionably authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) as 
the narration of Abū Musa is approved by a group of scholars. It is in the worst case mursal and Abū Isḥāq al-
Sabīcī made a mistake in elevating it but if it was supported by the narrations of those who reported it with a 
connected chain (isnād mawṣūl) and other supporting evidences which are not as weak as the isnād in Abū 
Musa’s narration –like the isnād of the narration of Jābir and the isnād of the narration of Abū Hurairah. Al-
Albānī believed that this ḥadīth is authentically related to Ibn cAbbās as a stopped narration (mawqūf) at him 
and none of the companions disagree with him’ see‘Irwā’ al-Ghalīl, VI, pp. 237-43. 
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is correct and supported by other evidence that indicates the ḥadīth has a strong origin, they 
arrive at a position that the validity of its significance is probable. So basically, their 
argument is built upon the evidence surrounding the ḥadīth not just the text of the ḥadīth 
itself.
360
 
4.12.3 The Jurists’ Understanding (fiqh) of the ḥadīth “No Marriage (nikāḥ) (should 
not be performed) without a walī” 
As for al-Māwardī (d. 450 AH / 1058 AD), theses legal texts (ḥadīths) are evidence for the 
invalidity of marriage without a guardian.
361
 Depending on their understanding of this 
ḥadīth, the majority of jurists claimed that it is part of the evidence that state that no 
marriage is valid without the presence of a walī and that the walī is a rukn in the marriage 
contract and therefore it is the legal starting point in regard to marriage. Moreover, the 
woman cannot conclude a marriage contract for herself or others. Her statement in the 
contract has no legal effect and in case a woman performs her marriage contract or assigns 
someone else to do that on her behalf then the contract is considered invalid.  According to 
al-Shawkānī, marriage without a guardian is invalid as stated by the ḥadīth narrated by 
cĀ’isha and as indicated by the ḥadīth narrated by Abū Huraira because prohibition (nahy) 
indicates irregularity (fasād) which is equal to invalidity (butlān). Also, he claimed that this 
was the opinion of 
cAlī, cUmar, Ibn cAbbās, Ibn cUmar, Ibn Mascūd, Abū Huraira, cĀ’isha, 
Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 21 AH / 728 AD), Ibn al-Musayyib (d. 14 AH / 94 AD), Aḥmad b. 
Ḥanbal, Al-Shāficī and the majority of scholars; they said, ‘the contract is considered invalid 
without a guardian’. Ibn Al-Mundhir (d. 319 AH / 931 AD) claimed that he does not know 
any of the companions who said anything different to this.
362
  
However, Ḥanafis argue that even if it is approved that the ḥadīth is authentic, it is still not 
evidence for the majority opinion, because the ḥadīth might give rise to differing 
interpretations, such as:  
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c
, Tahrīr cUlūm al-Ḥadīth , 1st edn  (Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Rayan, 2003), II, pp. 947. 
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 See Al-Māwardī, Al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, XI, p. 60. Also see Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, VII, p. 337. 
362
 Muḥammad  b. cAli, al-Shawkānī, Nayil al-Awṭār, ed. by Rabic Abu Bakr cAbd al-Bāqi, 1st edn (Beirut. 
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a- The walī mentioned in the ḥadīth might be the nearest of her parental relatives 
(
c
aṣba). 
b- It might be any man appointed by the woman whether he is a relative or not.363 
 
Moreover, they mentioned several possibilities for the meaning of (walī) in the ḥadīth; one 
of the most significant is that the ḥadīths which stipulate the presence of the walī are related 
to marrying off the minor not the unmarried major girl. Therefore, as long as this ḥadīth has 
many possibilities, it cannot be directed to one specific purpose without the support of extra 
evidence from either the Qur’an, and Sunna or ‘ijmāc (unanimous consensus).364 The 
Ḥanafis also responded to the majority in using this ḥadīth, claiming it is not valid to be 
used as evidence in their disagreement with the majority because their opinion of the validity 
for the woman to conclude her marriage contract by herself is indeed a marriage with the 
presence of a walī because the woman is the walī of herself, like the man is the walī of 
himself. It is also because the walī has the right of wilāya over those under his wilāya and 
the woman has that right in regard to her property, so she also has the same right [of wilāya] 
over herself.
365
 They suggest that even if we accept the authenticity of this ḥadīth, we still do 
not see that it conditions the presence of the walī in the marriage contract, as the negation 
(nafy) indicates the negation of perfection (nafy kamāl), but not the validity of the contract. 
Therefore, this ḥadīth must be taken on the meaning of recommendation i.e. it is 
recommended for a woman to appoint from her parental relatives (
caṣba), or someone to 
perform the marriage contract on her behalf, but she is not obliged to do so.
366
 
In conclusion, the Ḥanafī jurists believe that all of these interpretations are acceptable in the 
texts that include generality and which are unrestricted, so a general address can be directed 
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 See Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ Macānī al-‘Āathār, III, p. 10. 
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 See Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ Macānī al-‘Āathār, III, p.10. 
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to a specific purpose; such an interpretation must be used to avoid any conflict between 
texts, so they can combine the meanings to form a complete context.
367
  
The majority responded with the view that they did not accept the Ḥanafis claim that the 
negation (nafy) in the ḥadīth indicates the negation of the perfection (nafy kamāl) of the 
contract but not the validity of it because interpreting it on the meaning of recommendation 
contradicts the original rule regarding the legal texts, as the original rule is negation (nafy) of 
the legal reality (ḥaqīqah sharciah), so a marriage without the presence of a walī must be 
legally invalid. Moreover, the text of the ḥadīth states that the walī must be a man not a 
woman. If the address was directed to a woman the ḥadīth would have a feminine pronoun 
(wilāya) and if the address is directed to the woman –as you are saying- then it would not 
bring anything new because we already know that there is no marriage without the presence 
of the woman, i.e. the wife. Moreover, the one performing the marriage contract for 
him/herself is not called a walī –as Al-Khaṭṭabī )d. 388 AH / 998 AD) said- and if that is 
approved in the issue of guardianship (wilāya) it must be also approved in the issue of 
witnessing making the woman witness for herself which is invalid in the issue of witnessing. 
It must therefore be invalid in the issue of guardianship also.
368
 
According to al-Khaṭṭābī this ḥadīth indicates the negation of the approval of the marriage 
generally and specifically, except with the presence of a guardian. Although, Ḥanafis 
interpreted it as a negation of perfection (nafy kamāl), al-Kaṭṭābī claimed that this is invalid 
interpretation from Ḥanafis, because the general address comes depending on its origin 
either in the form of permissibility [incomplete] or perfection [complete] and the negation 
requires invalidity in transactions because they have one possibility only, unlike acts or 
worship which can have two possibilities of validity; complete and incomplete.
369
 
Additionally, Ibn Ḥajar believes that using the ḥadīth “No marriage (nikāḥ) (should be done) 
without a guardian (walī)” as evidence needs reconsideration because it is a formula that 
needs weighting, so the ḥadīth is suitable [as evidence] to those who assumed the negation 
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of validity and unsuitable to those who assumed the negation of perfection and therefore, the 
first possibility needs to be supported by extra evidence. Moreover, Ibn Ḥajar considered 
what al-Bukhārī stated as a title, ‘Whoever said, “A marriage (nikāḥ) is not valid except 
through the walī” as evidence to support the first possibility. Ibn Ḥajar then explained that 
reason why al-Bukhārī did not mention the ḥadīth “No marriage (nikāḥ) (should be 
performed) without a walī” in his Ṣaḥīḥ was because the ḥadīth did not fulfil the conditions 
set by al-Bukhārī to accept the ḥadīth.370 Likewise, Muslim did not mention this ḥadīth in 
the chapter on marriage in his Ṣaḥīḥ because it did not meet his standard. 
4.12.4 The Jurists’ Understanding (fiqh) of the ḥadīth “Her Marriage is Void” 
Now we turn to the other evidence which used by jurists to prove that the guardian is a 
condition or pillar for the validity of the marriage contract, which is the ḥadīth: “Whichever 
woman marries without her guardian’s permission, her marriage is void, her marriage is 
void, her marriage is void.  If he (i.e. the husband) performs intercourse with her, the dowry 
(mahr) becomes her right because he consummated the marriage (nikaḥ). And if they 
dispute, the ruler (sulṭān/ qāḍī) would then be the guardian of the one who does not have a 
guardian”. As for Ḥanafis, this ḥadīth has two deficiencies: one in its chain of narration 
(sanad) and one in the text itself (matn), so, these are the two reasons that stop Ḥanafis 
acting upon any lone-narrated ḥadīth (aḥād). Accordingly, the Ḥanafis object to the 
majority’s use of this ḥadīth for the aforementioned reasons in line with acting upon the 
significance of the text. 
First, they claim that this ḥadīth is weak (ḍacīf) so it is not accepted for use as evidence 
(istidlāl) because: 
a- One of its narrators in the chain is questionable; Sulaymān b. Mūsa (d. 119 AH / 737 
AD) 
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b- Al-Zuhrī (d. 124 AH / 742 AD) denies this ḥadīth, despite him being one of the 
narrators.
371
 
Second, they claim that it was proven that 
cĀ’isha’s practice was opposite to the significance 
of her narration and so was al-Zuhrī’s legal opinion (fatwā). Ibn cAbd al-Barr mentioned 
that, this saying, ‘al-Zuhrī, who has one narration of this ḥadīth, used to say, ‘If a woman 
marries someone who is suitable (kuf’) without the permission of her guardian (walī) then 
that is pemissible’’.372 Abū Jacfar al-Ṭaḥāwī also said: ‘If what is reported from al-Zuhrī was 
proven (dening his narration of the ḥadīth of  cĀ’isha)  then it would have been narrated from 
cĀ’isha that which contradicts with her narration. It was reported that cĀ’isha married off the 
daughter of her brother, Ḥafṣah bint cAbd al-Raḥmān, to al-Mundhir b. al-Zubair while cAbd 
al-Raḥmān had gone to Syria (shām). When cAbd al-Raḥmān returned he became upset and 
said: ‘Is this done to someone like me?’ cĀisha then talked to al-Mundhir who replied: ‘That 
is for 
c
Abd al-Raḥmān to decide’ and cAbd al-Raḥmān replied: ‘I would not undo something 
you (
cĀisha) did’ so he left Ḥafṣah with him and that wasn’t considered to be a divorce, i.e. 
the rejection from 
c
Abd al-Raḥmān to what cĀi’sha has done.’373 Therefore, the Ḥanafī 
jurists deduce from that it is impossible that 
cĀi’sha considered marrying off the daughter of 
c
Abd al-Raḥmān without his presence acceptable and considered the contract as valid while 
she knew that the Prophet said, “No marriage (nikāḥ) (should be performed) without a 
guardian (walī)”, or said, “Whichever woman marries without her guardian (walī)’s 
permission, her marriage is void, her marriage is void, her marriage is void”. This proves the 
unsoundness of what was related to al-Zuhrī in this regard.374 
Al-Kāsānī argues that the ḥadīth of cĀ’isha is dependent on al-Zuhrī who denied it when it 
was presented to him and that causes a weakness in the approval of the ḥadīth. Moreover, 
He believed that this weakness is even more clearly by the fact that its narrator is 
cĀ’isha, 
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whose opinion is the permissibility of marriage without a walī with the evidence that she 
married off the daughter of her brother 
c
Abd al-Raḥmān to al-Mundhir b. al-Zubair. 
Therefore, if that is her opinion in regard to this issue then how can she narrate a ḥadīth that 
she does not practice?
375
 And according to al-Sarakhsī, this proves that what was narrated of 
the ḥadīth of cĀ’isha was unsound because if the narrator gives a fatwā (legal opinion) that 
contradicts the ḥadīth then that is considered as evidence for the weakness of the ḥadīth.376 
In addition for the narrator to be a trustworthy (thiqa) and upright person (
c
adl), Abū 
Ḥanīfah stipulated that the narrator doesn’t practice the opposite of what he narrates and 
they considered that a criticism to his opposing narration. Amongst the examples they gave 
for this rule is the ḥadīth of cĀ’isha on the invalidity of the marriage without a guardian 
(walī) and they justified this with the argument that the narrator’s practice would contradict 
with the significance of his narration only if he knew that an abrogation took place or that 
the Prophet’s intention behind the rule was different to that which others understood.377  
Thus, it is one of the conditions that Ḥanafis gave for their acceptance of  a solitary ḥadīth 
(al- āḥād) that the narrator does not abandon practising the rule mentioned in the ḥadīth or 
choose a different opinion. According to al-Juday
c
,
378
 this is a methodology that is approved 
by the majority of scholars in criticising the ḥadīth, as they considered it to be a cause of 
deficiency in the ḥadīth. Therefore, the Ḥanafis were not singled out in this regard. It is a 
common issue in the science of the principles of Jurisprudence (
c
Ilm al-Usūl) which caused 
disagreement between scholars.
379
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c
Abd Allah b. Yusuf  b. Ya
cqūb al-Yacqub al Judayc is one of the leading scholars of our time, specially 
ḥadīth science, and a key reference-point for the cUlama in the West and beyond, born in al-Basra, Iraq in 
1958. 
379
 See Al-Juday
c 
, Taḥrīr cUlūm al-Ḥadīth , II, pp. 754-55 .For more details also See Aḥmad b. Maḥmūd, al-
Shanqīṭī, Khabar al-Wāḥid wa Ḥujjatuh, 1st edn (Madinah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic University of Madinah 
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Abū Zayid al-Dabbūsī (d. 430 AH / 1039 AD) confirms this rule of the Ḥanafis, and claim 
that Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yusuf did not act upon this ḥadīth stating that the reason for this 
is that Ibn Jurayj (d. 150 AH / 767 AD) asked al-Zuhrī about this ḥadīth and he didn’t know 
it.
380
 However, according to al-Dabbūsī, this rejection of the solitary ḥadīth (ḥadīth āḥād) is 
restricted by conditions including: 
a- If the narrator denies the narration before he narrates his own version, the ḥadīth then 
would have no consideration because his knowledge increased by the second [later] 
narration. 
b- If the narrator denies the narration after he narrates his own version of the ḥadīth 
then: 
- If his abandonment of the ḥadīth is built on his own interpretation then the 
proof of the rule (ḥujjah) remains in the ḥadīth because his own interpretation 
is only an opinion like any other opinion. 
- If his practice contradicts with what he has narrated then his abandonment of 
practising the [rule] in the ḥadīth without any interpretation caused the ḥadīth 
to become rejected (mardūd) because that can only be a result of negligence, 
denial or forgetfulness, or a knowledge he has of an abrogation of the ḥadīth 
he narrated. 
Therefore, the practice of 
cĀ’isha when she married the daughter of her brother cAbd al-
Raḥmān to al-Mundhir without his permission indicates that she knew the rule in the ḥadīth 
which she narrated from the Prophet.
381
 As long as Ḥafṣah bint cAbd al-Raḥmān stayed with 
her husband al-Mundhir b. al-Zubair with 
c
Abd al-Raḥmān saying to his sister cĀ’isha, ‘I 
wouldn’t undo something you did’ the Ḥanafī jurists believe that it wasn’t a divorce, so this 
requires that the opinion of 
cĀ’isha is that marriage without a guardian (walī) is valid as it is 
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not possible that 
cĀ’isha and cAbd al-Raḥmān had knowledge from the Prophet of the 
invalidity of the marriage without a walī then choose a different opinion.382  
The Ḥanafis argued by suggesting that even if we accept the validity of this ḥadīth and clear 
it of all causes of criticism surrounding it, we still refuse to consider it as evidence for the 
invalidity of the marriage just because the walī of the woman does not conclude the 
marriage contract on her behalf. Rather, we give that rule to the woman who marries a non-
suitable husband (kuf’) so it means that if the woman marries with a dowry less than the 
dowry given to similar brides (mahr al-mithl) or to a man who is not socially suitable to her, 
then the marriage is considered to be invalid. Thus, we would act upon the significance of 
this ḥadīth and approve the ruling of invalidity mentioned in it. This was the opinion of the 
later Ḥanafī scholars like al-Sarakhsī but the authentic approved transmissions of the legal 
opinions of the school (ẓāhir al-riwāya) in the Ḥanafī school of thought judges that the 
marriage of the woman who marries with a dowry less than the dowry given to similar 
brides (mahr al-mithl) or to a man who is not socially suitable is valid but the guardians 
have the right to annul the marriage through the judiciary (al-qaḍā’).383 It is interesting to 
note here that some academics have highlighted that Iraq, the birthplace of the Ḥanafī 
School, was very different in nature to other centres of knowledge, with a much less 
egalitarian culture than Medina and Egypt, which may have influenced the jurists various 
positions with regard to suitability.
384
 
The responses of the majority to the objections presented by Ḥanafis were as follows: 
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1- The answer to the first objection is as follows: 
If al-Zuhrī had forgotten what he narrated or denied the narration of Sulaymān b. Mūsā 
related to him, the ḥadīth is still more famous than al-Zuhrī denying or forgetting it. There is 
no legal effect for the narrator’s denial of the ḥadīth after he narrates it as the constant 
knowledge of the narration by the narrator is not a condition for the soundness of his 
narration.
385
 Ibn Ḥajar responded to that –with the assumption that the ḥadīth is sound- 
giving the argument that al-Zuhrī’s forgetting the ḥadīth doesn’t necessary mean that 
Sulaymān b. Mūsā was deluded in his narration.386 Ibn Ḥibbān said, ‘this narration deluded 
those who did not master the science of ḥadīth into judging it as having broken chain 
(munqati
c
) or a ḥadīth with no origin because of what Ibn cUliyya reported from Ibn Jurayj 
after mentioning this narration. He (Ibn Jurayij) said, ‘I met al-Zuhrī and mentioned that [the 
narration] but he didn’t know it’. Ibn Ḥibbān commented, ‘this is not a reason that causes 
weakness to the narration because the good, trustworthy (thiqah) and skilled narrator 
amongst the people of knowledge might narrate a ḥadīth then forget it, or not know it when 
asked about the ḥadīth; his forgetting the narrations he narrated does not mean the 
unsoundness of the original narration’.387 
And al-Ḥākim said about this ḥadīth of cĀ’isha, ‘this ḥadīth is authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) with the 
conditions of al-shaykhān [al-Bukhārī and Muslim] who did not report it’ (lam yukhrijāh).388 
However, the Ḥanafis still cannot accept this ḥadīth based on their principle of acceptance of 
a solitary (āḥād) ḥadīth. 
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2- The answer to the second objection is as follows: 
The practiced rule in the science of ḥadīth is that what is important is what the narrator 
narrates not his independent reasoning (ijtihād), because if the narration is approved then it 
would be enough proof as his approved narration from the Prophet is the original cause for 
the obligation of acting upon the [rule] in the narration. As for the narrator’s opinion, it is his 
own personal reasoning (ijtihād) which might be wrong because of his human nature and the 
ijtihād of someone cannot be considered to be a proof over anyone else. Therefore, the 
ḥadīth is a clear text in its significance with no possibility for interpretation or contradiction 
so there will be no interpretation in case the narrator contradicts with what he has narrated 
except by assuming possibilities, such as: he might have come across a text that abrogated 
the first rule; it might even be a cause of abrogation in his opinion but not in the opinions of 
others; he might have interpreted the text depending on his own understanding, so it is 
unacceptable to abandon the main text which is a proof without any possibilities and follow 
the independent reasoning of the narrator which is opened to possibilities. Thus we can 
explain 
cĀ’isha’s practice that contradicted the significance of the ḥadīth she narrated 
regarding the invalidity of the marriage without a walī and al-Zuhri’s opinion of the 
permissibility of marriage without a walī but their abandonment of the practice upon the 
ḥadīth they narrated is not considered as evidence enough to stop practising the significance 
of the ḥadīth.389 
The majority of jurists also respond to the Hanafi’s objection by noting that cĀ’isha’s 
opinion was that a marriage without a walī is valid because she married the daughter of her 
brother while he was absent. 
cĀ’isha’s narration is not explicit in confirming that she 
concluded the marriage contract herself as the term zawwajat (married) might mean that she 
facilitated the means of marriage like engagement, dowry and consent, but did not conclude 
the contract herself so the marriage was attributed to her because of her choice of the 
bridegroom and permission. Following this, she may have appointed a person who has the 
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right of wilāya in the absence of her brother cAbd al-Raḥmān, in order to conclude the 
marriage contract.  Following on from this, the suggestion that an indication for the 
soundness of this interpretation is what Ibn Rajīḥ cAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn al-Qāsim narrated 
from his father from 
cĀ’isha, that she married a woman from the daughters of her brother to 
a man from the daughters of her sisters; she made a veil between them and talked until 
nothing remained but the contract. She then ordered a man to perform the marriage contract 
and said: “The matter of marriage is not [a right] of women”.390 Thus, the majority of jurists 
said that the meaning of the term zawwajat (married) thus became clear and it does not 
contradict with what she narrated from the Prophet because she was among the latest 
narrators who narrated the saying of the Prophet, “No marriage (should be done) without a 
walī”. Ḥanafis claim that it was possible that she ordered a man to perform the marriage 
contract so the marriage was attributed to her because she ordered it [to be done].
391
 
However, the majority had no response but to interpret the action of 
cĀ’isha in a way that 
negated its contradiction with her narration.
392
 Ibn Al-Qāsim –the great student of Mālik- did 
the same thing and assumed possibilities to explain 
cĀ’isha’s action. He assumes that she 
authorised someone else at the time of performing the contract, but he then said: ‘scholars 
stated that the walī of a woman cannot authorise but another man and cĀ’isha cannot be the 
representative of her brother, so how can she authorise someone else?’ He didn’t find any 
answer to his question but to say: ‘if the walī authorises someone to authorise someone else 
to perform the marriage contract, then there is no objection for him (i.e. the walī) to 
authorise a woman for example’.393 
According to al-Māwardī, the majority’s opinion in regard to the ḥadīth of cĀ’isha is 
evidence for the invalidity of marriage without a walī with no specifications (takhṣīṣ) or 
distinction (tamyīz)’ (i.e. it is for every woman in any circumstances), so we cannot specify 
this ḥadīth for the invalidity of the marriage of the ward [male or female], or the woman 
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who marries off herself to one who is not kuf’ or with a dowry less than mahr al-mithl 
because that is a form of control of the outcome of the text without an evidence.
394
 
Al-Khaṭṭābi claims that, if the contract is concluded without the permission of the guardian 
then it is considered invalid even if the guardian allows it afterwards. The Prophet 
invalidated the marriage, repeating it three times. It is a confirmation of the annulment and 
cancelation of the contract.
395
 
Moreover, besides these two well-known ḥadīths about the wilāya in marriage, Ḥanafis have 
used others to support their argument against the majority, asserting that most of the ḥādīths 
that condition the presence of a walī in the marriage contract have been criticised in their 
isnād (chain of narration). They also understood from some ḥādīths something different to 
that what the majority understood; in order to support their ijtihād (independent reasoning), 
and they opposed the evidence used by the majority by other ḥādīths such as: 
1- The ḥadīth of the Prophet: “A woman without a husband –previously married- 
(‘aiyyim) should not be married until her permission is asked, nor should a virgin 
(bikr) be married without her permission”. They (the people) asked ‘What is her 
permission?’ He replied “it is by her keeping silent” and in another narration by 
cĀ’isha “silence is her acceptance”.396 
2- The ḥadīth of the Prophet: “A woman who has been previously married (thayyib) has 
more right over her person than her guardian, and a virgin (bikr) must be consulted 
by her father for her consent, and her consent is her silence” or he might have said 
“silence is her approval”.397 
3- The ḥadīth of cĀ’isha: “I asked Allah's Messenger about a virgin who is married by 
her family, whether it was necessary or not to consult her. The Messenger said, “Yes, 
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she must be consulted”. cĀ’isha reported: “I told him that she feels shy”, whereupon 
the Messenger said: “Her silence implies her consent”398  
Ḥanafis argue that these ḥādīths apparently approved the right of the woman in marrying off 
herself without a walī and that there is no consideration for the walī in the marriage contract 
as the adult woman of sound mind is the walī of herself and no one has a wilāya over her.399  
According to al-Ṭaḥāwī, the saying of the Prophet, “A woman who has been previously 
married has more right over her person more than her guardian”, is clarifying that she has 
the right to marry off herself not her walī. He also claims that the ḥādīths also indicate that 
the virgin (bikr) has the same ruling, meaning that there is no authority for her walī over 
herself and that her father is ordered not to marry her off without seeking her permission 
first, just as he is ordered not to marry off the previously married without seeking her 
approval first.
400
 Therefore, if the father marries off his virgin daughter without seeking her 
permission first –abandoning the order of the Prophet by doing so- then this marriage by him 
is impermissible until her permission is granted.
401
  
The Ḥanafis’ opinion is that the term (‘ayyim) in these ḥādīths means the woman who has 
no husband whether she is a virgin, previously married, a divorcee or a widow. They said 
that this is the opinion of the scholars of language in regards the term (‘ayyim). They also 
believe that these ḥadīths informed that it is right of the walī to perform the marriage 
contract with the woman’s consent and that the Prophet  gave her more right, so the only 
way she gets more right is if she has the right to marry off herself even without her 
guardian’s consent.402 For al-cAynī, there is no doubt that in the saying of the Prophet, 
an‘ayyim has more right over her person” ‘ayyim is a general term that includes the 
previously married, the virgin and the widow. Therefore, the generality in the text must be 
acted upon and the rule it came with is definitely obligatory and Abū Ḥanīfah prefers acting 
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upon the general form to the specific form.
403
 Therefore, Ḥanafis believe that there is no 
difference between the woman who has been previously married (thayyib) and the virgin 
(bikr), but the virgin usually has more shyness so she doesn’t declare her wish to marry or 
seek to, whereas the woman who has been previously married and who has therefore got 
experience of marriage is usually less shy than the virgin. Therefore, the Lawgiver took into 
account the situation of the virgin and settled for asking for her consent by seeking her 
permission in order for her to express her approval of the marriage.
404
  
However, the majority of jurists argued this from a number of different angles. For instance, 
the term (‘ayyim) in the Arabic is given to a woman without a husband, whether she is a 
virgin or previously married, and also the man without a wife, whether he has married 
before or not. It is also used for a woman if she marries and then becomes lawful to marry 
again -either by divorce or death- whether she is a virgin or previously married.
405
 The 
majority claim that giving this description to the virgin is not common, therefore, it can be 
assumed that it is a metaphor that is commonly used. The description of ‘ayyim as given to 
the man without a wife is a form of analogy between his situation and the situation of the 
woman without a husband. However some linguistic scholars give the same term to both 
man and woman; this is related from Ibn Abī cUbayd and al-Naḍr b. Shumayl.406   
Thus, the scholars disagreed about what is meant by the term ‘ayyim in these ḥādīths despite 
the agreement between Arabic linguists that it is given to the woman without a husband 
whether she is young or old, virgin or previously married, but then jurists disagree over what 
is meant by this term in this case. The scholars of Ḥijāz and all jurists said; it is the thayyib 
supporting their opinion with the arguments the second narration explained it as the thayyib 
by making the previously married woman different to the virgin and because it is more 
commonly used for thayyib in the language. The scholars of Kufa said that ‘ayyim is every 
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woman without a husband, whether she is a virgin or previously married as required by the 
significance of the language.
407
 
With regard to the saying of the Prophet ‘has more right over her person’ (‘aḥaqq bi 
nafsiha), the word ‘aḥaqq is used to indicate a common right between two parties with one 
of them has more right than the other. It is a possibility that what is intended by it is that the 
woman is entitled to more rights than her walī in everything, or that she is more entitled of 
the consent in regards of her marriage.  
Shafi
cīs believe that both of them (the guardian and the previous married woman) have a 
right and the thayyib has more right. Probably, the right of the woman is her consent and 
freedom to choose and the right of the walī is accepting the permission to conclude the 
contract. However, they claim that the virgin (bikr) wasn’t granted the same right as the 
thayyib because of the difference between them (i.e. that the thayyib has experienced 
marriage and living with a man, while the virgin has not), so the Prophet gave the bikr the 
right that her permission should be sought by the father and the grandfather only, which is 
mustaḥabb (recommended). As for other guardians, seeking the permission of the virgin is 
obligatory and she must not be married before granting that permission, whereas that thayyib 
has more right over her person than her guardian, so she must not be forced if she refuses to 
marry or prevented (
caḍl) if she seeks to marry.408  
The ḥādīths required a walī for the woman in her marriage contract, despite the fact that she 
has more right over her person, conclude that the right of the walī over her is not dropped 
under any circumstances but the right of the woman is her consent and freedom to choose 
and the right of the walī is accepting the permission to perform the contract. This combines 
these ḥādīths and the ḥadīth of “No marriage (should be done) without a walī” and the other 
ḥādīths that condition the presence of the walī. Therefore, no marriage contract is valid 
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without a walī after the woman approves or her permission is granted, but she cannot 
perform it on her own.
409
 
Ibn Al-
cArabī argued that if it is said that the saying of the Prophet about a previously 
married woman, “She has more right over her person than her guardian” grants the woman a 
more clear right, then it should be noted that this is true as the woman has the right to accept 
or refuse the marriage and she chooses the husband, dowry and consent to the contract. The 
walī has the right to conclude the contract legally.410 Thus, the walī has no right to force the 
previously married woman, but that does not mean that she can conclude the marriage 
contract without her walī exactly like she cannot conclude it without witnesses.411 
The Ḥanafis responded by arguing that the right –in regards to marriage- is for the woman 
over and above her guardian, not for him over her. This is evidenced by the permissibility 
for her to marry in case he is absent, in a way that might cause her to miss a marriage 
opportunity to a suitable man (kuf’). Furthermore, the judge can force the walī if he is 
present but refuses to marry her to someone she accepted and the judge can also prevent the 
marriage if she refuses and the walī accepts, indicating that she has the right over him.412 
Also, the Ḥanafis opposed the opinion of the majority using the following evidence from a 
ḥadīth of Ibn cAbbās: ‘A virgin came to the Prophet and mentioned that her father had 
married her against her will, so the Prophet allowed her to exercise her choice’. They 
asserted that it means that her father married her without her consent, and the Prophet gave 
her the right to allow the marriage or to disallow it.
413
 Abū Jacfar al-Ṭaḥawī believes that this 
ḥadīth confirms that the walī has no right over the virgin (bikr) in regard to her marriage 
without her approval.
414
 This is further supported by the ḥadīth of cĀ’isha: ‘A girl came to 
her and said: 'My father married me to his nephew (brother's son) so that he might raise his 
own social status thereby, and I was unwilling.’ She (cĀ’isha) said: 'Sit here until the 
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Prophet comes.' Then the Messenger of Allah came, and I told him what she had said. He 
sent word to her father, calling him, and he left the matter up to her. She said: 'O Messenger 
of Allah, I accept what my father did, but I wanted to know whether women have any say in 
the matter of their marriage’.415 
The Ḥanafis claim that these ḥādīths are a proof (ḥujja) and even the criticism that it is 
mursal  is invalid because the mursal ḥadīth is considered proof with the Ḥanafis and with  
the jamhūr (majority) and the isnād of the ḥadīth mentioned by al-Nasā’ī (d. 303 AH /915 
AD) is not mursal.
416
 Also, Ḥanafī jurists deduce from this ḥadīth that the guardian has no 
fixed right in the matter of the marriage but it is only a recommendation by the lawgiver. 
Moreover, these ḥādīths include evidence of the Prophet’s approval to the woman’s request 
as well.
417
 Ḥanafis also claim that since the Prophet gave the girl (bikr) the authority to 
annul the marriage after the initiation of the contract, this indicates that she has the right of 
her marriage not her walī because if the right of marriage is for the walī he wouldn’t have 
granted her the right to choose. The significance of this ḥadīth according to the Ḥanafis is 
that if the walī has concluded the contract it will not be legally effective and that the woman 
marries herself off by her own permission and approval and the walī only performs the 
marriage contract on her behalf.
418
  
In the view of the majority, if the ḥadīth of Ibn cAbbās is approved then it still cannot be 
used as proof for what the Ḥanafis deduced because the Prophet has rejected a marriage that 
was concluded by a walī only. The majority would argue that the Ḥanafis would need proof 
that the Prophet has approved a marriage that was concluded by a woman without her walī. 
Moreover, in this ḥadīth the Prophet rejected the idea of coercion with regard to this 
marriage, which was conducted by her father, and gave the girl the right to accept it or to ask 
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for its dissolution by the order from the Prophet who represents the judicial authority in this 
case.
419
 This is a ruling from the Prophet which rejects this kind of marriage, where women 
are forced to marry against their free will. Therefore, in this regard, the Prophet rejected the 
idea of forced marriage in the first place. In another narration, a girl came to the Prophet and 
stated that her father married her against her will, and the Prophet ruled for her marriage to 
be void because the marriage was concluded under coercion.
420
   
Ibn 
c
Abd al-Barr suggested that it is possible that her walī married her to a person who is not 
kuf’ or someone who might harm or not protect her, assuming that the ḥadīth of Jarīr is 
sound (ṣaḥīḥ).421  
As for the ḥadīth of cĀ’isha, the majority claim that if it is proven to be a sound ḥadīth then 
it is in regard to the virgin who is married to a person who is not kuf’. However, in the 
ḥadīth the girl herself mentioned that her father sought to raise his social status by way of 
this marriage, therefore, the husband must be kuf’. The assertion that this ḥadīth relates to 
the virgin who is married to a person who is not kuf’ would therefore appear to be false. Ibn 
Ḥajar claimed that this is a specific case so its ruling cannot be generalised, and there is no 
need for criticising this ḥadīth because it was reported by different chains of narration that 
strengthen each other.
422
 However, it seems when the majority were unable to criticise these 
ḥādīths they considered that the ruling of the Prophet with regard to these two incidents 
were because they were specific cases, which cannot therefore be generalised as Ibn Ḥajar 
has suggested.  
Moreover, the majority quoted many ‘āthār (precedents of the Companions of the Prophet) 
to prove their opinion of considering the walī as a condition or cornerstone in the marriage 
contract and argued that this consideration was known to them without any denial. Ibn al-
Mundhir mentioned 
culamā’ among the ṣaḥābah (Companion of the Prophet) who said that 
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there is no marriage without the presence of a walī including: cUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, cAli b. 
Abī Ṭālib, cAbd Allāh b. Mascūd, cAbd Allāh b. cAbbās, Abū Hurairah.423 Sacīd b. al-
Musayyab narrated from 
c
Umar b. al-Khaṭtāb saying, ‘A woman is only married with the 
consent of her guardian, someone of her family with sound judgement (wise man) or the 
sultan (authority)’.424 Also, they used another narration from cUmar b. al-Khaṭtāb when he 
rejected the marriage of a woman who married without the presence of a walī.425 
The Ḥanafis supported their opinion of the permissibility of marriage without the presence 
of a walī with some ‘āthār related to the companions, such as what was reported from cAli b. 
Abī Ṭālib where he allowed the marriage of a woman without a walī after her mother 
married her off with her consent. Furthermore, al-Zuhrī was asked about a woman marrying 
without a walī, to which he replied: “If he is suitable (kuf’) it is permissible.” Al-Shacbī said 
“If the husband is suitable (kuf’) then it is permissible [i.e. for woman to marry herself off 
without the presence of her walī].”426 
To conclude, from the way that the jurists argue their respective cases and the methods they 
employ to verify their opinions, it can be claimd that there is a problem in implementing the 
text, due to the lack of an authentic text with a definitive indication to prove the invalidity of 
the marriage without a guardian. Therefore, most of the evidence was subject to various 
possibilities of interpretation, or open to be challenged by other texts which might be 
indicative of something else, whilst being stronger in terms of their isnād. Thus, it wasn’t 
easy for jurists to claim that there is a definitive and explicit text from the Qur’an which can 
provide clear statements with regard to the requirement of the guardian in the marriage 
contract or to state that guardianship is also required for the validity of the marriage. So, it 
does not seem possible to prove the validity of the compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-
ijbār) over the adult of sound mind (al-bāligh al-cāqil). Nevertheless, the Ḥanafi school is 
distinct from all of the Sunni schools with regard to guardianship in marriage. Generally 
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speaking, one can call them ‘the most liberal school in Islamic law’, which can be seen with 
this specific example as they gave woman freedom in initiating a marriage contract for 
herself without her guardian. Her guardian can only object to her conduct if he thinks that 
she has caused harm to herself or has neglected some of her rights by taking the matter to the 
judiciary. It can be claimed that these discussions are mainly concerned on the legal capacity 
of women, and their rights and freedom to dispose. Ḥanafis built their doctrine on the basis 
of the recognition of the person’s freedom (who is adult of sound mind) in all his/her 
actions, regardless of gender. The following are some explanations for the disagreement 
between the two groups: 
The use of certain rules of Arabic language and principles of jurisprudence (‘uṣūl) can be 
seen as causes of the disagreement between the Ḥanafis and the majority of jurists in using 
evidence from legal texts (Qur’an and Sunna). In regard to the linguistic rules they 
employed, there is a discussion about whether a negated noun when mentioned in a legal 
text indicates the negation of the legal reality of the notion and whether or not it is 
considered mujmal (ambiguous/ambivalent), which refers to a category of unclear words that 
need clarification. For example, the ḥadīth “No marriage (lā nikāḥ) should be done without a 
walī”. This according to Ḥanafis is mujmal (ambiguous) because what is intended is to 
negate the legal effect as the mere term is not enough to negate the application of the act 
while no rule has a priority over another rule, so the address will have no significance. The 
majority’s opinion is that it is not mujmal (ambiguous) as they said, ‘the negation of 
essences does not necessarily mean ambiguousness’.427  Therefore, using the term ‘lā’ ‘No’ 
that negates genus (lā’ li-nafy al-jins) with a legal term in an indefinite form (nakirah), like 
the term nikāḥ (marriage), does originally negate the soundness (ṣiḥḥah) of the thing, in the 
opinion of the majority. The implication can be directed to negate perfection (kamāl), only 
with additional evidence that diverts it from its original implication. Negation of the 
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soundness (nafy al-ṣiḥḥah) means the invalidity of the prohibited conduct but the negation 
of the perfection (nafy al-kamāl) means that it is incomplete or deficient.428  
According to Ḥanafis, the ḥadīth “No marriage (nikāḥ) should be performed without a walī” 
negates either the reality (form) of the marriage or its ruling. They said: the first possibility 
is invalid because the reality of the marriage can exist in any form so it must negate the legal 
effect of the marriage. However, rulings can be numerous and equal so it is possible that the 
intended purpose is to negate soundness (ṣiḥḥah), perfection (kamāl) or something else, so 
the address remains indecisive and that is why it is mujmal (ambiguous).  
The majority responded with the argument that the Ḥanafis’ claim that the address is mujmal 
(ambiguous) is based on the fact that they regard the term as unclear as to whether the legal 
or literal meaning is intended. However, legal terms, also called juridical, (ḥaqīqah 
shar
cīyyah) in the address of the lawgiver have dominance over literal meanings, also called 
linguistic, (ḥaqīqah lughawiyyah) and implications, so the literal meanings become a form 
of metaphor compared to the legal terms.
429
 Accordingly, the ḥadīth “No marriage (lā nikāḥ) 
(should be done) without a walī” must be understood depending on its legal meaning; no 
marriage is legally valid without the presence of the guardian.
430
  
In regard to the principles of jurisprudence about which they have disagreement,
431
 is a rule 
in the Arabic language when certain words from the sentence are dropped which are 
indicated by the rest of it, known as dalālat al-iqtiḍā’ (the required textual implication).432 
Iqtiḍā’ literally means to seek and demand, and technically means: for the term to indicate 
an outside meaning [unrelated to the text] that can be a measure for the authenticity and the 
soundness of the text. Thus if the soundness and authenticity of the text both religiously and 
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logically depends on estimating an additional meaning that is unrelated to its words, then 
this estimation is called dalālat al-iqtiḍā’ because it is required for the text to make sense. 
The cause for estimating the additional meaning for the phrase of the text is called al-
muqtaḍī. Furthermore, the additional meaning which is estimated in addition to the phrase of 
the text is called al-muqtaḍā. The indication that the text does not make sense without that 
additional estimation is called al-iqtiḍā’.433   
The debate then circles around whether or not muqtaḍā indicates generality. Scholars 
differed in regards of the generality of muqtaḍā; some approved it and some did not. This 
disagreement has an impact on the rulings: 
1- The opinion of Shāficis and Mālikis is that the muqtaḍā is general and 
comprehensive because its estimation is required for the text to make legal and 
logical sense, and therefore it takes the status of the text itself. So the ruling which is 
established through dalālat al-iqtiḍā’ (the required textual implication) is like the 
ruling which is established by the text. 
2- The majority of Ḥanafis and some jurists from other schools of law hold that the 
muqtaḍā has no generality because the implication of iqtiḍā’ is added for the 
necessity of clarifying the text. If the text is clear without it then it should not be 
approved both linguistically and legally.
434
 
In conclusion, dalālat al-iqtiḍā’ is indication, not by the format of the text or its words, nor 
its meaning, but by additional matters that are required to estimate the meaning for the text 
to become correct, sound, true and direct in its meaning. Moreover, it is estimation by the 
mujtahid in order to accurately understanding the text. Both parties used it to suit their 
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principles and support their theory; it is not a dalīl in itself, rather it is part of the process of 
ijtihād. 
The Outcome of this Disagreement 
The ḥadīth “No marriage (nikāḥ) (should be performed) without a guardian (walī)” includes 
a linguistic negation for marriage without a guardian. The apparent significance of the text 
indicates the negation of the marriage itself, because originally this negation indicates the 
negation of marriage’s existence, which is unimaginable. Scholars were divided into two 
groups on this matter: A group which understood that this ḥadīth approves the negation of 
the soundness of marriage (ṣiḥḥah) which is a general additional meaning (muqtaḍa) term 
that negates virtue, perfection and completeness and other estimations. This group is the 
majority of jurists who approved the generality of the additional meaning (
c
umūm al-
muqtaḍā) and therefore they assert that no marriage is valid without the contract being 
concluded by the walī of the woman. As for al-‘Āmidī, it must be approved to negate its 
soundness (ṣiḥḥah) and the completeness (kamāl), and this can be seen from two aspects: 
a- Because it is closer to agreeing with the textual implication of the term in approving 
negation.  
b- Because if the term indicates the negation and non-existence of the act then the 
nearest metaphors to the term must be assumed when it is not possible to understand 
it with its real significance.
435
 
Al-Nawawī (d. 676 AH / 1277 AD) claims that Mālik and al-Shāficī argued the famous 
ḥadīth “No marriage (nikāḥ) (should be done) without a guardian (walī)” required the 
negation of the soundness of the contract (ṣiḥḥah).436 As for al-Zarkashī (d. 794 AH / 1392 
AD), it is a negation of the legal reality (haqīqah sharciyyah), meaning that no legal 
marriage exists in the legislation without the presence of a walī.437 Al-Ḥaṭṭāb (d. 954 AH / 
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1547 AD) reported Ibn Rushd’s saying, ‘It negated the validity of the marriage except in this 
form’ i.e. the guardian should conclude the contract.438 Al-Mubārakfūrī quotes from al-
Suyūṭī (d. 911 AH / 1505 AD) that the majority understood from this ḥadīth that it as a 
negation of the soundness (ṣiḥḥah) of the contract and Abū Ḥanīfah as a negation of its 
completeness (kamāl)’. Al-Mubārakfūrī suggested that the sounder opinion is that it is a 
negation of the soundness (ṣiḥḥah) which is the approved opinion because of the supporting 
ḥadīth “Any woman who marries without her guardian’s permission, her marriage is 
void”.439 However, this estimation still needs to be strengthened and supported by evidence 
from outside texts, such as circumstantial evidence (qarīna). Therefore, the preponderance 
of one of them over the other will be difficult.  
The other group of jurists disapproved the generality of the additional meaning (
c
umūm al-
muqtaḍā) in this ḥadīth and decided that it indicated one meaning only which is specified by 
the circumstantial evidence (qarīna); the negation of the completeness of the marriage but 
not its reality. So, according to their understanding the ḥadīth means that no marriage is 
considered complete without the presence of the guardian (walī). This group includes the 
Ḥanafis and those who adopted a similar opinion.440 Ibn al-Hummām suggested it is a 
possibility that negation is directed to the completeness of the requirements of contract.
441
 
Therefore, the contract is valid as long the cornesrstone of the contract exist, i.e. the offering 
and acceptance (ṣīgha). 
This disagreement with regard to the generality of the additional meaning (
c
umām al-
muqtaḍā) takes place only when there is no proof (dalīl) or circumstantial evidence 
(qarīnah) that gives preponderance to one of the possibilities.442 The majority consider the 
ḥadīth of cĀ’isha “Any woman who marries without her guardian’s permission, her marriage 
                                                     
438
 Al-Ḥaṭṭab, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, ed. by Zakariyya cAmayrāt, 1st edn (Beirut, 
Lebanon: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah 1995), V, p.187. 
439
 See Muḥammad b. cAbd al-Rahmān, al-Mubārakfūrī, Tuḥfat al-Aḥwadhī, ed. by cAbd al-Raḥmān 
Muḥammad cUthmān (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Fir, '[n.d.]'), IV, p. 227. 
440
 See Ibn 
cĀbidīn, Radd al-Muḥtār, III, p. 56. 
441
 Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, III, p. 260. 
442
 See Al-Shawkānī, Muḥammad b. cAli, Irshād al-Fuḥūl, ed. by Sami b. al-Arbi, 1st edn ( Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia: Dar al-Fadilah 2000), I, p. 579. 
 149 
 
is void” as evidence that gives preponderance to the estimation that no marriage is legally 
valid. Whereas, the Ḥanafī scholars used other ḥādīths to prove that the presence of the walī 
is not a condition in the marriage contract and therefore they estimated the additional 
meaning (muqtaḍā) is that no marriage is complete or recommended without the presence of 
the walī. 
Although al-Bukhārī and Muslim did not report either ḥadīth (“No marriage should be 
performed without a guardian” and “Any woman who marries without her walī’s 
permission, her marriage is void”) they both depended on the authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) ḥadīth “A 
woman who has been previously married (thayyib) has more right over her person than her 
guardian”. The practical outcome of the different opinions of jurists in their understanding of 
those ḥādīths can be seen through their disagreement in regard to the textual implication of 
those ḥādīths. According to al-Nawawī, if a marriage without a walī is consummated, then 
the dowry given to similar brides (mahr al-mithl) becomes due and there is no legally 
prescribed punishment (ḥadd) whether that marriage is concluded by someone who assumed 
the prohibition or permission of such an act depending on his personal reasoning (ijtihād) or 
his following of another opinion (taqlīd) or mere assumption, although the one who assumes 
the prohibition of such as act shall be subjected to corporal punishment (ta
czīr).443 
Al-Juwaynī stated that, if a qāḍī (judge) judges a marriage concluded without a guardian to 
be valid, his ruling will stand if that takes place after the consummation of the marriage 
because the judge applied his own personal reasoning (ijtihād). Al-Juwaynī (d. 478 AH / 
1085 AD) argued that if it was said that the ruling of the qāḍī shall not stand because it 
contradicts a text that is not open for any interpretation, ‘The text (naṣṣ) is missing in regard 
to this issue (i.e. there is no legal text with a clear injunction or definitive ‘qaṭcī al-dalāla’) 
and the ḥadīth that is related to this ruling is open to multiple interpretations’.444 According 
to Ibn Qudāmah, if a qāḍī judges the validity of the contract, or he himself performs the 
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contract then it is not possible to invalidate the contract. This is the case for all irregular 
marriage contracts because it is a disputed issue that is open to personal reasoning 
(ijtihād).445 Al-Qarāfī stated that, the jurists use the ḥadīth “Any woman who marries 
without her guardian’s permission, her marriage is void, void, void” to argue the invalidity 
of the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah. The significance of the ḥadīth indicates that if the walī grants 
his permission for the marriage then the contract becomes valid. It can also be deduced from 
the ḥadīth that the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah is correct from the perspective that if the 
conclusion of the contract is valid with the permission of woman’s guardian then it is valid 
absolutely because no one say that there is a difference between the two cases.
446
 
Therefore the practical result of this disagreement is that the jurists do not give the woman 
who marries without the permission of her walī the same ruling as the one who actually 
commits unlawful sexual intercourse and therefore she and the man she marries shall not be 
punished with the legal punishment (ḥadd). Rather, they approved the right of inheritance 
between them, obliged the man to present the dowry and confirmed other rulings related to 
marriage without the presence of the walī. Therefore, they decided that if a Ḥanafī qāḍī 
judges such contracts to be valid, then a Shāficī qāḍī cannot judge it to be invalid.  Al-
cAmrānī (d. 558 AH / 6611 AD) clarifies this by saying, ‘that is because the verdict of the 
first judge –the Ḥanafī one- took place in an issue that is open for personal reasoning 
(ijtihād)’. He also claims that this opinion is the sounder of the two opinions of Shāficī.447 
As for the Mālikis, Ibn cAbd al-Barr reported the opinion of Ismacīl b. Isḥāq (ismācīl al-qāḍī) 
)d. 282 AH / 895 AD) clarifying the opinion of Mālik in regards to acting upon the ḥadīth 
“No marriage (nikāḥ) should be done without a walī” as, ‘if a woman marries without the 
permission of her walī then the marriage must be annulled. If the marriage is consummated 
and a long period of time passed and birth took place then it is not annulled because none of 
the rulings are annulled except that which is clearly unlawful or which is clearly wrong with 
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no doubt, but that which is open for personal reasoning (ijtihād) and disagreement shall not 
be annulled.’448 
Thus, the disagreement in this issue is a result of differences in using the evidence and 
because the authentic text was not definite (the legal text has no clear injunction or definitive 
‘qaṭcī al-dalāla’) in specifying the invalidity and the cancellation of the contract. The terms 
that prohibited marriage without the presence of the walī in the ḥādīths were understood on 
the meaning of organising the issue of marriage in society, so that the woman does not fall 
victim to the manipulation of malicious men. Therefore, the opinion of the Ḥanafis in regard 
to the permissibility for a woman to act on her own in concern of concluding her marriage 
contract without any control by her guardian (walī) but by consulting him and making him 
participate in the choice, the intended purpose is fulfilled and the right of the guardians is 
protected, because they can take the matter to judiciary in case they think that the marriage 
of the ward might bring harm to her, or to the family.  
However, some believe that jurists who request guardianship in marriage see it as a duty, 
rather than the right of the guardian, or perhaps both. Moreover, they claim that the duty of 
the guardian is to achieve the best interests of the ward and that the guardian is required to 
take the ward’s desires into consideration. However, negligence and abuse do occur and, 
therefore, the right of the guardian -like any other right- is restricted by the requirement that 
it be used for the purposes for which it exists. If he uses it for other reasons, such as the 
intention of harming the interests of the person under his guardianship or for some profit to 
himself, then this is considered to be 
caḍl (prevention) and the case should be taken to the 
judge (qāḍī) to investigate and rule on.449 (For more details see sub-section 4.6.1.2) 
The above illustrates to us the importance involving of kinsmen in arranging and concluding 
womens’ and girls’ marriages, which is a common practice in various Islamic communities. 
Moreover, paternal involvement was not limited to the marriage of daughters. Therefore, 
jurists give fathers the power of compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-ijbār) over children of 
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both sexes.
450
 This could be seen as one of many reasons which led to the practice of forced 
marriage within Muslim communities. This is unlikely, however, as the motive of parents 
and relatives to force their children into marriage is probably related to customs and 
traditions, or perhaps the protection of honour, along with other factors such as that the 
husband of the girl must be Muslim or from the country or tribe of origin. Moreover, 
compulsion guardianship may remain an influential factor in forced marriage, but the 
question is how strong is that influence? Therefore, what concerns us here, with regard to 
the disagreement of the two groups of jurists, is the compulsion guardianship which has a 
strong link to forced marriage. Consequently, it is necessary to clarify this concept in order 
to see the link between it and forced marriage.    
4.13 Compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-ijbār)  
Compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-ijbār) means that the guardian (walī) has the right to 
initiate the marriage contract alone, the ward has no right to object and the marriage contract 
becomes binding with this conduct of the walī. For Kecia Ali, the term compulsion (ijbār) 
gives a false impression of control because although the jurists occasionally discussed the 
permissibility of contracting such a marriage, for the most part wards were presumed too 
young to have any opinion.
451
 Generally speaking, jurists believe that the fathers could 
compel marriage of daughters who were both virgins and minors.  
However, generally compulsion guardianship applies to the minor and the insane person, 
because they have less or no experience and are also not responsible by law, therefore, they 
should be subject to guardianship.
452
 The disagreement of jurists with regard to the marriage 
contract of a virgin adult girl is about whether she should be compelled or she should give 
her consent. The jurists used the ḥādīths of the Prophet as evidence to prove the father’s 
power of compulsion over his virgin daughter. For Mālikis and Shāficis, the reason for the 
right of compulsion guardianship is virginity. Unlike Ḥanafis, the majority of jurists give a 
                                                     
450
 See Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, p. 31. 
451
 See Ibid, p. 31. 
452
 See El-Alami, The Marriage Comtract in Islamic Law, p. 50. 
 153 
 
father power over his daughter because of her virginity, rather than her age or maturity. The 
right of compulsion continues to apply when the daughter attains majority.
453
   
The Ḥanafī School 
In the Ḥanafī opinion, wilāyat al-ijbār (compulsion guardianship) is granted to all caṣaba 
(paternal relatives). However, Abū Ḥanīfah granted it for the caṣaba as well as blood 
relatives, so relatives other than 
caṣaba (paternal relatives) have the right of wilāya but it is 
approved to the 
caṣaba (paternal relatives) first through lineage. The main cause for 
approving wilāya in their opinion is the relatives’ relationship in general as they don’t look 
at the level of kinship but that can be a reason to give priority in wilāya.  Accordingly, the 
father and the paternal grandfather have the priority because they are usually the most 
compassionate towards the ward and it is expected that they show full care and consideration 
for the interests of the ward.
454
   
Those who are subjected to compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-ijbār) in the Ḥanafī School 
are: 
1- The ward: the reason for the wilāya over the ward is the weakness of his intellect and 
the incompleteness of his/her mental capacity which he/she needs in order to 
distinguish between that which is beneficial and that which is harmful, and that 
which includes benefit and that which includes corruption.  
2- The ward girl who has been previously married (thayyib). 
3- The insane and the mentally unstable (mactūh): the reason if the same as in the case 
of the ward, i.e. the mental incapacity and the weakness of his intellect.
455
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It is worthwhile to mention here that there is a group of jurists who argue that there is no 
guardianship for wards in marriage as minors do not comply with the requirements of the 
marriage contract which cannot therefore come into effect before maturity is reached and is 
not therefore necessary at this stage. Thus there is no need for the guardianship of a ward in 
that the reason for guardianship is the ward’s need for it and so long as there is no need for 
marriage, then guardianship is not applicable. This view is supported by 
cUthmān al-Battī, 
Ibn Shubroma and Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm.456 Marrying off wards was one of the practices of 
ancient societies, and Kecia Ali claims that marrying off a ward child was not a Muslim 
innovation. It has parallels in other ancient legal systems and precedents in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, where parents might arrange marriages for their young children.
457
  
Thus, the condition, with Ḥanafis, for compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-ijbār) is for the 
ward to be a male minor, a virgin (bikr) minor, or a previously married (thayyib) female an 
insane major male and female. Ḥanafis consider minority as the main cause for wilāyat al-
ijbār (compulsion guardianship) but not virginity status (whether the girl is a virgin or 
previously married) so its existence depends on the existence of its cause.
458
 Therefore, 
compulsion guardianship is disapproved over every person who has full legal capacity as 
such person is the walī of him/herself and no one has the right of wilāya in marriage over 
him/her nor can he/she be forced to marry. They said that it is impermissible for the walī to 
force the major virgin (bikr) to marry.
459
 Al-
cAynī said, ‘if he [the guardian] marries her 
[virgin girl] off without her consent then the marriage is suspended (mawqūf) until her 
consent is granted in our opinion. If she rejects it then the marriage becomes invalid.’460 
However, if a ward male or female were married off by someone else other than their father 
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or paternal grandfather then they will have the right to choose after they attain majority 
whether to continue the marital life or to annul the marriage through the judiciary.
461
 
We shall mention some safeguards imposed by the Ḥanafis in regard to wilāyat al-ijbār 
(compelling guardianship) in order for the walī not to abuse this right which is granted to 
him by legislation.  
1- If the guardian is known for his bad conduct and immorality then caution must be 
taken in order to protect the right and interest of the ward. If the guardian marries her 
off to a suitable husband (kuf’) with the dowry given to similar brides (mahr al-
mithl) then the marriage becomes valid and effective but if he marries her off to a 
non- suitable husband or with a dowry less than mahr al-mithl then the marriage is 
considered invalid and ineffective because it neglected the benefit of the ward and 
did not protect her interests. 
2- If the guardian marries the female ward to an unsuitable person or with a dowry less 
than mahr al-mithl then she is granted the right to correct what her guardian has 
ruined as soon as she attains majority. The judge gives her the choice in order to 
remove harm away from herself so she can request for the marriage to be annulled 
because of the harm befalling her, even after the consummation of the marriage.  
3- If the closest guardian refuses to marry off the ward to a suitable husband who 
presents mahr al-mithl or more without an acceptable excuse then the walī is 
considered as an oppressor who abuses the right of guardianship and therefore the 
right of guardianship is transferred to a further walī or even to the judge. That is 
because
 c
aḍl (prevention) is a form of oppression so the wilāya is removing that 
oppression within the authority of judiciary.
462
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However, Ḥanafis have another type of wilāya called wilāyat al-ikhtiyar (optional 
guardianship) which means that the woman has the right to marry herself off to anyone she 
wants, or to appoint a man in order to marry her off to the suitor of her choice.
463
 So the 
mature major virgin (bikr) shall not be married off until her guardian grants her permission 
to marriy. When the walī seeks the permission of a mature major virgin in regard to her 
marriage and she comes to full knowledge of it and the identity of the husband then her 
consent is granted through keeping silent or smiling in a way that does not indicate ridicule 
and derision as the ḥadīth states “A virgin must be asked by for her consent for herself, and 
her consent is her silence”. The main thing in this case is the signs that indicate her 
satisfaction and acceptance and eliminate the possibility of dissatisfaction and rejection. 
However, acceptance through silence is accepted only if the one who is asking the woman is 
the closest guardian, like her father or paternal grandfather, but if her guardian is another 
relative then her silence is not enough because she might not pay attention to his speech or 
take him seriously and therefore the signs mentioned above are not enough to approve her 
acceptance. In this case it is a condition that she talks clearly and declares her acceptance or 
rejection. This is restricted to the customs and traditions of communities.
464
 
As for the one who lost her virginity through a cause other than marriage (illness or injury 
for example) i.e. the illness caused her hymen to be broken, she is still considered a virgin in 
the opinion of Ḥanafis, as is the woman who stays unmarried in her family’s house beyond 
the ordinary age of marriage (the spinster). The one who lost her virginity through unlawful 
sexual intercourse is still considered to be a virgin in the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah. As for the 
one who lost her virginity through a doubtful or invalid marriage, she has the same ruling as 
the one who has been previously married (thayyib).
465
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Thus, the opinion of Ḥanafis is that the woman can absolutely conclude the marriage 
contract for herself and others because it is her right, which is the same as her acting with 
her wealth and property through selling and purchasing. They said that the legal starting 
point is that everyone who has the right to act upon his wealth also has the right to act upon 
himself and any woman who is not forbidden from acting upon her wealth also has the right 
to act upon herself with regard to marriage. However, it is recommended for her to appoint 
someone to perform the contract on her behalf or grant permission to her walī to do so which 
is the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah. And in another narration related to him, if she marries herself 
off to a kuf’ then her marriage is considered valid but if she marries herself off to a non-
suitable husband then the marriage is considered invalid. There are other narrations which 
are related to the two companions of Abū Ḥanīfah, Abū Yusuf Al-Qāḍī and Muḥammad b. 
Al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (al-ṣaḥibān), but Ibn al-Humām said, ‘the three of them (imāms) 
agreed upon the absolute permissibility [of such marriage] whether to a kuf’ or non-kuf’. 
However, the walī is requested so dispraised insolence and boldness are not attributed to the 
woman’.466 According to al-Marghinānī (d. 593 AH / 1197 AD), the marriage of the sane 
major woman is initiated by her consent even if the marriage is not performed by a walī, and 
this is according to Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yusuf recorded as ẓāhir al-riwāyah (the authentic 
approved transmissions of the legal opinions of the school).
467
  
As for the previously married woman (thayyib), she cannot be married off except with her 
consent as the Prophet said, “The guardian has no right/authority over (i.e. to force) the 
previously married woman (into a marriage)”.468 Therefore, the guardian (walī) must seek 
the permission of the previously married woman in regard to her marriage and he cannot 
conclude the contract on his own until she clearly grants him her permission by telling him 
of her desire to get married or ordering him to marry her off to the person she wants. The 
Lawgiver granted her this right because she has been already married before, knows how to 
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deal with men and she no longer has the modesty that is usually associated with a virgin girl. 
Therefore, she was granted the right to explicitly declare her desire to marry without that 
being considered a lack of modesty.
469
  
Accordingly, the marriage can be initiated with the statement of the woman who is an adult 
of sound mind in the opinion of Ḥanafis. Therefore she can conclude the contract on her 
own and her guardian has no right or authority to force her into marriage, which contradicts 
the Mālikī, Shāficī and Ḥanbalī schools of thought. 
The Mālikī School  
According to the Mālikis, the compelling guardian (walī mujbir) is the one who possesses 
the right to marry off the virgin (bikr) ward under his care even if she is major and even if 
she has been previously married (thayyib) without their permission. He has the right to 
singly conclude their marriage contract and no one can share this right with him.
470
  
The father is the walī mujbir (compelling guardian), and he was granted this right over his 
daughter because it is expected that he cares for her rights, seeks her interest, treats her with 
mercy, kindness and compassion and therefore he deserve this authority over his child. 
Therefore, the father possesses the right of wilāyat al-ijbār (compulsion guardianship) in 
marrying off his daughter without her consent if she is characterised as having one of these 
two characteristics: 
a- Being a ward: which mean that she has not attained the age of majority so the father 
can compel the minor girl to marry without her consent whether she is a virgin or 
previously married because she is of partial legal capacity (ahliyya) and she cannot 
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choose her husband on her own. This also applies to the insane and the one who 
suffers of deficiency in her intellect. 
b- Being a virgin: the father has the right to compel his virgin daughter to marry 
whether she is ward or major. As for the spinster, they said that he also has the right 
to compel her as long as she is still a virgin and they also said that he does not have 
the right to compel her if she is in charge of her affairs and able to fulfil her interests 
because she would then be like the one who has been previously married (thayyib) 
who experienced the life of men and their affairs. The previously married woman is 
not compelled to marriy but asked for her permission; if she grants it then her walī 
marries her off and if she doesn’t then he does not marry her off.471 
If the girl lost her virginity because of illness, unlawful sexual intercourse or an accident, 
she is still considered a virgin in the opinion of the Mālikī jurists and therefore can be 
compelled to marriy. If the father instructed another man (executor) to compel his daughter 
(after his death) to marriy before or after she attains majority like by saying ‘compel my 
daughter to marriy’ or if the father specifies a husband to him, then the trustee takes the 
father’s position in his status and conduct under the right of wilāyat al-ijbār (compulsion 
guardianship). If the father does not specify marriage in his will like by saying ‘I make you 
an executor to my daughter’ then the executor does not have the right to compel to marriage 
and he cannot marry off anyone of them before they attain majority. 
The Maliki’s condition for the validity of the marrying off by the father’s executor is that the 
husband presents a dowry suitable for similar girls. Otherwise he cannot compel the girl to 
marriy because he is not exactly like her father.
472
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Furthermore, to control this right of compulsion guardianship given to the father and the 
father’s executor in regards of marriage, the Mālikī jurists imposed restrictions in order to 
control the exercising of this right, some of the following restrictions can be applied: 
a- To prove that the father does not intend to harm his daughter and the executor 
doesn’t intend to harm the girl under his trust. If that is the case then wilāyat al-ijbār 
(compulsion guardianship) is disapproved.  
b- In case the husband is socially not suitable, unequal to the woman’s piety and status 
like being immoral (fāsiq), if he has defects that prevent achieving the main purpose 
of the marriage, or if there is a clear harm falling on the girl if she marries such a 
man then the father has no right to compel her to this marriage.  
c- If the father approves the status of rushd (a person who has attained discretion at the 
time of attaining puberty or after it) to his daughter and says to her, ‘you are mature, 
have reached the age of full mental majority and know where you interest lies so you 
are free to carry out your own conduct’ then such girl is not subjected to wilāyat al-
ijbār (compulsion guardianship) anymore. 
d- If a virgin girl gets married, stays in her husband’s house for more than a year then 
he divorces her while she is still a virgin then her father has no right to compel her 
because she will be like the previously married (thayyib) who experienced marriage.  
e- The father is required –on a recommendation basis- to consult with his daughter in 
regard to her marriage. She must be informed that she can grant her permission 
through silence if she feels modest. In case she refuses the marriage then it is 
recommended for the father not to compel her and to respect her choice.
473
 The 
Mālikī jurists have said that the Prophet implied to this in his saying, “A virgin 
should not be married until her consent is asked.” They (the people) asked ‘What is 
her permission?’ He replied “it is by her keeping silence” and in another narration, 
“silence is her acceptance”.474 
 
                                                     
473
 See al-Ghirānī, Mudawwanat al-Fiqh al-Mālikī, II, pp. 561-69; Al-‘Ubbī, Jawāhir al-Iklīl, I, pp. 393-94. 
474
Al-Bukhāri, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhāri, ḥadīths number: (5136), (5137). 
 161 
 
The Mālikī scholars made some exceptions to the rule mentioned in the previous ḥadīth in 
regards of the virgin’s right, “silence is her acceptance” in that some types of virgin must 
explicitly declare their consent to the marriage, as their silence only is not enough. These 
are: 
1- The major virgin who is married off by a non-compelling walī without asking for her 
permission first and she dislike the marriage as soon as she learns of it. 
2- The major virgin whose father grants her the status of rushd and freedom to choose. 
3- The virgin whose father has prevented her marriage without any acceptable excuse, 
but rather out of oppression and seeking to harm her. She has the right to take the 
matter to the judiciary so the judge marries her off to the one she desires as a 
husband but with the condition that she expresses her consent explicitly. 
4- The virgin who is married off by her father or his trustee to a man who has defects or 
suffers from an illness that makes the marital life difficult and does not achieve the 
purpose of marriage.
475
   
As for the husband, he cannot be compelled to marriy in the opinion of the Mālikis unless he 
has no legal capacity (fāqid al-ahliyya), such as the insane or the mentally unstable that can 
fall into the sin of unlawful sexual intercourse, on the condition that his marriage does not 
result in a bigger harm.
476
 Moreover, the Mālikī jurists say that no one has the right to 
compel to marriage apart from the father or his executor. In case the father is absent without 
him leaving a will that explicitly or implicitly allows someone to compel his daughters to 
marriage, and then no one has the right to exercise wilāyat al-ijbār (compulsion 
guardianship) in the marriage without clear and explicit permission. Therefore, the major 
virgin girl is not married off without her permission and the ward virgin is not married off 
until she attains majority and grants her permission.
477
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The Shāficī School 
The compelling guardian (walī mujbir) in the Shāficī school includes: 
1- The father 
2- The paternal grandfather, when the father is not available. 
Shāficī jurists granted the right of marrying off the woman without her permission to her 
father and paternal grandfather because they are the most compassionate towards the woman 
and nothing is expected from them but to show full care and consideration for her interests. 
None of the other guardians has the right to marry off the woman without consulting with 
the woman and granting her permission first. The woman who is sought for marriage can 
either be a virgin (bikr) or previously married (thayyib). If she is a virgin (bikr) she can be 
either a minor or major, so the types of women can be categorised as follows: 
1- The ward virgin 
2- The major virgin 
3- The previously married (thayyib).478 
As for the major virgin in the opinion of the Shāficī school, she can be compelled to marriy 
without her permission by her father or paternal grandfather only; none of the other 
guardians has the right to do so before she attains majority. However, the first opinion of al-
Shāficī was that it is recommended for the father not to marry off the virgin ward until she 
attains majority and justified this opinion with the argument that by attaining majority she 
will be able to grant her permission because of the right which will be due on her as a result 
of the marriage.
479
 Likewise, the major virgin’s father and paternal grandfather have the 
right to compel her to marriy, in the Shāficī school, without her permission even if she 
expresses signs of refusing their decision. However, Shāficī jurists say that it is 
recommended for the father and paternal grandfather to ask for her permission first because 
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of the ḥadīth which directed towards that, i.e. a virgin must be asked for her consent for her 
marriage.
480
 As for guardians other than the father or paternal grandfather, they do not have 
the right to marry her off without her consent, and it must be explicitly uttered –which is one 
of two opinions in the school of law- because as long as the validity of her contract is 
dependent on her permission then it must be granted explicitly as long as she can utter it. 
However, the approved opinion with the Shāficis is that uttering is not required and her 
silence is enough after her permission is granted because she is still a virgin and her modesty 
might prevent her from declaring her desire for marriage, as the ḥadīth mentioned that a 
virgin must be asked by for her consent for herself, and her consent is her silence.
481
 
However, with regard to the previously married woman (thayyib), none of the guardians 
have the right to force her to marry whether he was a father, paternal grandfather or anyone 
else. Her marriage is valid only with her permission, which must be explicitly uttered. In the 
case of a ward, no one can compel her to marriage before she attains majority whether he 
was a father, paternal grandfather or anyone else.
482
 They used as evidence the ḥadīth of 
Khansā’ Bint Khidām al-Anṣāriyah, who was major, that “her father gave her in marriage 
and she had been previously married, she went to the Messenger of Allah and mentioned 
that her father had married her against her will, and he revoked the marriage”.483 They also 
used the ḥadīth “The guardian has no right (to force) the previously married woman (into a 
marriage)”.484 
The Shāficī jurists imposed conditions for the father or paternal father to be able to compel 
her to marry without her consent: 
a- No clear hostility should be between him and the woman, to ensure her interests are 
secured. 
b- To marry her off to someone who is suitable (kuf’) to her. 
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c- To marry her off with a dowry similar to the dowry presented to similar woman. 
d- For the dowry to be of the currency of the place. 
e- For hajj (pilgrimage) not to be due on her and he desires that she perform hajj before 
she gets married as marriage might prevent her from performing hajj. 
f- No hostility should be between the woman and the future husband so he does not 
harm her. 
Shāficīs claim that these conditions are imposed either for the validity of the marriage 
without the permission of the woman, or they can be conditions for the validity of intending 
the contract and they divided them into two categories: the first three conditions are for the 
validity of the contract and the rest are conditions for the validity of intending the 
contract.
485
 Therefore, this division clarified that the Shāficī jurists approved wilāyat al-ijbār 
(compulsion guardianship) as a right for the father and the paternal grandfather over the 
virgin women whether she attains majority or not. The criterion for the validity of the ijbār 
(compulsion) is the virginity status and wilāyat al-ijbār is limited to the father and the 
paternal grandfather only in their opinion.  Marriage is not valid except by the one who has a 
full legal capacity (ahliyya) by being a major sane with absolute disposal. Therefore, the 
marriage of the child and the insane is invalid as is the marriage of the safīh (the one who 
has no good control over his wealth and affairs) as he needs the permission of his walī.486 
Accordingly, this allows the father to marry off his ward son if he sees an interest for him in 
that. Some Shāficīs believe that he does not have the right to marry him off because a ward is 
in no need for marriage. They also said that it is impermissible for the father, the paternal 
grandfather, the executor, the rule or the judge to marry off the insane ward because he is in 
no need for marriage.
487
 Therefore, as the father has the right to marry off his ward virgin 
daughter he also has the right to marry off his ward sane son. When the son attains majority 
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the father cannot compel him to marriage and when he attains rushd he can conclude the 
contract without the need of his father.
488
 According to al-
cAmrānī , there are two opinions, 
the sounder of which is he does not because the ward is in no need of marriage.
489
 
As for those who do not have the right of wilāyat al-ijbār of caṣaba (paternal relatives) and 
kinship –other than the father and the paternal grandfather- it is impermissible for anyone of 
them to marry off the woman without her permission. As for al-Ghazzālī (d. 505 AH / 1111 
AD), the 
caṣaba (paternal relatives) do not have the right of wilāyat al-ijbār (compulsion 
guardianship) at all but they can marry off the virgin (bikr) and the previously married 
(thayyib) after they attain majority and with their consent.
490
 In case no compelling guardian 
(walī mujbir) or non-compelling guardian (walī ghayr mujbir) from the caṣaba (paternal 
relatives) is available then the woman is married off by the ruler or the judge. They can 
marry off the major woman only and with her consent.
491
 
The Ḥanbalī school 
It seems that Ḥanbalis take the same approach as the Shāficīs but they disagree with them in 
specific issues like the issue of approving the wilāya (guardianship) by waṣiyya (will) which 
is an approved reason for wilāya in their opinion, which is contrary to the opinion of 
Shāficīs. Al-Mardāwī said, ‘the waṣī (executor) of the walī takes his status’, and he said, 
‘this is the approved opinion in the school of thought’.492 As already mentioned, they do not 
differ from the opinion Shāficīs in regard to their divisions of wilāya in the marriage contract 
as they followed the Shāficīs’ approach in issues related to the principle of wilāya.  
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Ḥanbalis limit wilāyat al-ijbār to the father only so no one except the father can marry off 
the ward even his paternal grandfather. If the father marries off his son using his right of 
wilāyat al-ijbār then the son has no choice in the marriage but he acquires the right of 
divorce when he attains majority. The one who is most entitled to marry off the woman is 
her father and no one shares this right with him. However, they give the executor the right to 
marry off wards without their permission.
493
  
Those who are subjected to wilāyat al-ijbār according to the Ḥanbalis are as follow: 
1. The minor sons and the virgin daughters: 
a- The sane wards under the age of majority are married off by their father with or 
without their permission and consent. 
b- The virgin daughter who is nine years old or more but she has not attained majority 
yet. This opinion is exclusive to the Hanbalis who approved this age in marrying off 
the girl with the evidence of a narration that is related to 
cĀ’isha who said, ‘if the girl 
reaches the age of nine then she is considered as a woman’.494 They claim that 
cĀ’isha meant to say that the girl of nine years old is usually suitable to get married if 
she reaches the age of nine and therefore becomes like the major girl. There are two 
narrations in regard to the girl who reaches the age of nine according to the Ḥanbalis. 
The first opinion is that she is like the one who has not reached the age of nine, so 
she has the same ruling as the ward. Therefore, her father has the right to marry her 
off without her permission. The second is that she has the same ruling as the major 
and her father can marry her off without her permission, although it is recommended 
to ask for her permission and her permission is her silence. 
c- The virgin who is under the age of nine. The father has the right to marry her off 
without her approval and consent with no disagreement. Ibn Qudāmah said, ‘as for 
the ward virgin, there is no disagreement in her regard’. He also reported the opinion 
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of Ibn al-Mundhir when he said, ‘all the scholars whom we learned from were 
unanimous that it is permissible for the father to marry off his virgin ward daughter if 
he marries her off to a kuf’ even with her unwilling’.495 
d- The insane ward. Her father has the right to marry her off without her permission. 
e- The major sane virgin, Ibn Qudāmah said that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal has two opinions in 
regard to marrying off the major sane virgin: 
1- He has the right to compel her to marriage, so he can marry her off without her 
permission like the ward. 
2- He doesn’t have the right to marry her off without her permission. There is 
another narration in the school of thought which is that it is recommended to ask 
for her permission and it is also recommended to ask for the mother’s permission 
in regard to her daughter’s marriage.496 
f- The insane and the idiot, because of the incapacity to take charge of their own affairs 
and the invalidity of their conduct.
497
 
2. As for the woman who lost her virginity through a means other than marriage, such as 
illness, intense period, jumping or any other reason, she is subject to the same rulings as the 
virgin in the issue of wilāyat al-ijbār. And for the ward who is previously married her rules 
are as follow:  
a- The previously married (thayyib) of sound mind who is under nine years old: the 
father has the right to compel her to marriage without her permission. It was also 
said that he doesn’t have the right to do so. 
b- The previously married (thayyib) who is over nine but has not attaine majority yet: 
there are two narrations from Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal in regards of marrying her off 
without her permission: 
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i. Her father cannot compel her. Most of the Hanbalis follow this narration. 
ii. It is permissible for the father to marry her off without her permission. 
c- The previously married (thayyib) ward: it is impermissible for her father to compel 
her to marriage because the criteria of ijbār (compulsion) is the status of the virginity 
not the age so she must be left until she attains majority and choose for herself as her 
permission is required unlike the situation of the virgin. There is another opinion in 
the school of thought which say that the father can compel the previously married 
ward because she is still a ward and doesn’t have the capacity to realise her 
interest.
498
   
However, the major and previously married (thayyib) have the right of guardianship through 
permission (wilāyat al-idhn). She is, therefore, not subjected to wilāyat al-ijbār. The same 
thing applies for the one who lost her virginity through unlawful means, like unlawful sexual 
intercourse or rape. Therefore, in the case of the sane major thayyib, it is impermissible for 
her father or any of her guardians to marry her off until she explicitly utters her permission 
because the tongue usually expresses what is in the heart. That is because she is mentally 
mature (rashīdah) and knows the purpose of the marriage, has experienced marriage and 
already lived with a husband before. This is why she cannot be compelled to marriage and 
the Prophet ordered for her permission to be asked.
499
 Ibn Qudāmah said, ‘he (the father) 
doesn’t possess the right to marry off the thayyib daughter without her consent because of 
the Prophet’s saying: “A woman who has been previously married (thayyib) has more right 
over her person than her guardian”.500 Also, Ibn cAbbās reported the Prophet’s saying: “A 
guardian has no concern with a woman previously married (thaiyyb)”.501 
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Moreover, the woman’s permission is required in case one of the guardians other than the 
father seeks to marry her off because no one but the father can compel a girl to marriy, as 
previously mentioned. No other guardian has the right to marry her off without her 
permission because they are unlike her father in his care and compassion towards her. Again 
Ibn Qudāmah said, ‘no one apart from the father possesses the right to compel the major 
[woman] or marry off the ward whether he was a paternal grandfather or any other 
guardian’.502 If the husband is a sane major, he cannot be compelled to marriy without his 
consent because his consent is a condition for the validity of the marriage contract as he 
initiates it exactly like he initiates a sale contract - if a person cannot be compelled to a sale 
contract then it is of more priority he cannot be compelled to a marriage contract. Al-
Mardāwī (d. 885 AH / 1480 AD) said, ‘the father doesn’t possess the right to marry off his 
sane major male sons without their consent’.503  
Finally, if the woman is in a place where she has no guardian and there was no ruler or judge 
where she is, then the opinion of Ḥanbalis is that a man from the Muslim community who is 
c
adl (upright of good character) can marry her off with her consent.
504
  
Here, we finish with the suggestion from Ibn Rushd who suggested that if the lawgiver had 
intended the stipulation of guardianship, he would have elaborated all of the conditions 
required for guardians. Moreover, delay of the elaboration beyond the time at which it is 
needed would cause harm, especially when there is a general public need which requires that 
the stipulation of guardianship and the evidence should be mutawātir (consecutive), or as 
close to it as possible. That did not happen and therefore two possibilities shall be assumed: 
1- Wilāya (guardianship) is not a condition for the validity of marriage, but guardians 
have the right of inquiry in it; i.e to supervise the validity of the woman’s conduct, 
and they have the right of ḥisbah (guarding against infringements), or that 
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2- If guardianship is a condition for the soundness of the marriage contract then it is 
required to specify the gender, type and categories of the guardians for the wilāya to 
be valid, rather the contract is considered valid with the presence of any guardian 
(walī).505 
It would seem from the above discussion that wilāyat al-ijbār is a type of coercion (ikrāh), 
even if it has not been clearly stated by early jurists. Furthermore, some eminent jurists 
rejected the idea of ijbār (compulsion) in marriage and they did not distinguish between it 
and ikrāh.506 It can be claimed, therefore, that forced marriage is ikrāh, i.e. marriage with 
coercion. The next chapter will clarify ikrāh and its link with wilāyat al-ijbār (compelling 
guardianship) in depth. 
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Chapter 5 
The Effect of Coercion on the Marriage contract 
5.1 Introduction 
Based on the discussion of guardianship thus far, it is clear that scholars have mixed views 
on the significance of guardianship for the marriage contract, ranging from those who 
consider it a pillar of the contract, those who see it as one of the conditions of its soundness 
and those who see it as an aspect of its perfection which does not affect the validity of the 
contract, rather it is a recommended aspect of it. Opinions seem to be informed by the way 
scholars interpret the concept of human freedom and the state of legal capacity. So, for 
example, the Ḥanafis approve the complete freedom and independence of a woman in all her 
affairs, as long as she is mature and of a sound intellect. The other three schools of law 
apparently give priority to protecting a woman’s interests by giving more authority to her 
guardian who is –in their opinion- more experienced in dealing with the opposite sex (i.e. 
men).
507
 
In the previous chapter, we learned that the Islamic Jurisprudential system of guardianship in 
regards to the self and wealth was introduced in order to fulfil the interest of the ward in 
such a way as to benefit him or her as members of the family unit and as members of the 
wider community. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the legislation of the system 
of guardianship in Islamic jurisprudence aimed to deny the ward agency in the marriage 
process by somehow stripping them the right to choose, spend or to pursue other rights; the 
ward is an honourable human being with respected rights, feelings and personal choices. 
This is the spirit and purpose of Islamic law, which came to preserve the five necessities; 
religion, life, intellect, lineage, and wealth in order to seek benefit and repel harm (jalb al-
maṣlaḥah wa-dafc al-mafsadah).508. 
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The Qur’an highlights the following: “And We have certainly honoured the children of 
Adam and carried them on the land and sea and provided for them of the good things and 
preferred them over much of what We have created, with [definite] preference” (Q., 17:70). 
Quṭb said, explaining the meaning of this verse, ‘One aspect of God’s favour is to make 
human beings responsible for themselves, accountable for their actions. This is the first 
quality which distinguishes mankind and makes them worthy of their exalted position on 
earth: freedom of choice and individual responsibility’.509 
The fact that the ward might be incapable of fulfilling and taking care of his or her own 
interests does not automatically award full freedom to the guardian to control the ward in a 
way that does not fulfil their interests. This is what is clearly stated in the Qur’an when it 
forbids the guardian or the custodian to unjustly take the orphan’s wealth by squandering or 
spending it just before the orphan attains majority, thinking that he will waste it as soon as 
he attains majority and obtain full control over his/her wealth, which is a form of oppression. 
Because the orphan in this context is under the age of full mental maturity, the Qur’an 
guides the guardians and the custodians to take care of the ward’s rights and to preserve their 
trust, as they usually neglect this and keep squandering and following their own caprice. 
There should be no fear of the orphan attaining majority and becoming free of their 
guardianship to have full authority of their own wealth on the part of the guardian.  
The Qur’an further says: 
And test the orphans [in their abilities] until they reach marriageable age. 
Then if you perceive in them sound judgement, release their property to them. 
And do not consume it excessively and quickly, [anticipating] that they will 
grow up. And whoever, [when acting as guardian], is self-sufficient should 
refrain [from taking a fee]; and whoever is poor – let him take according to 
what is acceptable. Then when you release their property to them, bring 
witnesses upon them. And sufficient is Allah as Accountant. (Q., 4:6)  
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This verse includes rulings relating to the rights of orphans under guardianship. It clarifies 
the procedures of handing over wealth from the custodians to the orphan and stress upon 
hastening to hand them over in full as soon as the orphan attains majority, and after 
confirming the orphan’s capability to act responsibly, as regards himself and his wealth; the 
verse suggests that the guardian carries out a practical test that proves the ward’s eligibility 
to receive his own wealth. This procedure was decreed in order to protect the orphan’s 
interests as well as to prevent the oppression of the guardian or custodian. The verse also 
guides guardians and custodians to refrain from taking a fee from the orphan’s wealth when 
they are financially self-sufficient or to take the minimum amount in case they are poor. 
cĀ’ishah explained that this verse refers to a situation in which a man is in charge of an 
orphan girl and he is also her heir. She may enter into a marriage partnership with him. He 
may not want to marry her himself, as she may not be suitable in his eyes. At the same time, 
he may not want her to marry anyone else, lest the new spouse takes a share of the wealth. 
Her guardian, then, prevents her from marrying anyone. This verse explains that the severest 
oppression is exercised by the guardians or custodians over young orphan girls who have 
wealth when they prevent the girls from accessing their wealth or lock them up to marry 
them (when they attain the age of marriage), or marry them off to their sons, seeking their 
wealth, or by preventing them from marrying from outside the family.
510
   
This was also the case in the issue of marriage as guardians used to abuse the right of their 
wards by consuming their dowries and preventing them from getting married, which is a 
clear abuse of the right of taking care of the affairs of women granted to them by law. Here 
the Qur’an says, “But if they give up willingly to you anything of it, then takes it in 
satisfaction and ease” (Q., 4:4). This verse describes the reality that women used to live in –
and unfortunately still do in many places- where a woman is oppressed and her rights are 
abused in many ways; one of which is when a guardian takes her dowry for himself as 
though she is a bargaining tool owned by him. Thus, the Qur’an addressed men and forbade 
them from oppressing women, it giving guidelines and how to avoid such oppression. The 
verse obliges the guardian or the husband to give the full dowry to the woman for her to 
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takes full possession of it, and to give it to her in kindness as though he is giving her a gift. 
The verse also forbids men from taking any amount of the woman’s dowry without her 
consent, and therefore the verse grants the woman her full right and will, respecting her 
personality and character.
511
    
Another pre-Islamic practice which appeared not to protect the rights of women was a form 
of marriage called shighār, which refers to an arrangement in which the guardian gives a girl 
under his guardianship in marriage on the condition that his counterpart gives a girl under 
his guardianship to him in marriage, without any dower being paid by either. There was 
another form of marriage which involved a woman being inherited like any other item. 
When her husband died, his heir would come and throw his garment over her signalling that 
she now belonged to him. He could marry her without paying her any dowry, or he could 
give her in marriage to someone else, but in this latter case he would receive her dowry for 
himself. In another arrangement, if a man no longer wanted his wife then he would be at 
liberty to ill-treat her. He could leave her in suspense, neither married nor divorced, until she 
bought her freedom from him with her own money.
512
 
All of these practices were forbidden through the Qur’anic legislation. The Prophet too 
condemned them. A notable verse in this regard is:  
O you who have believed, it is not lawful for you to inherit women by 
compulsion. And do not make difficulties for them in order to take [back] 
part of what you gave them unless they commit a clear immorality. And live 
with them in kindness, for if you dislike them - perhaps you dislike a thing 
and Allah makes therein much good. But if you want to replace one wife with 
another and you have given one of them a great amount [in gifts], do not take 
[back] from it anything. Would you take it in injustice and manifest sin? And 
how could you take it while you have gone in unto each other and they have 
taken from you a solemn covenant? (Q., 4:19-21)  
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However, one of the purposes of marriage according to Muslim scholars is "to achieve 
tranquillity, love and compassion", because the marital relationship is not only a physical 
one. In marriage, the spouses should find calmness in each other and that results in love and 
compassion between them. The legislation sought to establish marital relations on a solid 
foundation of these principles, and to achieve the purposes that provide for each spouse a 
happy and calm marital life built on love, compassion, cooperation and psychological and 
social stability.
513
  
Thses purposes cannot be achieved in an environment where oppression is exercised against 
the woman or when she is compelled to live with someone she does not love or want to 
spend the rest of her life with - and certainly not a husband who she was compelled to be 
with. In Islam, marriage should be built on the foundation of two souls that willingly choose 
each other and establish a marital life on the principles of full consent, complete freedom of 
choice, satisfaction that stems from the hearts and compassion, which includes no 
restrictions. The Qur’an is clear:  
And of His signs is that He created for you from yourselves mates that you 
may find tranquillity in them; and He placed between you affection and 
mercy. Indeed in that are signs for people who give thoughts.” (Q., 30:21)  
Ibn Taymiyya used the general guidance in this verse -which includes the legitimate 
purposes of marriage- to insist on the invalidity of compelling a woman into a marriage and 
he used it as an argument against those who approved the validity of compelling the woman 
to marriy by saying:  
As for marrying off a woman who is averse to the marriage, it is contrary to 
both the principles of Sharīcah and the sound intellect. Allah, Exalted is He, 
does not allow her guardian to compel her to sell or lease contracts except 
with her permission; neither does He allow the guardian to compel her to 
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food, drink or dress; so how can he compel her to have a relationship with 
someone she hates.
514
  
The Qur’an forbids all kinds and forms of coercion because Islam is a religion that doesn’t 
accept for a person to be forced to anything against his will under any circumstances as the 
Qur’an says, “There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion” (Q., 2:256). The 
jurists though excluded one type of coercion which they called ‘coercion with right’ –an 
example of this is when a judge forces the indebted to sell some of his properties in order to 
pay back his debt. Ibn al-
cArabī (d. 543 AH / 1148 AD) said about the negation in this verse, 
‘it is a general statement in negating invalid coercion’, meaning the type of coercion which 
the jurists called ‘coercion without right’ which will be explained later.515 This negation of 
this invalid coercion is called categorical negation (nafy al-jins) by the scholars of Arabic 
language, meaning coercion is categorically negated to begin with. It is as though the Qur’an 
denies the possibility of coercion, which is beyond simply commanding not to do it. The 
scholars of the Arabic language stated that forbidding using the form of negation (al-nahy fī 
ṣūrat al-nafy) has a deeper impact; it is a confirmed indication.516 According to Quṭb, this 
reflects the honour God has reserved for man and the high regard in which man’s will, 
thought and emotions are held, as well as the freedom he is granted to choose his beliefs and 
the responsible position he is afforded to be judge of his own actions, which is of the main 
characters of the human freedom.
517
 
Al-Bukhārī reported that a woman called al-Khansā’ bint Khidām al-Anṣāriyah was given 
by her father in marriage though she disliked that marriage. She came and complained to the 
Prophet, and he declared that particular marriage invalid.
518
 Al-Bukhārī gave this ḥadīth the 
title ‘If a man gives his daughter in marriage without her consent, then her marriage is 
invalid’. The jurists said that this narration indicates that the marriage of a pubescent 
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daughter is rejected if she dislikes it. Only the one who understands the meaning of things 
can express his/her discontent.
519
  
Furthermore, one cannot find in the Qur’an or in the authentic Sunna of the Prophet -in what 
is related to the issue of marriage specifically- anything that allows the use of compulsion 
(ijbār) and there is no existence for the root of ja-ba-ra to compel in any text in the field of 
marriage from Qur’an or Sunna. One might ask: where did jurists bring this word 
compulsion (ijbār) from to make it a right for the guardian to exercise over his ward? 
If you are to check in the Arabic dictionaries you will find that the root word for compulsion 
(ijbār) is ja-ba-ra which, as we will see, totally contradicts the spirit of marriage and its 
legitimate purposes, which are based upon love, compassion, mercy and intimacy. The 
original meaning of ijbār indicates greatness, strength and might. It can also be used to 
suggest coercion, it is said: ajbartuhu ‘I compelled him to something’, meaning: I forced 
him to do it. Ibn Fāris (d. 395 AH / 1004 AD) said, ‘that can only be through compulsion 
and a sort of expressing greatness over the person’.520 However, amongst the meanings of 
the root ja-ba-ra is a positive meaning which is the antonym of breaking i.e., reparation of 
broken machines or bones. The piece of wood which is used to bring the broken bone 
together is called jibāra. There is another positive meaning for the same root with the verb 
form ijtabarahu which means to do good to someone and to make him rich after poverty. 
Such positive meanings are more worthy to be used in the issue of marriage and better than 
the compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-ijbār) which includes meanings of oppression and 
coercion.
521
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However, al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī (d. 502 AH / 1108 AD) mentioned that the root ja-ba-ra 
means ‘to repair something with the use of some force’.522 He might have taken into 
consideration the fact that repairing a broken thing requires some force or pressure to bring 
the two broken parts together but -in my opinion- I don’t think that this befits the situation of 
marital life which is built upon compassion and mercy to begin with. Al-ṣfahānī reassured 
that the commonly used meaning for ijbār is mere coercion.523  
Among philosophical theories in connection to theology (
c
ilm al-kalām), there is a group 
known as al-mujbira or al-jabriyya. The name comes from the word jabr which means 
attributing any human act to the divine decree and Will (al-qaḍā’ wa al-qadar).524 This 
meaning might have found its way into the jurists’ definitions of “guardianship of 
compulsion” (wilāyat al-ijbār), which is forcing someone to do something whether he or she 
likes it or not, adopting the definition given by al-Jurjānī: ‘Wilāya legally is to force an 
opinion over others, whether it is with or without their consent’.525 However, jurists used the 
word ijbār in the sense of oppression and coercion although the term in the books of jurists 
has no specific definition. Rather, they used the term in the sense of oppression and 
coercion, such that whoever has authority has the right to compel those under his 
guardianship to marry a person with or without their consent.
526
 Thus, the word ijbār 
(compulsion) is very relevant to the meanings of pressure, harassment, distress, and 
coercion. Therefore, compulsion to marriage when the woman or the man dislikes it shall be 
included in the last type, i.e. the impermissible ijbār, because it is a form of exercising of 
pressure, harassment and coercion over someone to accept that which he/she does not want 
or accept.
527
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5.2 Freedom a purpose of Islamic law  
There is no doubt that compulsion and coercion are forms of control over human freedom 
(ḥurriyyah) and actions. Human freedom is a value that Islam has given great attention and 
consideration to because human freedom is a means to remove all kinds of pressure, 
coercion, injustice, humiliation and control of others’ freedom of choice. This is why the 
meaning of the word ‘freedom’ has expanded to include human freedom; to get rid of all 
unfair authority or force that has befallen him.
528
 
According to Kamali, the word ḥurriyya (freedom) was not as commonly used by classical 
jurists as it is now being used by modern writers in Arabic. Thus, the current usage of 
ḥurriyya, which conveys the full force of the concept of ‘freedom’, is of relatively recent 
origin. However, the Word ‘ikhtiyār (choice, free will) is more commonly used in writings 
of Muslim mystics (ṣūfiyya) and philosophers (falāsifa) than ḥurriyya. The word ḥurriyya 
does not occur in the Qur’an itself but other derivatives of the same root, such as ‘al-ḥurr (a 
free man) (Q., 2:178).
529
 Freedom means for a person to enjoy his/her independent will and 
his ability to execute that which he sees as right and accepts responsibility for. According to 
Ibn 
cĀshūr as the term ḥurriyya means that the person enjoys the ability to act on himself 
and his affairs however he wishes, without anyone prevents him from doing so. The 
opposite of that is called ‘prevention to act’.530 
According to Ibn al-Khūja, freedom is one of the purposes of Islam (maqāṣid al-Islām); the 
freedom of one’s conduct is what he/she obliges himself to out of his/her free will in the 
disposal of contracts and self-obligations in order to achieve a benefit for him/her. Al-Khūja 
adds that the meaning which agrees with the modern significance of freedom –which he 
argues is one of the purposes of Islamic law- is for the rational person to act in his affairs 
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independently without the need of anyone’s consent. For a person to be able to act in himself 
and his affairs as he pleases without any objection is freedom.
531
 
Ibn 
cĀshūr believes that this is the intended meaning of freedom in Islamic law because it is 
a character of human nature and there are many manifestations of freedom in Islam which 
all relate to one original rule in consideration of individuals’ beliefs, speech and actions; for 
them to be completely free in all of their conducts –that are allowed by law- without being 
afraid of anyone. Amongst the manifestations of personal freedom in Islamic law is the 
freedom of action in regard to contracts and agreements. Ibn 
cĀshūr also believes that if it is 
not for the consideration of freedom of expression, then confessions, contracts, obligations, 
divorce pronouncements will have no legal effect. That is why these actions are ineffective 
once it is established that they have taken place under coercion.
532
  
According to 
cAmāra, the freedom of people in conducts related to their own affairs is an 
original purpose of Islamic law because freedom is the value which grants access for 
humans to the real meaning of life. A human being with no freedom is like a dead human 
being even he is alive, eating, drinking, working and earning.
533
 Al-Duraynī confirms that it 
is an original rule in Islam that all human conduct is permissible and so he is granted the 
freedom to carry out all kinds of contracts unless he causes a clear harm to another person or 
the community, contradicts a specific text, violates the terms of the contract or uses it as a 
means to allow something that is prohibited or to abandon a duty.
534
 Stressing the same 
meaning, Abū Zahrah claimes that the first manifestation of freedom is ‘personal freedom’, 
which includes the freedom of a person to believe in that which he thinks is right and to say 
that which he thinks is right and to act on his personal affairs in a way that results in his 
benefit with no interference from anyone and without any control by an authority in his free 
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will.
535
 According to Rayner, intention and consent have become the two fundamental 
precepts to any contract, and the Qur’an and ḥadīths determine that bilateral contracts can 
only take place with the free consent of the parties.
536
 Thus, if this is the value of personal 
freedom in Islam, is it then accepted to strip away the person’s freedom to choose for 
him/herself when choosing a husband or a wife, with whom they will spend a large portion 
of their lives with? 
It is well known in Islamic jurisprudence that the principle of freedom in regard to contracts 
in Islamic law is based on a very essential requirement, which is consent (riḍā). That is why 
we find many rulings in Islamic jurisprudence with a close connection to consent, like the 
rulings of sales with options (al-khiyārāt) and the rulings of returning goods if they are 
defective, because the principle of riḍā is essential in contracts as well as other transactions. 
It was decided in the rules of Islamic jurisprudence, and in the jurisprudence of transactions 
specifically, that ‘mutual consent is the foundation of the contract’ (al-riḍā asās al-caqd), 
meaning that any contract between two parties is not considered initiated except with the 
consent of the two parties. Some jurists might call it ‘the principle of consent in contracts’ 
(mabda’ al-riḍā fi al-caqd) and some others might call it ‘the principle of freedom in 
contracting’ (ḥurriyyat al-tacāqud). All of these labels lead to one original rule which is ‘the 
authority of free-will in contracts’ (sulṭān al-‘irādah al-caqdiyyah). 
5.3 The Principle of Consent (riḍā)  
As mentioned above, consent is a basic rule in human transactions, particularly contracts. 
This is established with evidence from both the Qur’an and the Sunna. The Qur’an says, “O 
you who have believed, do not consume one another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] 
business by mutual consent (tarāḍin)” (Q., 4:29). Islamic jurisprudence made mutual 
consent the basis of all transactions and any other conditions which should be fulfilled are in 
addition to this. 
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Ibn al-
cArabī confirms that the verse enjoins consent (riḍā) as a foundation of all 
transactions and in everything issued verbally by a person to express his contentment with 
the contract.
537
 Because contentment is an inward condition that cannot be seen, the Islamic 
law attached it to the existence of an apparent sign that indicates it, which is the formula 
(ṣīgha) of the contract; which jurists describe as the offer (‘ijāb) and the acceptance (qabūl). 
However, among the conditions of ‘ijāb and qabūl is for both of them to be in a 
confirmation form in order to confirm consent (riḍā).  
Ibn Taymiyyah confirms that the original rule in regards to contracts are the mutual consent 
of the contracting parties and that what is obliged by contracts are indeed that which the 
contractors have committed and he argued this using the evidence of one of the verses form 
Qur’an which is related to marriage:  “But if they give up willingly to you anything of it, 
then take it in satisfaction and ease” (Q., 4:4). He assumes the verse stipulates the husband’s 
consumption of the woman’s dowry to be a clear sign of her consent in this case. So, if the 
existence of consent is the reason that allows any taking from the dowry then that will be the 
case in any other types of donations, because it shares the same effective cause (
c
illa) - by 
applying the process of analogical deduction (qiyās) - with the cilla stated in the verse. Thus 
if the two contracting parties came to a mutual consent in a transaction, or if someone 
donated something willingly, then that becomes lawful by the evidence of the Qur’an- 
except a transaction that is declared to be unlawful by Allah and His Messenger-.
538
 
Generally, Islamic jurisprudence stipulates rulings grant freedom to the contracting parties in 
order that they do not restrict themselves by such formalities that prevent their free will and 
consent. Therefore, it stipulates the existence of an essential requirement in all contracts 
which is offer (ijāb) and acceptance (qabūl), or what is known as the formula (ṣīgha) of the 
contract, which is what is issued by both parties as expressions of their consent. This consent 
is considered to be the binding element beside any other forms and manifestations. 
Furthermore, the legislation also equates men and women in the freedom of contracts and in 
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respecting their will in all conduct such as sales, donations, commitments and marriages.
539
 
In this context, al-Sanhūrī states that the basic rule, as delineated by jurists, is that offer and 
acceptance alone are enough in the formation of the contract.
540
  
5.4 The Concept of Consent (riḍā) in Islamic Jurisprudence 
Riḍā literally means the fact of being pleased or contented, indicating contentment and 
approval. In the Qur’an, the root of word ‘riḍā’ and its derivatives occur frequently in the 
general sense of ‘to be content’.541 In Arabic riḍā is a verbal noun from the root ra-ḍi-ya 
which means the sense of pleasure and acceptance of something; the opposite is hatred and 
indignation. Riḍā can take many meanings like self-satisfaction or acceptance and ability to 
choose, someone says ‘raḍītu bi al-shayi’, it means that you have chosen and approved 
something. This is how Qur’an used like in the verse, “I have perfected for you your religion 
and completed My favour upon you and have approved (raḍītu) for you Islam as religion” 
(Q., 5:3).
542
 
Of the terms that are related to consent (riḍā): 
a- The will (‘irāda): which means wanting something and going towards it. 
b- The intention (nīyya): This means to intend while the heart is determined to carry out 
the act, so it is connected to acting upon the intention. 
c- The advancement towards the establishment of an act (qaṣd). However, qaṣd and 
nīyya is almost the same thing.543 
The opposite of riḍā is coercion (ikrāh) and compulsion (ijbār).544 Thus, phrases like 
freedom to choose, free-will and contentment all lead to one meaning which is ‘the principle 
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of freedom in action’. The opposite of them is coercion, compulsion, and being forced.545 
Jurists are divided into two groups in defining riḍā. The Ḥanafis differed in their definition 
of riḍā because they differentiated between riḍā (consent) and choice (ikhtiyār), while the 
majority (the other three schools of thoughts) gave similar definitions for riḍā in general and 
therefore did not differentiate between riḍā and ikhtiyār. 
One of the definitions of riḍā is mentioned by al-Taftāzānī (d. 793 AH / 1390 AD): 
‘preferring and favouring something’.546  Ḥanafis define consent (riḍā) as reaching ‘the 
maximum point of contentment in a way that reflects on the limbs with signs of cheerfulness 
and satisfaction’.547 The majority defined riḍā as ‘intending to carry out the act without any 
trace of coercion’, or ‘the satisfaction to do something’. They defined choice (ikhtiyār) as ‘to 
select something and prefer it over other things’.548 Hence, choice (ikhtiyār) is to seek what 
is good and to do it. The good is everything that you seek such as intellect, justice, beneficial 
things, etc.; its opposite is evil. The good is what a person sees as good even if it was not in 
itself. Ikhtiyār is everything a person does without any coercion.549 The Encyclopaedia of 
Islam defines it as a philosophical term, (ikhtiyār) which means free choice, free will. 
However, from its very root khayr (good), ikhtiyār implies primarily not a sovereign 
indifference above good and evil, but free choice of what is good. And it is thus 
distinguished, in its connotations, from hurriyyah, personal and political freedom of 
exultation or autonomy’.550  
Accordingly, the principle of riḍā for the Ḥanafis has a more specific significance than the 
principle of riḍā with the majority because the opinion of the majority is that riḍā is the 
mere intent to do something with the condition that it is free from any control or coercion by 
anyone, even if it is not a totally free choice or if the signs of pleasure are not apparent on 
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the person’s limbs. On the other hand, Ḥanafis do not approve riḍā unless it is accompanied 
with approbation and preference in the process of choosing and therefore pleasure takes 
place and is reflected on the face. This means that Ḥanafis think that riḍā and ikhtiyār are 
two different things, both in their conventional meaning and the rules which result from 
them, whereas the majority think that they are two similar things as all acts issued by a 
person must be accompanied by his choice (ikhtiyār). This choice is considered sound if it 
results from a person’s own desire to do something and considered unsound if it is affected 
by any factors that tamper with the process of ikhtiyār. Therefore, we learnt from the above 
the Ḥanafīs and the majority differ in their perception of riḍā and ikhtiyār. This difference 
can be summed up as follows: 
a- Riḍā (consent) and ikhtiyār (choice) with Ḥanafis are two different things in their 
meaning and their effect. Ikhtiyār is the intent to do something while riḍā is to prefer 
and favour something with comfort and pleasure. 
b- The majority did not differentiate between riḍā and ikhtiyār, either in their meanings 
the rules which result from them because they are the same thing. 
5.5 The Connection between Consent (riḍā) and Choice (‘ikhtiyār), and their Effect on 
Conduct  
Accordingly, riḍā in the opinion of the Ḥanafis is a stage that is more specific than ikhtiyār. 
They justify that with the argument that a person might perform an act out of his free choice 
-meaning this he has the ability not to do it- while he is not fully satisfied with it, i.e. 
unwilling or uncomfortable to do it. Therefore, riḍā in their opinion is full free choice by a 
free will without any outside effect.
551
 Ḥanafis divide ikhtiyār into: 
1- Ikhtiyār ṣaḥīḥ (valid choice): when the person has a full legal capacity without any 
strong coercion exercised on him.  This case combines riḍā and ikhtiyār (choice) as 
long as no coercion is exercised, but if slight coercion is exercised then ikhtiyār is 
considered valid but riḍā is not. 
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2- Ikhtiyār bāṭil (invalid choice): when the person is insane or a boy under the age of 
clarity (tamyīz) as there is no choice for these categories and therefore, none of their 
conduct has any effect. In this case, riḍā is disapproved because ikhtiyār is 
disapproved. 
3- Ikhtiyār fāsid (irregular choice): is built upon the choice of someone else, called 
mukrih (the one who exercise coercion), and under strong coercion. In this case riḍā 
does not exist because of the strong coercion, however, ikhtiyār exists so if a person 
chooses then his choice is approved but considered as fāsid (irregular).552 
Generally, according to the Ḥanafis, these three types have a strong connection to dividing 
the contracts as ṣaḥīḥ (valid), bāṭil (invalid) and fāsid (irregular).553  
Al-Zarqa summarised the above as follows: 
1- Choice is considered as sound and valid if it results from free will. 
2- Choice is considered as irregular if it was a choice of a lesser of two evils or harm. In 
this case choice exists but consent does not.
554
    
Thus, the process of consent and choice is affected by external factors which have a direct 
reflection on the choice of someone and the extent of his satisfaction with it, resulting in a 
legal rule. The most prominent effect on consent and choice is the factor of coercion (ikrāh). 
Depending on the difference the Ḥanafis established between consent and choice, this 
differentiation appears clearly in the issue of coercion where the Ḥanafis think that coercion 
has no effect on the choice but has an effect on the consent. That is because riḍā is to intend 
and seek something with full desire and preference. For example, a contract is not fulfilled 
unless it takes place with the desire to carry out the contract in a way that leaves a person 
feeling satisfied. All of this is not stipulated to fulfil ikhtiyār. Therefore, riḍā with the 
Ḥanafis is more specific than ikhtiyār but the latter can still exist without the existence of the 
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former in the case of slight coercion, because that eliminates the riḍā but it doesn’t eliminate 
ikhtiyār or even causes it to be irregular. That is because ikhtiyār –in the Ḥanafī view- is the 
mere intent to do something even if it was not the result of an urgent desire or preference to 
do it over any other thing, whereas strong coercion eliminates consent completely and 
causes the choice to be irregular but doesn’t affect the process of ikhtiyār. Based on the 
personal reasoning of the Ḥanafis, the existence of consent means the existence of choice 
but the existence of choice does not mean the existence of consent. 
Thus, ikhtiyār for the Ḥanafis is connected to the expression that initiates the contract 
whereas riḍā is connected to the legal effects of the contract. Therefore, the one who is 
forced into a contract is considered a person who has a choice (ikhtiyār) because he intended 
the expression that initiated the contract, but at the same time is not content with the legal 
effects of the contract. Accordingly, every contract that stipulates the existence of riḍā  (like 
contracts of sale and purchase) is considered as fāsid (irregular) if riḍā  does not exist, where 
riḍā  is not a condition, the contract is considered valid and effective as in the case of 
marriage and divorce. However, the majority accepted neither the differentiation the Ḥanafis 
established between riḍā and ikhtiyār nor the divisions of the types of ikhtiyār as they said 
that coercion is contrary to both riḍā and ikhtiyār because they are same thing.555 
According to Ibn Al-Qayyim, the expressions do not become binding until the person means 
them and accepts their consequences. However, he must also mean and intend to utter the 
word, so two wills must be fulfilled: 
a- The will to freely utter the words. 
b- The will to intend the commitments and consequences of the contract. 
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The will to intend the meaning of the contract (the commitments and consequences of the 
contract) is even more confirmed than the will to freely utter its words because it is the 
intended meaning of the contract while the words are only tools by which to achieve it.
556
 
Al-Shāṭibī (d. 790 AH / 1388 AD) stated that, if the act is combined with the intent then all 
defining laws (aḥkām taklīfiyya) become effective but if the act is not combined with intent 
then all defining laws becomes ineffective, like the acts of a sleeping person, the insane or 
the unaware. He then used as evidence the verse: “And they were not commanded except to 
worship Allah, [being] sincere to Him in religion” (Q., 98:5), and the verse: “So worship 
Allah, [being] sincere to Him in religion” (Q., 39:2), and the verse: “except for one who is 
forced [to renounce his religion] while his heart is secure in faith” (Q., 16:106), and he 
confirmed this meaning by the ḥadīth of the Prophet: “Actions are according to intentions, 
and everyone will get what he intended”. He then mentioned that if a person is forced into 
something in order to defied harm from himself then he did not intend to do what he was 
ordered to do because deeds are accepted only if combined with the right intention; if he had 
no intention then his deed is invalid and therefore it is considered non-existant (i.e. as if it 
never happened).
557
  
Ibn Al-Qayyim also clarified that, ‘the intention is the spirit of the contract; it causes it to be 
valid or invalid’.558 He confirmed that the lawgiver gives more consideration to the intention 
than the words because the words can be directed to other purposes but the intention is 
directed to the contracts themselves. He then stated that whoever reflects upon the sources of 
the law will find that the Lawgiver has abolished all the phrases where the speaker did not 
intend their meanings, but uttered them unintentionally like the one who is sleeping, the 
intoxicated, the forgetful, the ignorant, the forced and the one who makes a mistake under 
the influence of great happiness, anger or sickness. Therefore, the main rule that must not be 
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overlooked is that intentions are considered in actions and speech, just as it is considered in 
acts of worships.
559
  
Al-Duraynī explained the reason that the Ḥanafis differentiate between riḍā and ikhtiyār and 
mentioning that they did so depending on their concept and effect. They see ikhtiyār as ‘the 
ability to do a thing and its opposite’ and riḍā as ‘seeking a thing and being comfortable 
with it’. They also explain irāda (will) as the mere intention to do a thing. Accordingly, 
ikhtiyār has a more general significance while riḍā has a more specific significance; for riḍā 
to exist, ikhtiyār must exist but ikhtiyār can exist without riḍā. This results in the fact that 
ikhtiyār and riḍā in the Ḥanafī school are two different things, and are not synonymous nor 
are they the same because ikhtiyār can exist while riḍā does not, as in the case of 
coercion.
560
 
As mentioned in chapter two when explaining about the nature of the marriage contract and 
its cornerstones and conditions, we pointed out that formula (ṣīgha) is the essential pillar in 
any contract. Therefore, a contract is nothing more than an offer (ijāb) and acceptance 
(qabūl) which results in binding obligations. Moreover, we also mentioned that every party 
in the contract must have the intention or the will to initiate the contract and that will or 
intention must be expressed by a means of clarification like an explicit utterance, writing, 
gesture or any other means. This ‘will of contract’ exists in any transaction because it is the 
intention of a person to initiate the contract so it results in the transfer of possession in 
financial transactions or, in the case of marriages, makes the sexual intercourse between the 
husband and wife lawful.
561
  Jurists divide this ‘will of contract’ into two types: 
1- The real internal will (‘irāda bāṭina ḥaqīqiyya): which is a hidden will that no one 
can check. In this case, it is the mere intention and seeking to do the act even if it 
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was not combined with words or actions that indicate the intended meaning of the 
person.
562
  
2- The clear will (‘irādah ẓāhira): which is to express the real internal will by words or 
actions that issued by the parties of the contract. It is the ‘words and the action’ 
which are the effective factors in the initiation of the contract. There is no need to 
search for the intention behind initiating a contract and therefore the clear will is 
considered as a sufficient proof of the existence of the intention and will to initiate 
the contract and it can be approved –in the contract- with the existence of some sort 
accompanying evidence (qarīna) that indicates it, even with cultural practices.563   
If there is any sign that indicates the absence of intention or a lack of will when initiating the 
contract, it is considered as a factor that affects the internal real will. However, if the real 
will is approved and does exist but there is a suspicion that it took place under the influence 
of fear, a mistake, deception, compulsion or coercion then these factors are called by jurists 
‘the defects in the consent’ (cuyūb al-riḍā), because the main foundation of the contract in 
reality is the will and the intent of the contracted party.
564
 Obviously, this is directly 
connected to the issue of ijbār (compulsion) in marriage or when ikrāh (coercion) is 
exercised against one of the parties in the marriage contract. Therefore, anyone who gets 
married under the influence of compulsion or coercion is considered discontented with the 
contract because compulsion and coercion are considered to be factors that affect the will of 
the contract. This is called ‘defect will’ by jurists. Al-Sanhūrī clarified that it must 
distinguished between the non-existing will and the defect will: 
a- The non-existing will is just an external appearance for a will that has no reality, like 
that which comes out of the insane, the boy with no clarity (tamyīz), the intoxicated 
man or the one who is joking. Such will has no existence because the ability to make 
a clear choice is the requirement of an approved will and therefore the absence of 
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that requirement means the non-existence of the will which causes the contract to be 
invalid and non-existent.  
b- The defect will do exist but it came out of a person who is unaware of his action 
(which is described as mistake) or out of a person against his will (which is described 
as compulsion).
565
 
Consent can only exist when its requirements exist and it will have no effect unless all of its 
conditions of soundness and effectives are fulfilled. Moreover, consent is considered valid 
when it is not affected by any type of compulsion or coercion, and when it does not restrict 
the freedom of any party. It must also come out of a person who is fully aware of his 
disposal without any factors of ignorance, deceit or exploitation exercised by anyone. It is 
not hidden that the freedom of consent is not approved unless it wasn’t affected by any type 
of compulsion of coercion.
566
 
We learnt previously that the original condition for the validity of a person’s conduct is for 
him to have full legal capacity by attaining the age of majority and mental maturity, in 
addition to the existence of the ‘real internal will’ which leads to free consent. Accordingly, 
as consent is one of the most important conditions in initiating contracts in the Islamic law, 
everything that affects it will also affect the ‘real internal will’ which is essential for consent. 
Therefore, all of the person’s conduct must be disposed with his real will and free choice so 
he desires to do the act as soon as he intends it. However, a person is considered as ‘having 
choice’ as long as he has the ability to commit an act or refrain from it.  
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5.6 The Impact of the Differentiation Established by Ḥanafis between riḍā and ikhtiyār  
The impact of the differentiation established by Ḥanafis between riḍā (consent) and ikhtiyār 
(choice) appears in everything that affects the validity and the soundness of riḍā in 
transactions. Jurists mentioned things that are considered to affect riḍā  and ikhtiyār, like 
mistakes, joking, intoxication, and coercion, and mentioned that in the books of  principles 
of jurisprudence (‘uṣūl al-fiqh) in issues related to legal capacity (ahliyya) and the factors 
that affect legal capacity. We will choose the example of coercion (ikrāh) to clarify the 
impact of this differentiation because it has a close connection with the subject of the thesis 
and because coercion is one of the most prominent deficiencies of riḍā in Islamic 
jurisprudence. That is why jurists –Ḥanafis specifically- denoted chapters to coercion to 
discuss its rulings and impact upon the conduct upon peoples’ actions. The jurists of the 
other schools of law mentioned coercion in the fields of financial transactions and in the 
field of divorce –the divorce of the compelled- but what concerns us is the effect of coercion 
on the validity of the marriage contract. According to al-Sanhūrī, one of the most prominent 
defects which have a direct impact on the will of the contracted parties in Islamic 
jurisprudence is coercion (ikrāh), as he considered coercion to be the most objective and 
least subjective of those defects, because of the means of violence related to coercion which 
is clear and physical.
567
 
Islamic jurisprudents did not ignore the issue of coercion but discussed it extensively, as 
many verses in the Qur’an mention the issue of coercion (ikrāh) which all lead to the 
principle that any actions which have been carried out by a person under the influence of 
coercion cannot be legally binding. Those verses are considered as original rules in this 
issue, which is regarded as one of the most prominent influences on the freedom of the 
human being; his will and his choice. Amongst verses explicitly related to the issue of 
coercion is, “There shall be no coercion in [acceptance of] the religion” (Q., 2:256) which 
means that no one should be forced to embrace Islam.
568
 According to Ibn 
cĀshūr, negating 
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coercion is a predicate that indicates prohibition and means to negate all causes of coercion 
in the rule of Islam, i.e. do not force anyone to accept Islam. It came in a form of categorical 
negation and encompasses any type of coercion because of the generality of the text.
569
 
Thus, this verse is an evidence to disapprove of all acts whereby someone is forced to accept 
Islam, because accepting the faith is a matter that is built on conviction, consideration and 
free choice. 
Another verse is, “Whoever disbelieves in Allah after his belief… except for one who is 
forced [to renounce his religion] while his heart is secure in faith” (Q., 16:106). This verse is 
talking about the person who is forced to pronounce disbelief while his heart is secure in 
faith, satisfied with it, does not hate it and determined to stay on it. Such a person is excused 
by law because he uttered the words of disbelief under coercion.
570
  Ibn 
cĀshūr stated that 
this verse gives permission to the compelled person to show disbelief by showing any of the 
manifestations of actions or speech that are customarily considered to be disbelief.
571
 
Thus, if this verse grants permission for the compelled person to show disbelief then the 
permission becomes even more significant where actions other than disbelief are done under 
coercion. That will also be the case when oppression is exercised over others like in case of 
coercion in marriage and divorce. According to al-Qurṭubī, the Qur’an allowed outward 
disbelief in Allah –although believing in Allah is a foundation of the faith- in instances of 
coercion without considering that disbelief to be real. Jurists applied this in all branches of 
the Sharīcah, so if coercion takes place then no action is considered as valid and no rulings 
or punishment result from that action.
572
  Therefore, in jurisprudence this situation is 
described as a concession (rukhṣa) for the competent person as a means of ease and to 
approve the principle that matters are judged depending on their intentions and objectives, as 
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the Prophet said, “Allah has pardoned my nation (‘Ummah) for mistakes, what they forget 
and what they are forced to do”.573  
Generally, Islamic jurisprudence considers coercion (ikrāh) to be an illegal act and sees it as 
a defect in will which affects consent. Jurists consider all acts and contracts issued by the 
person under coercion as void and Ḥanafis considered them as irregular (fāsid) or suspended 
(mawqūf). Both grades are considered to be stronger positions than those acts and contracts 
remain to be binding. The apparent judgement of their school of law is that the contract of 
the compelled is irregular and not suspended on the condition that the forced person allows 
it after the cause of coercion is removed. As for Māliki jurists, they considered the contract 
of the compelled to be non-binding so he can invalidate it after the removal of the cause of 
coercion. This is their judgement in the issues of sale, purchase and financial transactions. 
As for marriage contract, they judged that marriage contract under coercion is invalid.
574
 
Coercion (ikrāh) is one of the defects that have an impact on will because it has a direct 
influence on the principle of consent in contracts. Because evidence and facts proved that 
forced marriage is indeed a compulsion to marriy, this raises the question: what is the effect 
of coercion on the validity of marriage contract in Islamic jurisprudence? Before answering 
this question, we need to provide introductions that are necessary in this matter.  
5.7 Coercion Definition 
Coercion (ikrāh) is a legal term denoting ‘duress’, Nyazee states that ikrāh is coercion and 
duress. He describes ikrāh as: ‘a situation in which one is forced to do something without his 
willingness. He also classifies it as one of causes of defective legal capacity, as all jurists do 
when they write about “Legal Capacity”.’575  
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Coercion is not consistent with love; rather, it is completely to the contrary. According to 
Ibn Fāris the origin of ‘kaf-ra-ha’ (karaha) gives the opposite of consent and love.576 
Coercion in Islamic jurisprudence is: ‘to force others to do that which they are unpleased 
with’.577  In other more precise words: ‘it is the call to action under threat’.578 
There are many definitions for coercion as a result of the differences in views between 
jurists. Some of them clarified the linguistic significance of coercion whilst others added to 
that the effect of coercion, especially the Ḥanafis who differentiated between consent (riḍā) 
and ikhtiyār (choice) and the effect of coercion on both of them. Amongst the definitions 
that Ḥanafis gave to coercion is, ‘the action a person takes because of another’s will in a way 
that negates his consent and invalidates his free choice without disapproving his legal 
capacity or excusing him of a mistake’. This is because they considered the compelled 
person to be one who is afflicted with coercion but is still accountable and addressed with 
the provisions of the law.
579
   
The person who is compelled is called ‘mukrah’; under threat, pressure and compulsion. His 
condition is to be incapable of resisting the threat befalling him with any means, and the 
compeller is called ‘mukrih’; the person who threatens and forces someone else to commit 
an act forcibly. His condition is to be seriously capable of implementing his threat. The 
action is called ‘mukrah calayh’, which is the action that the compeller seeks to achieve with 
his threat; either a verbal action like carrying out a contract or other verbal conducts like sale 
and marriage. The means of fear is called ‘mukrah bih’; the means which the compeller uses 
when he threats, like killing, beatings and imprisonment. Its condition is to be a harm that is 
disliked by the compelled whether it is a cause of harm to the self, one of his organs or a 
property, or a means of distress that causes a rational person to commit the request of the 
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compeller out of his fear of that distress. These are known as pillars and conditions of 
coercion.
580
  
Therefore, coercion is putting pressure on a person with harmful means and threatening him 
with it in order to compel him to either do or not do something. This implies that coercion 
can take two forms: 
1- For a person to force another to commit an act by inflicting harm on him, so the 
compelled person complies out of his fear of suffering that harm again. This is 
legally described as ‘physical coercion’.   
2- For a person to be threatened with harm in case he does not comply, so he complies 
out of his fear of the harm which will be inflicted if he refuses to comply. This is 
legally described as ‘psychological coercion’. 581 
When reflecting upon all of these definitions, we notice that they do not differ much as they 
are all consistent in the meaning and the significance, even if they differ in words and 
phrases.  
5.7.1 The Criterion of Coercion 
The following section will assess whether or not the criterion for coercion is to cause fear in 
the compelled.
582
 
We concluded from the definitions above that for coercion to exist, two factors must exist, a 
physical and a psychological. The physical one is the threat of causing harm and the 
psychological  one is to cause the compelled fear, which is the main element in the issue of 
coercion because coercion through that fear affects the will and the intention of the 
individual. Therefore, coercion differs depending on peoples’ conditions: age, sex, strength, 
weaknesses, social position and status and so forth. Ibn Ḥajar said, ‘the scholars agreed that 
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the threat of death, causing harm to an organ of the body, severe beating and long 
imprisonment are all considered coercion. They disagreed in regard to light beating, a day’s 
imprisonment and similar acts’.583 In case the act that the compelled person is forced to 
commit is initiating a contract, then it is stipulated in Islamic jurisprudence –if coercion is 
exercised in such case- that the coercion causes fear to the contracting party which causes 
him to carry out the contract. Al-Sanhūrī confirms that the psychological criterion which is 
considered in a case of contracts initiated under coercion is for the compelled to assume that 
the threat will be almost certainly implemented, so he carries out the contract because of this 
fear. 
5.7.2 Could Coercion be Legitimate? 
Generally, in Islamic law, coercion is dispraised because it contradicts with love and consent 
and it is usually takes place under threat, so it is unimaginable that coercion is legitimate in 
Islamic law. However, what if the purpose of coercion is to achieve a legitimate cause, a 
public interest, fulfilling a right or repelling injustice? In answering this question, al-Sanhūrī 
stated that requesting a person to fulfil his duty is legal no doubt and forcing him to fulfil 
that right is not described as coercion and doesn’t invalidate the legal act through which the 
right is fulfilled. This type of coercion is considered to be a legitimate compulsion or 
‘coercion with right’. However, this can only be achieved through judicial system. This is 
also called ‘coercion with legitimate means and purpose’, and that is why jurists stipulate 
that it is not generally legitimate for coercion to have an effect on the contract. Therefore, 
when coercion is mere aggression on a person’s will, without any right, then it effects the 
validity of his disposal.
584
 Coercion which is mere aggression on a person’s will is ‘coercion 
without right’.  
Al-Duraynī stated that, by carefully considering the fiqh of this issue one can find the 
‘coercion with right’ (ikrāh bi ḥaqq) and ‘coercion without right’ (ikrāh bi-ghayri ḥaqq) are 
different in regards of their rule and legal effects. The first is legitimate and allowed in order 
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to achieve justice and considered interest. The second one is not allowed because it includes 
prohibited compulsion and aggression on personal freedom without right. Al-Duraynī 
concluded that coercion with right is legitimate and obligatory if the purpose is legitimate 
because of the public interest. That is why the Sharīcah does not consider it to be a cause to 
disprove free choice and consent and doesn’t invalidate a person’s actions, but rather 
approves them and the consequences of the contract become effective as if the person is 
fully content with sound will. Coercion without right, however, is a forbidden act legally and 
attributing the action and its effects to the accountable is a transgression against his personal 
independence and rights. This is why the Lawgiver disapproved that connection –between 
the person and attributing the action to him- both in its causes and its effects in order to 
guard his personal independence and protect his rights, so that he does not lose them against 
his will.
585
         
Therefore, ‘coercion with right’ is legitimate coercion when no aggression against anyone’s 
right takes place. For it to be legitimate, it must fulfil two conditions: 
1- For the compeller to have the right to threaten. 
2- For him to have the right to oblige [others] to the act. 
Examples for coercion with right are: for the judge to compel the husband who took an oath 
not to have sexual intercourse with his wife either to do so or to divorce her after the expiry 
of the waiting time which is four months as set out in (Q., 2:226). Coercion without right is 
unjust coercion or coercion that is not allowed because either its means or purpose is 
forbidden. An example of this is when a person who is capable of inflicting harm on another 
person forces the other person to commit a prohibited act in Sharīcah like committing 
unlawful sexual intercourse.
586
 This division is customary with Shāficī,587 Wheras the 
Mālikis call it ‘legal coercion’ (ikrāh sharcī) and ‘illegal coercion’ (ikrāh ghayr sharcī).588  
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As for Ḥanafī jurists, they considered the strength of the coercion and the level of its effect 
upon the compelled and they divided it into two types:   
1- Extreme coercion (ikrāh mulji’): that which is based on fear of instant death, instant 
permanent impairing of any organ of the body, severe beating, lengthy imprisonment 
or an insulting action for a person of a high status in the community. This includes 
the person and those whom he fears for their safety like his parents, children, 
brothers or sisters. This ruling of such coercion is that it negates consent and causes 
the choice to be irregular. 
2- Limited coercion (ikrāh ghayr mulji’): when the means of the threat does not cause 
severe pain or distress. The ruling of such coercion is that it negates riḍā (consent) 
because the compelled has the capacity to endure it, but it does not affect the ikhtiyār 
(choice). 
They can also be called strong coercion  (ikrāh qawī) and weak coercion (ikrāh ḍacīf) 
respectively.
589
 
Although the majority of jurists believe that any threat is considered to be coercion, it is 
usually combined with the threat of killing, torture or beating. The threat of any punishment 
or the mere fear of torture is a criterion for coercion. This extends beyond physical acts like 
torture, beating etc., because coercion can be physical and/or psychological.
590
 Furthermore, 
there is another type of coercion called ‘moral coercion’, which was not overlooked by the 
Sharīcah because the threat of imprisoning the father or the son is not actually a physical 
harm that afflicts the person’s body but it afflicts his soul (nafs). It might seem physical to 
the relatives but it is moral and psychological for the compelled person. The difference 
between physical and moral coercion is that moral coercion is directed at the psychological 
side of the human while the physical coercion is directed at his body. Moreover, moral 
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coercion affects freedom of choice but it doesn’t approve the will completely, as in the case 
of physical coercion. There is no stronger coercion than a person seeing his son or father 
exposed to torture.
591
 Al-Sarakhsī praised the opinion of Ḥanafis, which approves the effect 
that moral coercion has on the validity of contracts because a person is not usually content to 
see his father or son killed or imprisoned as that causes sadness to him, like if he himself 
was imprisoned or perhaps even worse.
592
 The judgement of this type of coercion is 
considered ineffective.  
5.7.3 Does Coercion Affect the Legal Capacity (ahliyya)? 
All types of coercion mentioned previously do not have an effect on the capacity to acquire 
rights (ahliyyat al-wujūb) because its criterion is for a person to be a living human. This type 
of capacity is only affected by death, as already discussed in the section on legal capacity 
(ahliyya). None of the types of coercion previously discussed any effect on the capacity to 
execute (ahliyyat al-‘adā') and do not negate the person’s eligibility to be accountable or 
addressed by the legislation. The effect is only limited to changing some rulings which result 
from the legal capacity to execute (ahliyat al-‘dā’) (while the person remains competent for 
two reasons:  
- The existence of intellect and clarity which are the criteria for the legal capacity to 
execute (ahliyat al-‘dā’) and for the person to be addressed with the rulings of the 
legislation. 
- The fact that the compelled is considered as afflicted in the case of coercion as well 
as in the choice between doing an act and refraining from it. This affliction is 
approved as soon as the person is addressed with the rulings of the legislation.
593
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The reason for coercion not contradicting the two types of legal capacity is that legal 
capacity is approved by the fact that the person is alive, sane and major and coercion doesn’t 
affect any of those things. The things the person might be compelled to do can be forbidden 
so committing them means that he has committed a sin like fornication. It might also be 
obligatory so not committing it means that he has commit a sin, such as eating a dead animal 
in case of necessity. It might also be a concession (rukhṣah) so if he does not do it he does 
not sin and if he does it then he gets a reward, like uttering a word of disbelief when his life 
is threatened.
594
  
Types of Actions in Case Coercion is exercised: 
1- Actions that are allowed in essence, like eating or drinking: if a person is compelled 
to carry them out then he must commit the least of the two harms.      
2- Actions that the Lawgiver allowed in times of necessity like drinking alcohol or 
eating dead animals and everything that is forbidden in order to preserve the 
Sharīcah’s right not people’s rights: the compelled is allowed to commit them and he 
is even obliged to do so, so if his refusal to commit them would cause him death or 
the loss of an organ. The Sharīcah allows them in times of necessity and consuming 
that which is forbidden in order to preserve the self is obligatory and must not be 
abandoned as Qur’an says: “He has only forbidden to you dead animals, blood, the 
flesh of swine, and that which has been dedicated to other than Allah. But whoever is 
forced [by necessity], neither desiring [it] nor transgressing [its limit], there is no sin 
upon him. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful” (Q., 2:173). That is because 
necessity is a case that is more general than coercion which is in itself part of 
necessity.
595
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3- Actions that the Lawgiver allowed in times of necessity but if the person remains 
patient until he dies then he will be rewarded, like apparently disbelieving in Allah or 
ridiculing the religion. 
4- Actions that the person is not allowed to committ under any circumstances, like 
murder. If a person is compelled to commit murder, then he does not have the right 
to do so because by doing this he will be obeying a creature in an act of disobedience 
to the Creator and giving preference to himself over another person who has the 
same sanctity as him. Although the Sharīcah allows uttering words of disbelief under 
coercion, it does not allow killing under coercion.
596
 
5.7.4 The Effect of Coercion  
Generally speaking, actions or conduct carried out by a person under coercion are divided 
into two categories: 
a- Practical conduct (actions) 
b- Verbal conduct (speech) 
Jurists differed in their personal reasoning (ijtihād) in regard to holding the compelled 
person responsible for his actions. In the Ḥanafī opinion, coercion has no effect in holding 
the compelled person responsible for his verbal and practical actions, but it has an effect in 
transferring that responsibility to the compeller if possible, so he is judged accordingly. In 
the case the action cannot be attributed to the compeller then the compelled person becomes 
responsible for his action. They said, ‘the compeller becomes responsible only if he has full 
control over the compelled person so he becomes like a tool in his hand’. Thus, Ḥanafī 
jurists approved that conduct carried out by the compelled but the effect of coercion is to 
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attribute the consequences of the action to the person who compelled him to commit that 
action instead of the compelled person.
597
    
However, for jurists other than Ḥanafis, coercion with right (as explained above) has no 
effect and the conduct is considered as valid and effective. In the case of illegitimate 
coercion or coercion without right, they explained: 
a- If the action of the person who is compelled is not allowed under coercion, like 
murder, then the compelled is responsible. 
b- If the action of the compelled is allowed for the coerced, like destroying another’s 
property, then he is not responsible and the compeller is held responsible. 
c- If the action of the compelled is verbal conduct (speech) then neither the compelled 
nor the compeller are held responsible.
598
   
Schacht confirms that coercion is a defect of declarations (iqrārāt) as approved by both civil 
and criminal laws; when one party comes under the influence of the threat from the other 
party who is able to inflict the threat; the party under the threat complies. Schacht then states 
that there is a legal responsibility resulting from the declarations taken under threat, but the 
responsibility varies according to the level of threat.
599
 
Scholars differed in their judgement of verbal disposals which take place under the influence 
of coercion. These disposals are divided into two types: 
1- Initiations (inshā’āt) 
2- Declarations (iqrārāt) 
Ḥanafī jurists ruled that the effect of coercion varies depending on the type of verbal 
disposals; so, if the action that the compeller seeks to achieve with his threat (mukrah 
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c
alayhi) is a declaration, the effect of coercion will be to invalidate the declaration, whether 
the coercion was extreme or limited. Hence, if a person is forced to declare a marriage or a 
divorce then his declaration is considered void with no legal effect. This is because 
declaration is usually approved as the truthful part of it outweighs the untruthful part, which 
is not the case when coercion takes place. Indeed, coercion gives more weight to the 
untruthful part in the declaration because it is strong evidence that the confessor is untruthful 
in whatever he confesses to and that he only intends to defy the harm that he was threatened 
with, and therefore his declaration is considered void.   
Generally, verbal disposals under the category of initiations like contracts and so forth are 
divided by Ḥanafis into two groups: 
a- Those which can be annulled 
The validity of those disposals depends on the existence of riḍā (consent), like sale, lease 
mortgage and other contracts. Coercion in this case causes the disposals to be irregular but 
the contract is still considered initiated and valid whether the coercion was extreme or 
limited because the contract is issued by a person who is legally liable for his disposals and 
the contract is judged to be irregular because riḍā (consent) is a condition for its validity and 
effectiveness. Thus, if the compelled allows the contract after the removal of the coercion, 
the contract is considered valid because of the removal of the reason of irregularity. 
Accordingly, the effect of coercion on initiations which can be annulled like sale, gift and 
lease is to cause them to be irregular (fāsid) but not invalid (bāṭil). Their argument is that 
coercion negates riḍā (consent) but not ikhtiyār (choice) and consent is a condition for the 
validity of the contract but not for its initiation so the disposals are considered initiated but 
irregular (fāsid) and therefore take that ruling according to the Ḥanafis.600 
b- Those which cannot be annulled 
                                                     
600
 See Al-Khafīf, Aḥkām al-Mucamlāt al-Māliyyah, pp. 217-18. Also see al-Sanhūrī, Maṣādir al-Ḥaqq, II, pp. 
208-09. 
 205 
 
These are disposals that cannot be annulled in the Ḥanafī view like marriage, divorce,  
recovering  a marriage (raj
c
ah), oath of divorce (yamīn), ẓihār (an oath by the husband that 
his wife is like his mother, meaning she is unlawful for him), ‘īlā’ (for a husband to swear 
not to have a sexual intercourse with his wife for a period of time), vows and so on which 
are all considered to be permissible in their view, even with coercion because coercion has 
no effect in such disposals as they result in their consequences as long as a person carries 
them out by his own choice and because the legislation considers that uttering such disposals 
equates to meaning them and approving their rule. That is why the Sharīcah obliges the one 
who jokingly utters words of marriage or divorce, whether under the influence of coercion 
or not. Therefore –in their opinion- all of those initiations are valid and legally effective with 
no effect stemming from coercion. The Ḥanafis’ argument is that those disposals result in 
their consequences as soon as the person carries them out because he did so by his own 
choice –depending on the fact that they differentiate between riḍā (consent) and ikhtiyār 
(choice) - as the compelled chose to carry them out and accepted their resulting rules while 
accepting the fact that his choice is irregular if the coercion was extreme.
601
  
On this basis, Ḥanafis differentiated between contracts that can be annulled (trade-off 
financial contracts and similar contracts) and contracts that cannot be annulled. Ḥanafis 
believe that riḍā  (consent) is neither a cornerstone nor a condition of soundness in this last 
type of contracts and marriage, divorce, recovering of a marriage (raj
c
ah) and similar verbal 
disposals do not depend on the existence of riḍā  (consent) and intention but rather on words 
uttered by the major sane person (al-bāligh al-cāqil). Therefore, they are not affected by 
coercion, mistake, unintentional speech, joking, intoxication or not understanding the 
meaning. Ḥanafis justified this by claiming that intent is a hidden thing that cannot be 
approved in and of itself, but that reality is approved by the means that indicate that intent.
602
 
Al-Ḥaṣakfī (d. 1088 AH /1677 AD) said, ‘realising the meaning of offer and acceptance is 
not required in disposals where there is no difference between seriousness and joking like 
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marriage and divorce and no intention is needed’. Ibn cĀbidīn justified this by the fact that 
realising the content of the words is considered in order to clarify the intent which is 
unconditioned in disposals where seriousness and joking make no difference, contrary to 
sales and other similar contracts.
603
 
Al-Marghinānī stated that, if a person is forced to sell his property, to purchase a commodity 
or to lease his house under the influence of ikrāh, such as the threat of being killed, severe 
beating or imprisonment, he has the choice after the removal of coercion either to approve 
the sale or to disapprove it and return the commodity because mutual consent is one of the 
conditions of the validity of such contracts as the Qur’an says, “do not consume one 
another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business by mutual consent” (Q., 4:29) and 
coercion in such contracts negates consent because if the condition does not exist then that 
which it is conditioned for does not exist either too.
604
  
Ḥanafī jurists believe that consent is not a pillar for the validity of the financial contract but 
a condition for them to be sound and binding, as al-Marghinānī declared by saying, ‘because 
mutual consent is one of the conditions for the validity of such contracts’.605      
In summary, the Ḥanafis considered the uttered statement but not the intent in verbal 
disposals, as they considered the statement uttered by a sane major person as the main 
cornerstone of the contract and the contract becomes effectual if the person approves it after 
it takes place, except in the case of a contract that cannot be annulled which becomes 
effective immediately without the need for approval because they include the Sharīcah’s 
right and they cannot be an object of jest. However, riḍā (consent) is a condition for the 
contract to become valid and binding in contracts that can be annulled but not a condition at 
all in contracts that cannot be annulled like marriage and divorce.
606
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5.7.5 The Effect of Coercion on Verbal Disposals in the Opinion of the Majority 
The majority of jurists held a different view as they didn’t divide contracts into those which 
can be annulled and those which cannot be annulled. They considered riḍā (consent) as a 
cornerstone in all types of contracts and therefore if it does not exist then the contract is 
considered invalid (bāṭil) whether it is a financial contract or any other type. Consent -as 
previously discussed- is to seek something with intent for its effect to be the result. It is a 
cornerstone in all types of contract in the opinion of the majority and accordingly it differs 
from the mere intention that expresses that something is sought. 
607
 
According to al-Shāṭibī, if the action is combined with an intention then the rules of the law 
(al-aḥkām al-sharciyya) result from it, but if the action is not combined with an intention 
then no rules of law result from it. This is the situation in case of the one who is asleep, 
unaware or insane. Al-Shāṭibī then mentioned that if a person is forced to an act in order to 
repel harm from himself, then his act is considered unintentional because an act becomes 
valid (ṣaḥīḥ) only if it is combined with the right intention and the coercion negates the 
intention in this case. Therefore, his act is invalid (bāṭil) and as a result the existence and 
nonexistence of that act are the same.
608
  Mālikis stated in the field of business transactions 
that a sale is considered initiated with any sign that indicates the mutual consent of the two 
parties whether by words, exchange, writing or gesture.
609
 They judged that if a person is 
forced to make a sale or a purchase, then his disposal is suspended until the removal of the 
reason of coercion and the person can choose with his free will whether to approve the sale 
or the purchase. They ruled that ‘no consent [exists] when coercion is exercised’.610 Also, 
they judged that a marriage is considered invalid (bāṭil) until it fulfils three conditions; the 
first of which is that no coercion is exercised. So the marriage of the compelled man or 
woman is considered void and if the marriage contract is carried out under threat or coercion 
then it is considered invalid.
611
 Shāficis adopted the same approach and made intention a 
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cornerstone for divorce.
612
 Al-Ghazālī stated that divorce carried out by the compelled is 
disapproved because its intention is incorrect and it is only intended under the influence of 
coercion, so its judgement is the same as the act of a compelled person.
613
 
Therefore, Mālikis do not judge the disposal of the compelled to be irregular (fāsid) or 
suspended (mu
c
allaq) but they judge it as non-binding (ghayr mulzim), so the compelled has 
the option to approve or disapprove the contract after the removal of the coercion. The 
Shāficis completely contradict the Mālikis, in that they rule with irregularity or suspension, 
as judged by them, and judge the disposal of the compelled as invalid (bāṭil) whether in 
disposals that can be annulled (like sales) or those that cannot be annulled, like marriage. 
They believe that coercion negates consent and if consent does not exist then choice is not 
considered at all. Furthermore, coercion causes the legally approved choice to be irregular 
and any disposal is considered to be initiated with the statement that is uttered with intention 
and a legally approved choice.
614
 
According to al-Zarqa, consent is a condition for the validity and effectiveness of all verbal 
disposals and that is why coercion affects them whether strong or weak. This is the case 
whether they are contracts or single-will disposals like declarations.
615
 In this context, al-
Duraynī stated that it is legally approved -as a confirmed original rule in jurisprudence- that 
a person is not obliged except with what he/she obliges him/herself with out of his/her free 
choice and consent because free choice and consent is the foundation of all the legality of 
verbal disposals’. Therefore, if choice and consent do not exist then the disposal will have 
no legitimacy and become invalid with no legal existence either in its original rules or in its 
legal effect. The result of personal reasoning (ijtihād) in the Shāficī school was that coercion 
prevents responsibility although it has no effect with regard to legal capacity.
616
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Accordingly, coercion in verbal disposals results in it having no legal effects in the opinion 
of the majority of jurists. Rather, all verbal disposals of the person who is compelled are 
considered invalid (bāṭil) so his/her marriage, divorce, sale and any verbal disposal issued 
by him/her are considered invalid (bāṭil). This is because coercion invalidates such contracts 
as they are not carried out with consent, full desire and sound choice. The compelled cannot 
be given the same rule as the one who utters the formula (ṣīgha) with free choice and desire 
but who intends to joke. Such a person must be legally punished and therefore the Lawgiver 
approved his verbal disposal. The compelled has no desire or choice in uttering the formula 
but intends to repel harm from himself which causes him to be treated with ease by the law, 
by disapproving his verbal disposal.
617
  
To conclude, the Ḥanafī jurists differentiated between consent and choice in their concept 
and legal effect. For the Ḥanafis, consent and choice are two different things and therefore 
choice can exist while consent does not, like in the case of coercion. The compelled –in the 
Ḥanafis view- is a person who intends to establish the formula (offer and acceptance) which 
is the means that causes contracts and all other disposals to be effective, so that formula is 
approved even if his intention was to merely repel harm. They justified this with the 
argument that he had the choice not to do it and to endure the harm which he was threatened 
with but he preferred the choice of establishing the formula over the choice of enduring the 
harm. In other words, he chose to commit the lesser of the two harms without being content 
with either of them, but nevertheless he made the choice. This is described as having ‘the 
ability to carry out the act or not’ which is the criterion of ikhtiyār (choice) in the Ḥanafī 
view.
618
 Riḍā (consent) does not exist in the case of coercion –which is the known opinion 
of the Ḥanafis as well as the majority of jurists- but consent in the Ḥanafī opinion is a 
condition for soundness but not for the contract to become effective, so in case coercion 
negates riḍā (consent) then the contract is considered irregular (fāsid) but the lack of 
soundness doesn’t invalidate the contract. That is why the compelled can approve the 
contract after the removal of compulsion in order to express his full consent and there will 
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therefore be no reason for irregularity anymore so the contract becomes sound and binding, 
meaning that its consequences become effective from the time of its establishment not from 
the time of its approval by the compeller, and no party can annul it alone.
619
 
5.8 Evidence Used by the Ḥanafis to Prove That Consent is not Conditioned in 
Contracts That Cannot be Annulled 
a- The rules of the issues of marriage, divorce and recovering a marriage in the Qur’an 
are not restricted to anything but the mere intent to initiate the marriage contract, the 
intent to divorce and the desire to recover the marriage in case of seeking 
reconciliation. The Qur’an does not stipulate consent, which suggests that the main 
condition in these issues is for the major and sane individual to issue the statement, 
as the Qur’an says, “when you divorce women, divorce them for [the commencement 
of] their waiting period” (Q., 65:1) and “then marry those that please you of [other] 
women” (Q., 4:3) and “and if the latter husband divorces her [or dies], there is no 
blame upon the woman and her former husband for returning to each other if they 
think that they can keep [within] the limits of Allah” (Q., 2:230). They claimed that 
these verses are in regard to verbal disposals and do not restrict their initiation to 
consent, so they used the generality in those verses as evidence for the effectiveness 
of such disposals without specification or restriction.
620
 Therefore, divorce, marriage 
and similar disposals are simply statements and a person usually has clarity of mind 
when he issues a statement, and coercion does not negate that clarity. Furthermore, 
statements are the apparent means to express the internal desires of the self (nafs), so 
coercion has no effect over consent; it is not considered in all disposals and does not 
negate the consent and the intent because the compelled chose the least of the two 
harms.
621
 
b- The ḥadīth “There are three things which, whether undertaken seriously or in jest, 
are treated as serious: Marriage, divorce and taking back a wife [after a divorce 
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which is not final] (raj
c
a)”. The Lawgiver approves the soundness of those disposals 
in case of jest because it considers uttering the statements like intending their 
meaning and rules even though the person does not intend their meaning. The 
compelled is similarly, he intends to establish them and chooses their rulings.
622
 
They also supported their argument using narrations where 
c
Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and cAli b. 
Abī Ṭālib approved the divorce of the compelled, including what cAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣancānī 
reported from 
c
Abd Allah b 
c
Umar that 
c
Umar approved the divorce of the compelled.
623
 
Moreover, Ḥanafis also argued using qiyās (analogical reasoning) by comparing the divorce 
of the compelled to divorce in jest. The point of comparison is that the person who jokes is 
not content with his divorce or marriage but they are still approved. Al-Kāsānī said, 
‘coercion negates consent definitely, but it [consent] is not a condition for the divorce to be 
approved because the divorce in jest is approved while the person is not content with it’.624   
Therefore, the Ḥanafis view of coercion was built upon the fact that it doesn’t have an effect 
over speech because no one can use another person’s tongue in order to change what the 
latter person wants, so everyone has the choice to say whatever he wants and he is not 
considered to be compelled in reality. As for actions, they are affected by coercion because 
the action can be attributed to the compeller by using the action as a means to do whatever 
he wants.
625
   
Al-Duraynī explains that the Ḥanafis’ personal reasoning (ijtihād) regarding their judgement 
of the irregularity (fasād) of the contract of the compelled is a protection for his personal 
right but not the Shariah’s right, so it is a specific type of irregularity. Al-Duraynī also 
believes that the reason behind this is that it is an aggression against human will, so their 
judgement is a way to protect the personal right of the compelled because of the lack of his 
consent. This is the process of deduction (istidlāl) used by the Ḥanafis in approving the 
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contract of the compelled if and when he approves it after the removal of coercion while 
being accountable and responsible.
626
 
This was deduced by the argument that the verses they used to prove that intent is a 
condition of marriage, divorce and recovering the marriage do not actually indicate that 
statements alone are enough without the intent. The evidence for this is that the words of 
divorce issued by one who is asleep are disapproved with all jurists. So when the verse says, 
“divorce them” it means what is issued by the legally mature, sane person with free choice 
but not the compelled, the mistaken or the one who is unaware, as evidenced by the verse, 
“And if they decide on divorce – then indeed, Allah is Hearing and Merciful” (Q., 2:227). 
Al-Qurṭubī said, ‘the determination and resolve is that which you intend to do within 
yourself’.627 And al-Shawkānī said in explaining the same verse, ‘it means that they made 
their intention to carry out the action’.628 
The Qur’an also stipulated the heart’s intent as a requirement in many issues and overlooked 
that which is issued by the tongue without that intent:  
Allah does not impose blame upon you for what is unintentional in your 
oaths, but He imposes blame upon you for what your hearts have earned. And 
Allah is Forgiving and Forbearing (Q., 2:225)  
And there is no blame upon you for that in which you have erred but [only 
for] what your hearts intended. And ever is Allah Forgiving and Merciful (Q., 
33:5).  
These verses indicate that mere statements issued by the tongue have no effect unless they 
are combined with the intent of the heart so that the tongue is expressing that intent. One of 
the confirmed rules in Islamic jurisprudence is the maxim: ‘matters are determined 
according to intention’ (al-‘umūr bi maqāṣidihā). Ibn Ḥajar stated that the rule is directed to 
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the person who is sane, aware and with free choice because the one who insane or with no 
free choice has no intention in what he does or says. This is also the case for the mistaken, 
forgetful and compelled.
629
 
5.9 Evidence used by the Majority to Prove that Consent is a Cornerstone in any 
Contract 
a- The verse, “O you who have believed, do not consume one another's wealth unjustly 
but only [in lawful] business by mutual consent” (Q., 4:29). Their point of deduction 
was that the Qur’an restricted the lawfulness of consuming one another’s wealth to 
the case when there is mutual consent and the lawfulness here is the effect of the 
contract so if the consent does not exist then the foundation of the contract does not 
exist.
630
 
b- Amongst the evidence they used to prove the invalidity (buṭlān) of the marriage and 
divorce of the compelled was the verse, “except for one who is forced [to renounce 
his religion] while his heart is secure in faith” (Q., 16:106). The point of deduction is 
that the Qur’an allowed disbelief in Allah under the infiluance of coercion and it is 
not considered disbelief. Therefore, jurists applied the same principle in all branches 
of the Sharīcah.631 Disbelief is greater than the rulings of sale, purchase, marriage and 
divorce and the compelled does not intend what he is compelled to do and does not 
desire the resulting ruling, but he only intends to repel harm from himself.
632
 
c- The verse, “O you who have believed, it is not lawful for you to inherit women by        
compulsion” (Q., 4:19), i.e. while they dislike the marriage and are not content with 
it, until they agree to marry that one whom they accept as a husband.
633
 The point of 
deduction in this verse is that the Qur’an disapproves marriage and giving in 
marriage under coercion and made it that prohibited to Muslims, which clearly 
indicates that marriage under the influence of coercion and pressure is invalid. 
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d- Al-Bukhārī reported that Ibn cAbbās said, ‘The custom (in the Pre-Islamic Period) 
was that if a man died, his relatives used to have the right to inherit his wife and, if 
one of them wished he could marry her or they could marry her to somebody else, or 
prevent her from marrying if they wished, for they had more right over her than her 
own relatives. Therefore this verse was revealed concerning this matter’.634  
Amongst the evidence from the Sunna which confirmed the meaning in the previous verses 
from the Qur’an are: 
1- Ḥadīth, “Allah has forgiven my nation for mistakes and forgetfulness, and what they 
are forced to do”.635  
The point of deduction in this ḥadīth is that, Allah has forgiven the nation of Muḥammad in 
that which they are forced to do, which are the rules which result from coercion not the 
action itself. The phrase ‘what they are forced to do’ is a general phrase that indicates 
coercion, whether verbal or practical, with no preference for one of them over the other and 
as long as there is no preference or detail then it is considered as on restriction with no sound 
reason.  
2- Ḥadīth reported by Al-Bukhārī that a woman called Khansā’ bint Khidām was given 
by her father in marriage when she disliked that marriage. So she came and 
(complained) to the Prophet and he declared that marriage invalid.
636
  
3- Ḥadīth, ‘A virgin came to the Prophet and mentioned that her father had married her 
against her will, so the Prophet allowed her to exercise her choice’ and in another 
narration, ‘the Prophet rejected her marriage’.637 
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The majority of jurists believe that all these ḥadīths are clear in indicating the invalidity of 
the marriage and the divorce of the compelled. Ibn al-Qayyim said, ‘it wasn’t authentically 
reported to any of the companions that he approved the divorce of the compelled’.638 
Therefore, the marriage contract takes the same rule with the majority. 
Al-Duraynī stated that the Shāficis believe that the contract of the compelled is void and his 
statement is ineffective, because of the fact that consent and choice are the same both in 
their concept and in their effect. They are synonymous, so if one does not exist then the 
other does not exist either. It is well known that coercion negates consent, so the choice 
become negated as well and, because there is no accountability without the existence of 
choice, the contract becomes invalid as the existence of choice is the condition for its 
initiation.
639
 
As for the ḥadīth: “There are three things which, whether undertaken seriously or in jest, are 
treated as serious”, the majority said that the approval of the marriage and divorce in jest 
does not mean not to stipulate the intent in such contracts absolutely, because they are 
serious matters that the Lawgiver emphasised and they are considered part of the Sharīcah’s 
right, which must not be subjected to jest. That is why whoever utters words of disbelief in 
jest becomes a disbeliever under the law, because he/she intended and chose the words, and 
should not therefore be compared to the compelled, the mistaken or the one who utter the 
words unintentionally. The Sharīcah obliged the one in jest with regard these three matters as 
a punishment for his action of belittling issues that are related to honour. However, the view 
of the Ḥanafis is that marriage, divorce and recovering a marriage in jest is approved which 
indicates the validity of the verbal disposals of the compelled because the one in jest also 
issued the words without intent. One of the answers to this was that this opinion has no 
grounds because there is an essential difference. The one in jest carries out the conduct while 
knowing its meaning and it consequences, but he is only tampering whereas the compelled 
issues the words under the influence of compulsion without intending them or seeking their 
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consequences, and he does so in order to repel harm from himself. Therefore, he is like the 
one who expresses the desire of someone else and if he was to be given his free choice he 
would not have said or chosen the same thing. Furthermore, the ḥadīth talks specifically 
about the verbal disposals of the one in jest, and no text that applies the same rule to the 
compelled is brought forward in their defence.
640
  
Ibn Ḥazm confirmed the understanding from the majority in this regard and stated that 
speech does not become binding under the influence of coercion, even if the compelled 
utters the words like in cases of disbelief (kufr), false accusation of unlawful sexual 
intercourse (qadhf ), declaration (iqrār), marriage (nikāḥ), marrying off (tazwīj), recovering 
a marriage (raj
c
a), divorce (ṭalāq), sales (bayc), purchases (shirā’), vows (nadhr), oaths (al-
yamīn wa al-qasam), gifts (hiba) and forcing the kitābī (the person from the people of the 
Scripture who is under the covenant of protection with the Muslims) to embrace Islam. Ibn 
Ḥazm explain this by saying that when the person said what he was compelled to say he was 
expressing the words that he was forced to say, so he is no doubt under no liability. 
Moreover, Ibn Ḥazm claimed that those who differentiated between the two cases [actions 
which can be declared null and others which cannot] have contradicted themselves because 
the Prophet said: “Verily, the reward of deeds depends upon the intention and every person 
will get the reward according to what he has intended” which indicates that if a person is 
compelled to make a statement without intending it by his free choice, then he is not obliged 
to it.
641
 
It seems that the opinion of the majority of jurists which disapproves any verbal disposal of 
the compelled is the soundest opinion as all verbal disposals should be considered invalid 
when they took place without consent. Therefore, consent must be preferred because it 
agrees with the purposes of the legislation in making it a foundation for any disposal issued 
by the person and considering his freedom in all of his choices, disposals and initiations, 
while holding him responsible for that which he does out of his free choice. Furthermore, the 
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requirement of mutual consent in sale contracts indicates that it is even more required in 
marriage as marriage has a higher priority because the issues of honour, lineage and the 
sanctity of the private parts (furūj)  is greater than issues of property in the measure of 
Islamic law. As the Qur’an prohibited the consumption of another’s property without mutual 
consent, then the private parts do not become lawful unless there is mutual consent which is 
required by the legislation in all transactions between people. This is why the Sharīcah 
prohibited the guardian to marry off his ward without her consent.
642
 
Ḥanafis do not allow coercion in any contract, which is in agreement with the majority but 
they differ with them when the contract is already concluded, where they divid contracts into 
those which can be annulled and those which cannot. They also give the same ruling to the 
one in jest. Ibn Taymiyyah claims that the opinion adopted by some jurists that marriage 
cannot be annulled has no evidence. Thus, the Qur’an, the Sunna, the narrations from the 
companions and analogical reasoning indicated the contrary, as marriage can be annulled 
based on the existence of defects in one of the contracting parties.
643
 However, al-
Qarahdāghī believes that although the Ḥanafis’ opinion can be justified from the 
jurisprudential point of view, but it does not reach the point of cancelling the need of 
intending and consenting to contracts that cannot be annulled like marriage and divorce. 
This is because, although such contracts are verbal disposals, they result in implications no 
less serious than the implications which result from written contracts that can be annulled, 
like sales. In fact, they could have even more serious consequences because they are have a 
direct link to free will, liberty of choice and honour, which jurists unanimously agree is 
sacred.
644
 
Al-Duraynī believes that comparing the compelled person to the one who contracts in jest is 
not a direct analogy because coercion does not exist in the case of jest because the person 
has chosen to utter the words and act by his free choice, but he is discontent with the 
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approval of its ruling as he is only joking. The situation of the compelled is different because 
of the existence of coercion, both in the act and the formula, so this is an assault on his 
consent and choice. He then goes on to explain the difference between the compelled and the 
one who contracts in jest by clarifying that both of them are discontent with the rule and the 
resulting effect, but legislation obliges the one in jest in issues of marriage, divorce and 
recovering the marriage because he is frivolous. Therefore the legislation intends to punish 
him for this to achieve a general legal interest in regard to marriage and divorce as it should 
not be subjected to jest and that is why the ḥadīth came for those cases specifically. The 
compelled is in different situation because he did not accept the rule and the resulting effect 
because of coercion, not because of frivolity and therefore he does not deserve to be 
punished but rather to be pardoned and protected because of the aggression which was 
exercised on his consent and free choice. Therefore, punishing the one in jest is for the sake 
of fulfilling the public interest and disapproving the effect of the disposal. In cases of 
coercion it is a protection for the individual interest which clarifies the difference between 
them in their concept, effect and intent.
645
 
The majority of jurists disagreed with the opinion of Ḥanafis and rejected their process of 
comparing compulsion to jest and they differentiated between compulsion and jest in 
marriage, divorce and recovering the marriage, where jest has no effect on them and the one 
in jest becomes obliged to them as the ḥadīth indicates. They also decided that compulsion 
has an effect on them and prevents their validity, as in all other disposals. Ibn al-Qayyim 
states:  
Don’t you see that Qur’an excused the compelled in case he utters words of 
disbelief while his heart is secure in faith but did not excuse the one in jest! 
Rather, the Qur’an says, “And if you ask them, they will surely say, "We 
were only conversing and playing." Say, "Is it Allah and His verses and His 
Messenger that you were mocking? Make no excuse; you have disbelieved 
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after your belief” (Q., 9:65-66). Therefore, the Sharīcah excused the forgetful 
and the mistaken as well.
646
  
According to al-Zarqa, the opinion of the majority is more sound and in line with the 
wisdom behind the legislation.
647
 Ibn Ḥajar said, ‘there is no difference between compulsion 
in speech or [compulsion in] acts in the opinion of the majority’.648 
It seems that consent is a cornerstone in all contracts and that is the general rule in Islamic 
law. Therefore, no contract is considered initiated or valid without it except with a specific 
piece of evidence, as in the case of a marriage or divorce conducted in jest and a sale made 
by the ‘compelled with right’ in order to pay back his debt.649 
The Effect of Coercion on the Marriage contract 
The formula (ṣīgha) in marriage contract is verbal disposal that requires offer and 
acceptance; both are considered a sign of consent to the contract. However, we previously 
explored the issue that in the Ḥanafis’ opinion, consent is described as a full choice 
(muntahā al-ikhtiyār) and that consent is different than choice, whereas in the opinion of the 
majority consent and choice are the same thing. We also explored the issue that in Ḥanafis’ 
view only extreme coercion negates consent and causes the choice to be irregular and that 
limited coercion does not affect the choice at all but a type of it negates consent and another 
type causes consent to be irregular. The opinion of the majority is that coercion affects both 
of them absolutely.     
We then discussed the subject of coercion and its impact on both consent and choice. The 
argument is that the Ḥanafis used to differentiate between consent and choice and the effect 
of the presence of one of them in the contract and the absence of the other and how jurists 
differed in regard to the effect coercion has in verbal and practical disposals. Furthermore, 
verbal disposals are divided into those which can be annulled, like sales and purchases, and 
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those which cannot be annulled like marriage and divorce (in the Ḥanafi’s opinion). They 
also adopted the view that coercion has no effect on disposals that cannot be annulled, so 
they are considered to be sound even with coercion. The majority of scholars ruled disposals 
that take place under the influence of coercion to be invalid. Accordingly, jurists are in two 
camps in regard to the validity of marriage contract under the influence of coercion, which 
can be summarised as follows: 
1- The Ḥanafī opinion 
Marriage, in the personal reasoning of Ḥanafis, is a contract that cannot be annulled so it is 
considered sound even with coercion. They justified this with the argument that marriage is 
a verbal disposal and that the compelled cannot logically be like a tool in the hand of the one 
who compels him/her. The evidence they used was based on the generality of the verses in 
regard to marriage in the Qur’an which came without specifying or restricting this disposal 
to the condition of consent. Amongst the evidence they used was the verse, “And marry the 
unmarried among you and the righteous among your male and female slaves. If they should 
be poor, Allah will enrich them from His bounty, and Allah is all-Encompassing and 
knowing” (Q., 24:32). Al-Kāsānī said, ‘the generality of the texts requires the validity of the 
disposals without any specifying or restriction. Coercion has no effect on verbal disposals 
because every speaker is free in what he says, so he is not compelled in reality’.650 Thus, 
whoever is compelled to marriy and utters his acceptance is considered to be the same as one 
who chooses without coercion because he has chosen the least of two harms, even if he/she 
is discontented with what becomes binding as a result of the marriage contract. Therefore, 
he/she has no right to request the annulment of the contract, just like the one who is 
compelled to sell or purchase, because he/she is given the same rule as the one in jest. The 
Prophet said, “There are three things which, whether undertaken seriously or in jest, are 
treated as serious: Marriage, divorce and taking back a wife (after a divorce which is not 
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final)”.651 They claimed that the words of this ḥadīth indicate the validity of marriage 
contract in jest and coercion is given the same ruling as jest.  
They also believe that the original rule is that anything which is considered valid under jest 
is considered valid under coercion because that which is considered valid under jest cannot 
be annulled and anything that cannot be annulled is not affected by coercion. Furthermore, 
Ibn 
cĀbdīn said in this context, ‘coercion has no effect in regard to preventing validity 
because coercion negates consent and the negation of consent causes the contract to be non-
binding and that allows the compelled to annul the contract. Therefore, coercion allows the 
compelled to annul the contract after coercion is confirmed and coercion has no effect of 
disposals which cannot be annulled’.652 
Based on this, marriage, in the opinion of the Ḥanafis, is considered valid under jest as well 
as coercion because if jest has an effect in any contract then coercion also has an affect and 
if  jest does not have an effect in any contract then coercion doesn’t have an effect. Any 
contract that cannot be annulled is not affected by coercion and any contract that is 
considered valid under jest cannot be annulled.
653
 They justified their position with the 
argument that legislation approved the requirement of the statement only in such disposals to 
indicate the intended meaning, so the presence of the statement causes the presence of their 
effect – whether or not the person meant it or intended its meaning. Intent and consent have 
no effect in regard to the validity of marriage contract, but the ruling is made based on 
actions, which are outward manifestations of the individual’s inner intent. Therefore, there is 
no disagreement among Ḥanafis regarding the validity and the binding nature of the 
marriage of the compelled.  Nyazee states that all transactions that do not accept rescission, 
and do not depend upon consent are valid under coercion, because they amount to the 
                                                     
651
Al-Tirmidhī, Jāmic al-Tirmidhī, ḥadīth number: (2039). Also, see al-Albānī, ‘Irwā’ al-Ghalīl, ḥadīth 
number: (1826), II, pp. 224. 
652
 Ibn 
cĀbidīn, Radd al-Muḥtār, VI, p. 139. 
653
 See Al-
cAynī, al-Bināhyah, X, pp. 76-77. 
 222 
 
termination (isqāṭ) or relinquishment of a right, and relinquishment cannot be reverted, 
because these transactions are not dependent on consent.
654
 Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah states:  
The original rule is that all the disposals of the compelled are approved in 
our opinion. He can annul those disposals which can be annulled but those 
which cannot be annulled –like marriage and divorce- are binding.  
It also states: 
If it is a verbal disposal, which is open to seriousness or jest, then coercion 
has no effect, so the compelled is considered as one who carried out that 
disposal with his free choice.
655
 
2- The opinion of the majority (Mālikis, Shāfi’is and Ḥanbalis) 
Their opinion is that coercion in marriage causes the contract to be invalid and the contract 
is non-binding even after the removal of coercion and it results in no legal consequences.
656
  
Al-Qurṭubī said, ‘the opinion of the majority is that the marriage, divorce and similar 
contracts of the compelled are invalid because of coercion’. He then quoted from one of the 
distinguished Mālikī scholars Saḥnūn:  
Our companions are unanimous that the marriage of the compelled male 
and female is invalid. They rule that this marriage should not continue 
because it is not considered to have been initiated in the first place.  
Saḥnūn also said:  
The scholars of Iraq -meaning the Ḥanafis- allowed the marriage of the 
compelled…If a person is compelled to marry a woman with a dowry of ten 
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thousands dirhams, while the normal dowry of a similar woman is one 
thousand dirhams, then the marriage is approved and he is obliged to pay the 
one thousand but not the extra amount to mahr al-mithl (the dowry paid to 
similar women). Therefore, as they disapproved the extra dowry then they 
must disapprove marriage under coercion. Moreover, their opinion 
contradicts the confirmed Sunna in the ḥadīth of al-Khansā’ bint Khidām al-
Anṣāriyyah and the Prophet’s command of seeking the woman’s 
permission.
657
 
Among the evidence the majority used was that the Prophet disapproved the marriage of a 
bikr (virgin) and a thayyib (previously married woman) after their fathers had married them 
off when they disliked the marriage. They deduced that the ḥadīth indicates the invalidity of 
the marriage contract in the case of coercion, whether the compelled woman is a virgin or 
previously married. Coercion causes the contract to be invalid and that is why the Prophet 
disapproved the marriage. Furthermore, they used the ḥadīth: “Allah has forgiven my nation 
for mistakes and forgetfulness, and what they are forced to do”. The point of deduction is 
that its verbal significance states that no rule is applied in cases of mistake, forgetfulness and 
coercion and the absence of the rule requires the disapproval of the contract which the 
person was compelled to and therefore the marriage becomes invalid with no legal effects. 
Furthermore, they use the ḥadīth of al-Khansā’ bint Khidām when she was given by her 
father in marriage and she disliked that marriage. Therefore, she came and complained to the 
Prophet and he declared that marriage to be invalid. The point of deduction in the ḥadīth is 
that it indicates the invalidity of the marriage contract when the woman is discontented with 
it, which further indicates that consent is a condition for the validity of the marriage contract 
and without it the contract is considered to be irregular.  
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We can sum up the views of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence in the subject of 
coercion in terms of its impact on human conduct as follows: 
- 1. The Ḥanafī school: they divided coercion into two types:  
a- A type that considers the strength and the weakness of the means of the threat, 
which is divided into:  
i.) Extreme coercion (ikrāh mulji’): when the coercion reaches its highest point. 
They also call it complete coercion. This type is that which leads to death, the 
loss of an organ or a severe beating that causes death or the loss of an organ. 
ii.) Limited coercion (ikrāh ghayr mulji’): when the coercion does not reach full 
strength. They also call it incomplete coercion. This type is that which 
includes imprisonment, being tied up and beatings that do not cause major 
harm. 
b- A type that consider the effect of coercion in consent and free choice. This is 
divided into three types: 
1- That which negates the consent and causes the choice to be irregular (extreme 
coercion; ikrāh mulji’). It negates consent completely but the choice still 
exists because the act is initiated by the compelled by his choice but it is 
considered irregular because he/she wasn’t completely independent in 
making that choice as he/she was affected by the choice of the compeller.   
2- That which negates consent but does not affect the choice, which happens in 
the case of threatening with something other than death or the loss of an 
organ. 
3- That which does not affect the choice but causes the choice to be irregular, 
which happens in the case when coercion is indirectly exercised on the person 
himself but towards those whom he cares about, like imprisoning the father, 
the mother or the son.   
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The last two types are under the category of limited coercion (ikrāh ghayr mulji’).  
Accordingly, limited coercion can be divided into two types:  
1- That which negates the consent. 
2- That which does not negate consent but causes it to be irregular. 
However, neither typ affects the choice.
658
 
- 2. The Mālikī school: they divided coercion into two types: 
a- Legitimate (ikrāh sharcī) 
b- Illegitimate (ikrāh ghayr sharcī) 
The first type is when coercion is exercised in case there is a right of another person, like 
when the judge forces the indebted person to sell some of his properties in order to pay back 
his debt. The second type is when coercion is exercised without being attached to any 
person’s right. This type affects consent and causes the contract to be either void or 
suspended depending on the consent of the compelled after the coercion is removed.
659
  
- 3. Shāficī and Ḥanbalī schools: Generally, they do not differ much from the 
classification given by the Mālikis, but they expressed it differently with the same 
outcome. They divided coercion into two types: 
a- Coercion with right (ikrāh bi ḥaqq) 
b- Coercion without right (ikrāh bi-ghayr ḥaqq).660 
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Although the classification which the Ḥanafis gave to coercion (i.e. extreme and limited) is 
useful in some conducts, it is not very beneficial in issues of contracts and verbal conduct. In 
this context, al-Kasānī declared that, ‘in issues of sale and purchase, extreme coercion (ikrāh 
mulji’) and limited coercion (ikrāh ghayr mulji’) are the same because both of them negate 
consent’.661 Madkūr claimed that he did not find a practical effect for the distinction between 
coercion types. He believed that it is a only a theoretical distinction, because jurists did not 
differentiate between coercion types when discussing the contract of the compelled, even 
though this distinction has an effect in practical conduct, like forcing someone to commit 
murder. Therefore, according to Madkūr, in the case of the extreme coercion (ikrāh mulji’) 
Ḥanafis approve that it negates both the contest and the choice.662 However, the 
classification of coercion established by the Mālikī, Shāficī and Ḥanbalī jurists only clarifies 
the coercion which has an effect, because coercion with right has a legal effect but coercion 
without right has no legal effect. 
5.10 The Opinion of Some Eminent Jurists who opposed the Idea of Forced Marriage 
Though the majority of jurists approved the compulsion guardianship (wilāyat al-‘ijbār), 
they stipulated the condition of not causing harm to the interests of the ward, whether male 
or a female. The scholars who investigated this issue rejected the idea of compulsion 
absolutely, even with this restriction, and believed that compulsion contradicts the meanings 
of compassion and mercy (which from the Qur’anic point of view the marital life is built 
upon) and therefore they rejected the opinion that approved compulsion in marriage and 
considered it to be coercion that is exercised over the woman to live with someone whom 
she dislikes. 
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 Ibn Taymiyyah 
Ibn Taymiyyah, said, ‘Marrying off a woman while she hates that is contrary to both the 
original rules and sound intellect’.663 According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the Sharīcah does not 
permit a guardian to compel a woman to a sale or lease contracts except with her permission, 
nor does it permit him to compel her to food, drink or clothes that she does not want, so how 
can her guardian compel her to live and be sexually active with someone she hates? 
Moreover, one of the Sharīcah’s objectives from marriage is that it be creates love and mercy 
between spouses, so how can that be achieved if the wife hates the husband?
664
  
It seems that the opinion of the majority which states that the contract of the compelled is 
invalid under the influence of coercion has more applicability in cases of forced marriage- 
where the types of psychological and social pressure exercised and the ways coercion is 
applied will naturally affect the full choice and consent to the marriage contract- because of 
the amount of evidence already mentioned that supports their opinion. It also seems that the 
opinion of the Ḥanafis in regard to this issue is not strong because it depends on comparing 
the one compelled to marriage to the one who marries in jest, which in the opinion of the 
scholars of principles is a qiyās maca al-fāriq (analogical reasoning with difference) because 
the cause (
c
illa) in the new case -coercion- is not equal to the cause in the original case -jest. 
According to al-Duraynī, the personal reasoning of the Ḥanafis is not in accordance with the 
logic of the legislation as the compelled cannot be held liable for the effect of the marriage 
contract that he/she was forced to initiate when he/she was stripped of his/her will and 
consent, which are the foundations of any disposal in the legislation. He also questioned 
how one can be forced to terminate his/her marital life through divorce and be obliged to 
endure the effects of that disposal. This is definitely not in accordance with the legislation of 
Islam and if the Ḥanafis judge such disposals to be irregular or suspended for the sake of 
protecting the compelled, that would be better and closer to the spirit of the Sharīcah.665  
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It can also be argued that the opinion of the majority upholds equity and justice and clears 
Islam of the accusation that it is a religion that builds marital relations on the basis of 
coercion and oppression and overlooks the woman’s right to have full consent and choice. 
We explored how the authentic ḥadīths (reported about the Prophet) conclusively 
demonstrate that Islam has approved the woman’s right to marry whomever she wants, as 
long as she fulfils the requirements of being able to make a good choice. Moreover, 
exercising pressure and coercion over peoples’ emotions is an ugly thing, exactly like 
unlawfully consuming their wealth and respecting the person’s will and free choice must be 
given consideration, care and protection.  
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the soundest opinion is that no one can compel a major virgin 
(al-bāligh al-cāqilah) into marriage because of what was narrated that the Prophet said, “A 
virgin should not be married until her permission is asked nor should a woman without a 
husband (‘ayyam) be married without her permission”. They (the people) asked whether ‘the 
virgin is usually modest?’ He replied “her permission is her silence”. In another narration, 
“the father must seek the virgin’s permission”. Ibn Taymiyyah stated that the Prophet 
prohibited guardians from marrying off women without their permission and this includes 
the father or any other person. This was clearly stated in the second narration; that the father 
must seek her permission.
666
 Furthermore, there is plenty of clear evidence that stipulate full 
consent in marriage, as the Qur’an said, “And when you divorce women and they have 
fulfilled their term, do not prevent them from remarrying their [former] husbands if they 
agree among themselves on an acceptable basis” (Q., 2:232), where the Qur’an prohibited 
guardians from preventing those under their guardianship from marriage if they agree among 
themselves on an acceptable basis (ma
crūf). The Qur’an also says in regard to the dowry: 
“And there is no blame upon you for what you mutually agree to beyond the obligation” (Q., 
4:24) which indicates that the criterion of marriage contract is mutual consent. Moreover, 
the Qur’an says, “So marry them with the permission of their people” (Q., 4:25) which 
indicates that marrying off is approved through permission, which is consent, and 
disapproved under the influence of coercion. The Prophet’s tradition also indicates clearly 
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that marriage is not approved except with mutual consent and furthermore that Prophet 
disapproved the marriage of the woman whom her father married off while she disliked it. 
In addition to this, the opinion that coercion in marriage doesn’t cause it to be annulled, 
invalidated or suspended can potentially open the door to dangerous consequences as 
marriage is closely linked to people’s honour and cohabitation between the woman and the 
man, as well as serious consequences in relation of linage. Therefore, it must be protected 
from any kind of oppression and coercion which is one of the purposes of the Sharīcah.667  
 Ibn al-Qayyim 
As for Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah who, after he mentioned a number of ḥadīths that 
approved a woman’s right to choose and accept a marriage such as the ḥadīth of al-Khansā’ 
bint Khidām (mentioned above) and the ḥadīth where the Prophet disapproved the marriage 
of a bikr and a thayyib. Ibn al-Qayyim stated that, the legal implication of this rule –given by 
the Prophet in the above ḥadīths - is that a major virgin (al-bikr al-bāligh) must not be 
compelled into marriage and she must be married off only with her full consent in 
accordance with the rule given by the Prophet, his commands, prohibition, the basis of 
Islamic Law and the interests of the community.
668
 Ibn al-Qayyim notes that the Prophet, 
judged by giving the choice to the virgin who disliked the marriage. He further states that it 
is in accordance with the command of the Prophet: “The virgin must be asked for her 
permission” which he states is a definite principle because it came in the form of a khabar 
(which indicates the confirmation of that which it tells about). Furthermore, he notes that it 
is in accordance with the prohibition of the Prophet when he said: “A virgin should not be 
married until her permission is asked” so he commanded, prohibited and ordered the woman 
to be given the choice which is the most effective way to confirm the rule.
669
  
As it is in accordance with the basis of the legislation as Ibn al-Qayyim sees it, the matter 
can be summarised as follows. The father of a major sane mature virgin cannot act in the 
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lowest of her wealth without her consent and he also cannot force her to spend even a little 
amount it without her consent, so how can her guardian treat her like a slave by forcing her 
to live with someone she dislikes, because by doing so he makes her like a slave who is sold 
and purchased without having an opinion, consent or a choice in the matter. Therefore, the 
guardian should not give away a woman to someone with whom she will share her sexual 
life and whom she hates without her consent. Ibn Al-Qayyim then goes on to confirm these 
by stating that giving away all of her wealth without her consent is easier for her than giving 
her in marriage to someone without her consent. After all, Ibn al-Qayyim believes that it is 
clear that the interest of the woman is to marry whomsoever she chooses for the purposes of 
the marriage to be fulfilled. The opposite will happen if she marries someone she hates and 
rejects. Then he said, ‘even if the clear Sunna did not come with this clear judgement, sound 
analogical reasoning (qiyās) and the basis of the Sharīcah would not require otherwise’.670 
The majority of jurists also argued that the statement of the compelled is considered to be 
invalid and his/her contract is void and of no effect.
671
 According Abū Zahrah, any form of 
coercion is a crime and a crime cannot be a means to approve any right.
672
 As for Ibn Ḥazm 
(d. 456 AH / 1063 AD), consent is a condition for the soundness of the marriage contract. 
Therefore, the absence of consent causes the contract to be invalid.
673
 
Depending on this we have no doubt that jurists are unanimous in preventing coercion 
originally and that it must not be exercised because of what it include in respect of 
oppression and aggression, but they differed in the judgement in the rule of the contract after 
it takes place under coercion.  
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5.11 Islamic Law of Personal Status Preventing Forced Marriage  
Many modern Laws of personal status in Muslim countries clearly state the prohibition of 
exercising forced marriage or exercising coercion on any party of the marriage.  For 
example, terms of Article VIII of the Libyan Personal Status Law (1984) states that: 
a- A guardian is not allowed to force a boy or a girl to marriage against their will 
b- A guardian is not allowed to prevent his ward from marring the person he/she 
accepts as a husband. 
In his explaining to this legal article, al-Hūnī says, ‘the Libyan legislature does not approve 
the guardianship of compulsion as indicated in this text, but approves the ‘guardianship of 
choice and participation’.674 However, we have already mentioned that Ḥanafī jurists 
adopted the opinion of the ‘guardianship of choice and participation’ while the Mālikis 
adopted the opinion of the guardianship of compulsion. However, the Libyan legislation–
which depends on the legislation regarding the personal status laws of the Mālikī school of 
law- abandoned the Mālikis opinion and chose the Ḥanafis’ in order to control the practice 
and also to limit the harm caused by coercion. 
The Kuwaiti Personal Status Law (1984) also states the invalidity of the marriage of the 
compelled in article 25 of the family code.
675
 In Syria, Jordan and Morocco the personal 
status laws prevent all forms of coercion in marriage. The guardian still has the right to 
object to the marriage but they afford the judge the power to dismiss his objection.
676
 
According to El-Alami, in Egyptian law, a woman with full legal capacity has the right to 
conclude her marriage, although her guardian still has the right to request a judicial 
annulment to the marriage if she marries someone who is unsuitable for her with regard to 
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social status, which, as we know, is the opinion of the Ḥanafī school.677  El-Alami also 
thinks that the personal status laws in Egypt and Morocco reflect the nature and 
characteristics of those communities and highlight the pad that there are serious attempts to 
bring renewal and reform to those laws, but he confirms that no real reform will take place 
while the social reality of those communities remains the same without any change.
678
 
El-Alami here refers to the existence of many practices which are contrary to Islamic 
principles that are wide spread in many Muslim societies today which are product of cultural 
heritage as well as the customs and traditions that stem from misconceptions of the law, 
even if they are mistakenly or deliberately given a religious nature. In this context, it is 
worth mentioning that Morocco has conducted a series of amendments to its marriage law in 
what is known as ‘Family Code’, under Law No. 03-70/5th of February 2004. The 
amendments preamble includes the following: 
Guardianship is a right for the mentally mature woman which she can apply 
according to her interests and benefits depending on an interpretation of the 
holy verse which disapproves compelling the woman to marry someone other 
than the one she chooses in an acceptable basis: “do not prevent them from 
remarrying their [former] husbands if they agree among themselves on an 
acceptable basis” (Q., 2:232). The woman can -with her free will- delegate 
her father or one of her male relatives to do so.
679
  
Also mentioned in the Moroccan ‘Family Code’ in the first section ‘the legal capacity and 
guardianship in marriage’ / Article (24): ‘The guardianship is a right for the mentally 
mature woman whom she can practise according to her interests and benefits’. Article 25 
reads: ‘the legally mature woman can carry out her marriage contract or delegate her father 
or one of her relatives to do so.’680 Moreover, as for the issue of coercion in a marriage 
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contract, the Family Code states that the annulment of the marriage is allowed whether 
before or after the consummation of the marriage in the Article 26:  
If one of the spouses were compelled or cheated to accept the marriage then 
he/she can request for the annulment of the marriage before and after the 
consummation of the marriage, within the period of two months after 
coercion is removed or when he/she discovers that he/she was deceived. 
He/she also has the right of compensation’.681     
The marriage law in Pakistan and Bangladesh is governed by the Ḥanafī School and 
amongst the articles of the marriage law are: 
1- The marriage of a major sane Muslim –whether male or female- is considered as 
invalid with the disapproval of any party in the marriage. 
2- The invalid marriage is not considered a marriage by law; therefore, no civil rights or 
obligations by any party result from it.
682
 
In Pakistan, of the methods available to civil litigation with respect to the issue of forced 
marriage is the so-called Jactitation of marriage (declaring that the marriage is invalid for 
lack of consent and approval) or by requesting a judicial divorce. In the case that the 
marriage contract includes a clause that grants the right of divorce to the wife by her 
husband, she can exercise this right granted to her and get a divorce. If the marriage contract 
contains no such clause then she can apply for divorce through the family courts by 
establishing her lawsuit on the fact that the marriage took place without consent and 
approval or the fact that her approval was obtained through coercion.
683
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In Indian Muslim Personal Law, section 104 Part I Law of Marriage, we read: ‘It is 
necessary for the nearest guardian to contract the marriage of a sane and adult woman with 
her consent; and if he does not do so the marriage will be voidable at the girl’s option’.684 
Furthermore, forced marriage violates a range of fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution of Bangladesh and Pakistan which consider compelling any person to marriy as 
a punishable offence. To clarify how forced marriage is a harmful traditional practice that 
cannot be justified by culture or religion, a Pakistani court states:  
In the issue of marriage, the woman is approved her right [by Islamic 
legislation] to choose her spouse; but unfortunately, our practical lives are 
influenced by many practices which were adopted by history, tradition and 
feudalism. Such a culture needs to be adjusted by law in order to suit the 
correct understanding of the Islamic objectives and values. Male chauvinism, 
feudal bias and compulsions of a conceited ego should not be confused with 
Islamic values. An enlightened approach is called for.
685
   
An example of this is that some cases raised the matter of consent in Islamic marriage. In 
one of the cases in 1990 in the Kerala High Court, a father of a major girl argued that he is 
allowed to approve the marriage depending on his understanding of both the Islamic law and 
the local custom, but the judge rejected his argument saying:  
The original rule is that if a girl is major and mentally mature then no one can 
act as her guardian in giving approval to her marriage, although it is up to her 
to authorise her guardian to discuss the terms of the contract on her behalf, 
but that does not mean the he can give her in marriage without her consent. If 
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the consent of both parties in the contract is not approved then the contract is 
considered as invalid’.686  
This is the exact meaning of the concept of wakālah (agency/authorisation) instead of 
guardianship in marriage.  
This was an example of the attempt at renewal and reform in family law and personal status 
within the framework of the legal provisions and purposes of Islamic law. Some may feel 
that such reforms are a mistreatment of legal provisions in order to adapt them to suit the 
peoples’ modern life. Thus, we believe that this is acceptable as long as the intention behind 
this is to reform and renew in order to achieve the public interest and as long as those 
reforms are based on the principle of considering the general purposes of the Islamic 
legislation without distorting clear and explicit evidence from the Qur’an or the Sunna. As 
for the jurists’ opinions and legal edicts in the issues that are open for personal reasoning 
(ijtihād), they are not binding on anyone as long as there is room to choose from them in a 
way that fulfils this interest. We shall also clarify that the personal reasoning of the jurists 
are not the Sharīcah per se, rather they are the jurists’ understanding of the Sharīcah. 
Therefore, people who reject calls for reform and renewal stick to the opinions of jurists of 
specific schools of law which caused -and are still causing- a lot of problems and restrictions 
for people in their lives because of the stance of partiality and intolerance that such scholars 
adapt.  
Generally speaking, it is well known in the origins of legislation that some discretionary 
provisions are based on the interests of a specific time or custom which prevailed in a 
community at that time, so when these factors change the legal edicts change accordingly. 
Some provisions were based on a specific custom or situation at the time of  the early jurists 
and those who followed them, but when these customs or situations changed the legal edicts 
should also logically change because of the change in their effective causes. Moreover, one 
of the schools of law that is famous for this rule is the Ḥanafī school as we find a wide range 
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of discretionary judgments given by their early jurists, which were abandoned by their later 
jurists who gave different edicts because of the change in customs and time. Amongst the 
most famous jurisprudential rules in the Ḥanafī school is the rule of ‘the custom is a means 
for judgement’ (al-cādah muḥakkamah) and they used the saying of cAbd Allah b. Mascūd as 
evidence, ‘Allah considers good what people consider good’. Ibn cĀbidīn has a book about 
the changing of provisions when customs change.
687
  
In this context, al-Qarāfī believes that for the provisions to continue without any change 
when their causes change is against the consensus and a lack of understanding of the 
Sharīcah. Everything in the Sharīcah follows the causes; the provision changes when the 
custom changes in a way that fulfils the interests of the renewed custom.
688
 Thus, the 
opinion of al-Qarāfī concerns the provisions that are established according to customs and 
traditions not the provisions that are approved of by definite texts. Depending on this rule, 
edicts shall consider the change of custom with time. Therefore, jurists should approve that 
which is approved by custom and disapprove that which it disapproves, and they should not 
stick to that which is written in the books indefinitely. Al-Qarāfī suggested that if a person 
from outside your county comes to ask a muftī (one who is capable of giving legal 
statements, known as a fatwā) then he should not answer him according to his own custom 
but ask him about his customs and give him the edicts accordingly. Al-Qarāfī claimed that 
this is the clear truth; sticking to the opinions of the early scholars is a form of misguidance 
in Sharīcah and a misunderstanding of the purposes of the early Muslim jurists.689 
 
 
 
                                                     
687
 See Yusuf, al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Siyāsah al-Sharciyyah, 1st edn (Cairo, Egypt: Maktabat Wahbah, 1998),  p. 288-
93. 
688
 See Aḥmad b. Idrīs, al-Qarāfī, al-Iḥkām Fī Tamyyīz al-Fatawa cAn al-Aḥkām, ed. by cAbd al-Fattāh Abu 
Ghuddah,  2nd  edn (Beirut Lebanon: Dar al-Bashaer al-Islamiyyah, 1995), p. 218. 
689
 See Al-Qarāfī, al-Furūq, Farq (28), I, pp. 322-23. 
 237 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Forced marriage is a marriage where one or both parties are coerced into a marriage against 
their will and under duress;
690
 duress includes physical and emotional pressure. Forced 
marriage has emerged as a harmful social practice, related to particular communities that 
have settled in the United Kingdom. The practice has already received the attention of a 
variety of scholars, writing within a diverse range of academic frameworks - sociology, law, 
and so on. Many have viewed it as a product of cultural and/or religious traditions. It is a 
phenomenon that is most often associated with the South Asian community; given that a 
large proportion of South Asians are Muslim, it has inevitably been seen as a specifically 
Muslim problem. This perspective is discernible in the media, among policy makers and 
within the general public. Islam and its teachings are cited as being among the major sources 
of the practice. Fewer voices would argue that forced marriage has no foundation in Islamic 
teaching.  
This study aimed from the outset to explore the concept of forced marriage and its basis in 
Islamic teachings. Moreover, it sought to explore the connection between this practice and 
the provisions of guardianship (wilāya) in Islamic jurisprudence. The over-arching aim was 
to provide an understanding of marriage in the light of the wisdom of the Qur’an and 
normative practice of the prophet Muḥammad (Sunna). It also sought to provide a better 
understand of the problem of forced marriage and its effects from a religious perspective. 
Additionally, it attempted to address the question of whether Islam tolerates forced marriage. 
Guardianship (wilāya) in Islamic jurisprudence is a widely practiced tradition in Muslim 
communities, and has long been seen to provide religious legitimacy to forced marriage. 
Muslim jurists understand guardianship as a “right” granted to parents or male agnates, the 
purposes of which is to provide protection and safeguard the interests and rights of the ward 
who has incomplete or no legal capacity. Wilāya is posited as a legal requirement of the 
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marriage contract by the majority of juristic Schools, with the exception of the school of 
Abū Ḥanīfa, who stipulated it only for the marriage of the minor and the insane. 
If the purpose of appointing a guardian in the process of marriage is to protect and secure the 
interests of the ward, what happens if the guardian proves himself incapable of fulfilling the 
duty? Islamic law requires that the judiciary in such cases intervene in order to protect the 
interests of the individual. Complexities arise when religious law is observed, not as an 
official law of the place, but as an unenforceable law with no political authority, such as is 
the case for Muslim communities living in the West.   
Research has demonstrated that the problem of forced marriage in the context of the UK is 
particularly acute within families of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian descent; many of 
these follow imams and muftis (religious legal scholars) who represent the Ḥanafī School. 
These same imams and muftis determine when meat is halal and other matters relevant to 
daily life; yet it is strange that with regard to marriage they seem not to follow their own 
doctrine (madhhab). Here the question remains: why do they not follow the Ḥanafī school 
with regard to granting women the freedom of choice to contract their own marriages? 
In this thesis I have demonstrated that the Ḥanafī school is distinct from all the other Sunni 
schools with regard to the necessity of guardianship in marriage. It would be fair to regard it 
as the most liberal school in Islamic law, insofar as it gave women freedom in initiating a 
marriage contract without stipulating guardianship. Her guardian can only object to her 
conduct if he thinks that she has caused harm to herself or has neglected some of her rights 
by taking the matter to the judiciary. 
Ḥanafis built their doctrine on the basis of the recognition of the freedom of the person who 
is adult and of sound mind in their actions, regardless of gender. Therefore, the person with 
full legal capacity is not in need of a guardian (walī) in order to manage his/her affairs and 
carries out certain actions like marriage contract, as mentioned above. Ḥanafīs gave this 
right to everyone who is adult and of sound mind, whether male or female, while the 
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majority of jurists restrict personal authority with regard to women in general, specifically 
the virgin girl (bikr). 
An essential element of the marriage contract is the authority of the individual to conclude 
the contract. This depends upon the individual legal capacity (ahliyya) which is essentially 
the fitness of a person to enter into obligation. Accordingly, the person with full legal 
capacity has the full right and freedom to willingly initiate a marriage contract, which 
upholds the wishes and choices of the person to marry whoever he likes and wants to be 
connected to by the bond of marriage.   
Yet the responsibility of guardianship in marriage is one of duty rather than right. 
Negligence of the duty of guardianship, and abuse of its right do occur, especially where 
force and coercion are used with regard to marriage. Therefore, the right of the guardian - 
like any other right - is restricted by the requirement that it be used for the purposes for 
which it exists. If the guardian causes harm to the person under his guardianship then his 
right is removed because of the damage and harm caused by him; such a case should be 
taken to the judicial authorities to investigate with a view to solving the issue.  
Generally, texts from the Qur'an and the authentic ḥadīth indicate that guardianship in the 
marriage contract is a social element, rather than a legal requirement, and carries the 
meaning of care, guidance and protection of the ward. Therefore, jurists differed in their 
views about the significance of guardianship in marriage contract, ranging from those who 
consider it a cornerstone of the contract, to those who see it as one of the conditions of the 
soundness of the contract, and those who see it as an aspect of its perfection which does not 
affect the validity of the contract, rather it is a recommended aspect.  That was because of 
the lack of an authentic text with a definitive indication to prove the invalidity of the 
marriage without a guardian. Therefore, most of the evidence was subject to various 
possibilities of interpretation, or open to be challenged by other texts which might be 
indicative of something else, whilst being stronger in terms of their isnād. Thus, it wasn’t 
easy for jurists to claim that there is a definitive and explicit text from the Qur’an which can 
provide clear statements with regard to the requirement of the guardian in the marriage 
 240 
 
contract or to state that guardianship is also required for the validity of the marriage. 
Therefore, it does not seem possible to prove the validity of guardianship by compulsion 
(wilāyat al-ijbār) over the adult of sound mind (al-bāligh al-cāqil). 
Thus, the terms that prohibited marriage without the presence of the walī in the ḥadīths were 
understood to imply emphasis for the sake of organising the issue of marriage in society, so 
that the woman does not fall victim to the manipulation of malicious men. Therefore, the 
opinion of the Ḥanafīs in regard to the permissibility of a woman acting on her own in 
concluding her marriage contract without any control by her guardian (walī) – except to the 
extent that she consult him and allow him participation in the choice - is fulfilled and the 
right of the guardian is protected. And here we should recall what Ibn Rushd has suggested: 
If the lawgiver had intended the stipulation of guardianship, he would have elaborated all of 
the conditions required for guardians.
691
 
This study has demonstrated that the majority of jurists approved the compulsion 
guardianship (wilāyat al-‘ijbār), with the proviso that no “harm” is caused to the ward. The 
scholars who investigated this issue rejected the idea of compulsion absolutely, even with 
this restriction, and believed that compulsion contradicts the meanings of compassion and 
mercy (which from the Qur’anic point of view form the basis of marital life). Therefore, 
they rejected the opinion which approved compulsion in marriage and considered it to be a 
type of coercion which is exercised over the woman to make her live with someone whom 
she dislikes. As some jurists have stated about marrying off a woman against her will, ‘It is 
contrary to both the foundational principles in Islam and the sound intellect’. The harm is 
increased within the context of Muslims in the UK because the expectations of the younger 
generations in the Muslim community which have been adopted from society are very 
different from of previous generations. 
This study explored how these authentic ḥadīths conclusively demonstrate that the woman 
has the right choose to marry whomever she wants, as long as she fulfils the requirements of 
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being able to make a good choice, with guidance and support from her guardian or family. 
Moreover, exercising pressure and coercion over peoples’ emotions is unethical, exactly like 
unlawfully appropriating their wealth. It can be also argued that the opinion of the majority 
upholds equity and justice and clears Islam of the accusation that it is a religion that builds 
marital relations on the basis of coercion and oppression and overlooks the woman’s right to 
have full consent and choice.  
Therefore, taking into consideration all of the evidence and the discussions of the scholars 
previously mentioned, the soundest opinion is that no one can compel a major virgin (al-
bāligh al-cāqilah) into marriage based on what was narrated from the Prophet when he said: 
“A virgin should not be married until her permission is asked nor should a woman without a 
husband (‘ayyim) be married without her permission”. They (the people) asked ‘the virgin is 
usually modest?’ He replied “her permission is her silence”. In another narration, “the father 
must seek the virgin’s permission”.  
In Islamic jurisprudence, freedom with regard to contracts is based on an essential 
requirement: consent (riḍā). Therefore, mutual consent is the foundation of the contract, 
which means that no contract between two parties is considered valid except with their 
consent. Therefore, it is possible to link ‘consent’ with ‘satisfaction’ and ‘choice’, although 
it has been demonstrated in this thesis that the matter is subject to disagreement among 
jurists who differed on how to assess the effects of coercion. Their differences were set out 
in this study, and are worthwhile repeating here:  
a) Riḍā (consent) and ikhtiyār (choice) according to Ḥanafīs are two different things in 
their meaning and their effect. Ikhtiyār is the intent to do something while riḍā is to 
prefer and favour something with comfort and pleasure.  
b) The majority did not differentiate between riḍā and ikhtiyār, both in their meanings 
and the rules which result from them because they consider that they are the same 
thing. 
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The effect of this differentiation appears clearly in the issue of coercion, where the Ḥanafīs 
believe that coercion has no effect on choice but has an effect on consent. That is because 
consent is ‘to intend and seek something with full desire and preference’. While choice for 
the Ḥanafīs is connected to the expression (ṣīgha) that initiates the contract, consent is 
connected to the legal effects of the contract. Therefore, the one who is forced into a contract 
is considered a person who has exercised choice (ikhtiyār) because they intended the 
expression that initiated the contract, although at the same time they may not be content with 
the legal effects of the contract. Accordingly, every contract that stipulates the existence of 
riḍā (like contracts of sale and purchase) is considered irregular (fāsid) if consent does not 
exist. Where consent is not a condition, the contract is considered valid and effective as in 
the case of marriage and divorce.  
The majority of scholars consider the parties to the contract and its subject as cornerstones 
of contracts; in addition they stipulated that the parties of the contract should be adult, of 
sound mind and be acting of their own free will and consent. 
The Ḥanafīs base their view on a principle, namely the consideration and respect  of all 
actions that result from an individual who is adult of sound mind cannot automatically be 
cancelled or ignored; Ḥanafī jurists will therefore search for ways to refrain from cancelling 
what has been entered into by the adult of sound mind. Though ostensibly sound, the view 
of the Ḥanafīs cannot be accepted since it is inconsistent with the general purposes and 
objectives of Islamic law. How can a marriage contract be considered valid that has been 
concluded under the influence of threat and coercion, while the actions of the coerced have 
been considered void and have no effect in the opinion of the majority of jurists, save for the 
Qur'an and the ḥadīth of the Prophet? The principle of respecting the freedom of the adult of 
sound mind, i.e. every word coming from him/her in a contract, agreement, declaration and 
approval, is without any doubt a result of their broad respect for individual freedom. It 
nevertheless has very serious implications which may open the door to tyrannical and 
oppressive behaviour. Some may take advantage of this opinion of the Ḥanafīs and use it as 
evidence to coerce and force individuals to marry or divorce. This  can be seen as a 
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contradiction in the jurisprudence of the Ḥanafīs since on the one hand they highly respect 
the freedom of the individual who is adult of sound mind (al-bāligh al-cāqil) in all his/her 
actions regardless of their gender - and they clearly state that no one can force him/her to 
enter obligations without his/her free will and consent-  yet on the other hand, they accept 
the outcome of a contract or any legal obligation of the adult of sound mind (al-bāligh al-
cāqil) under the influence of threat, intimidation and coercion, making it a binding contract, 
despite the absence of free will, consent, and choice. According to Ḥanafī jurists, even if the 
contract was signed under the influence of coercion it still has legal effects. 
This is in contrast to the opinion of the majority where a mere threat is considered to be 
coercion. This includes the threat of punishment or torture, and extends beyond physical acts 
like torture, beating etc., because coercion can be physical and/or psychological.  As 
previously stated, this coercion will lead to the cancellation of the contract and, in the case 
of marriage, annulment. I would argue that, in this case, the opinion of the majority which 
states that the contract of the compelled is invalid under the influence of coercion, has more 
applicability in cases of forced marriage where the types of psychological and social 
pressure exercised and the ways coercion is applied will naturally affect the choice and 
consent to the parties of the marriage contract.  
It should be noted that the discussion is but theoretical in the Muslim world, where the laws 
of Muslim countries today unanimously criminalise coercion in marriage, and also amend 
many Articles of religio-legal jurisprudence related to marriage provisions such as the 
guardianship of compulsion. What might have been appropriate in the context of classical 
Islamic law is not necessarily appropriate in every age and every place. This is because 
Islamic jurisprudence and its provisions are often based on the interests of a specific time or 
prevailing custom, such that when these factors change the legal edicts cease to be relevant. 
Jurists should be in the habit of approving that which is approved customarily and 
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disapprove that which is disapproved customarily; dogmatic attachment to jurisprudential 
treatises can be a very destructive approach.
692
 
English law is clear in its position regarding forced marriage: the Forced Marriage (Civil 
Protection) Act 2007, and was introduced as a criminal offence in England and Wales in 
June 2014, making forced marriage a criminal offence. Courts have been able to issue civil 
orders to prevent forced marriage since 2008, but offenders will now be punishable by up to 
seven years imprisonment. The Scottish Government, having investigated these European 
examples, opted in 2009 to forgo criminalisation and, instead, created civil legislation based 
closely on FMCPA. Moreover, a number of European countries have already criminalised 
forced marriage. 
We are yet to see how Muslims communities will reorient themselves in light of this 
legislation. Ordinarily, Muslims are required by Sharīcah to seek judgements from Muslim 
judges. Given the well-known principle of Islamic jurisprudence (qācidah fiqhiyyah) which 
was discussed in chapter two ‘necessity permits the unlawful’ (al-ḍarūra tubīḥ al-
maḥḍūrah), it remains to be seen if the community and its jurists will view the potential 
physical and/or psychological harm that can afflict women who are compelled into marriage 
as an exceptional case that would allow seeking the ruling of a non-Muslim judge and/or 
court.  
6.1 Contribution and Significance of this Research 
This research has contributed to the academic literature in three ways. Firstly, it has 
acknowledged and outlined the problem of forced marriage in Muslim communities within 
the UK from a Muslim perspective. Secondly, it has clarified that from the standpoint of 
Islamic law, wilāya (guardianship) is a duty of protection to the ward, rather than a right of 
the guardian. This is significant because the attitude of the walī should not be one of 
tyranny, rather it is one of love, care and duty, protecting the best interests of the ward and 
preserving his/her honour. The third contribution is that this work has clarified the meaning 
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and significance of wilāyat al-ijbār (compelling guardianship), and it has demonstrated that 
there is a strong link between it and ikrāh (coercion). According to the majority of Islamic 
jurists, coercion invalidates the contract. It can be clearly seen from the discussions 
throughout this work that forced marriage is coercion. Therefore, forced marriages should be 
annulled. This is significant because it agrees with the two fatwās (legal statements) by the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) and the Academy of Islamic Fiqh in 
India (Majma
c 
al-Fiqh al-Islāmī fi al-Hind) which can be found in the Appendices. Both 
have approved juridical separation (faskh) but they have differing views regarding whether 
or not this can be executed through a non-Muslim judge. 
6.2 Limitations 
This research was limited to clarifying the position of the Sharīcah regarding forced 
marriage. It did not conduct research into the extent and character of the practice and it did 
not attempt to conduct a survey to ascertain this because of the researcher’s position in the 
community as Imam of a major mosque in Leeds.  
6.3 Suggestions for Further Research into this Subject 
There are a number of areas of research pertinent to the subject of forced marriage which are 
in need of further research. From the experience of the researcher, when someone is forced 
into marriage and it is annulled or divorce takes place, or when the ward rejects the marriage 
in the first place, the relationships within the family often begin to break down. This leads to 
qaṭc al-arḥām (cutting familial ties) which is considered to be an enormity in Islamic 
teachings. This can lead to a number of complex situations and blame is often passed on by 
the family to the one who was forced into the marriage, rather than the one who was 
coercing the ward. In this respect, there is scope for research to be conducted into this issue, 
from the sociological effects of forced marriage, to research into what exactly Islamic law 
stipulates regarding this issue.  
More research could also be done into why Muslims engage in this practice; is it because of 
customs, honour or a misunderstanding of Islam? Are there socio-economic factors which 
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drive people to this practice? Although these reasons may not justify the practice (from 
either an Islamic legal point of view or from a human rights point of view), it will help to 
explain the phenomenon and will provide avenues to explore how to address the issue on the 
ground.  
Another area of research which would be of interest is the extent to which Islamic scholars, 
Imams and preachers are aware of the issue and whether they support the practice. This is 
useful as it will help to address the issue and will provide further explanation as to why 
certain attitudes exist within parts of the community.  
An area of research which is absolutely necessary is in regard to the applicability of going to 
a non-Muslim judge to have marriage contract annulled or terminated, and whether this 
would become religiously binding. This is because the restrictions of the Muslim Tribunal 
and the Shariah Council are such that they are only able to refer cases and provide legal 
advice. 
6.4 Further Recommendations 
Ideally, the Muslim community need a recognised legal body who can deal with these issues 
to protect the rights of vulnerable Muslims, especially women. This body can help to find a 
legal avenue for those forced into marriage to get out of a marriage which he/she has been 
forced into. It is the researcher’s belief that the government can play a positive role in 
establishing and empowering such initiatives which work alongside non-governmental 
organisations. 
The issue of forced marriage in the Muslim community can be tackled by proper Islamic 
education and better understanding of the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. This 
education should encourage Muslims to abandon harmful customs and traditions which 
contradict Islamic teachings. The researcher believes that this is not the role of the 
government; rather it is the role of the mosques; specifically the teachers and imams. The 
Friday sermon (khuṭba) is an ideal place for this, as the majority of Muslims will attend 
these gatherings, and therefore it will maximise exposure to the issue. This type of education 
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can include imparting knowledge of UK law regarding this issue, especially as it upholds 
justice which is a foundational Islamic principle.
693
 It should also seek that when parents 
arrange marriages, they do so with mutual and free consultation among the whole family, 
without any undue pressure, and most importantly with the free consent of the son or 
daughter. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
The following resolution was built upon the perception of the situations of Muslims living in 
non-Muslim societies: 
1- If the spouses are citizens of a Muslim country and they conducted their marriage 
there but reside in a European country, then originally they should seek the 
judgement of the courts of that Muslim country. If one party seek the judgment of 
the court in the country they reside in then that is considered being contrary to the 
teachings of Islam and the party is considered, from a religious point of view, a 
sinner. 
2- If the law in the country of residence allows them to seek the judgment of the law in 
their original state then the spouses must claim the application of the provisions of 
the Muslim country. 
3- If the constitution of country of residence does not allow the application of any law 
apart from the country’s law then the ruling of the European courts becomes binding 
for the both of the spouses. 
4- If one spouse is a citizen of a Muslim country, the other spouse is a citizen of a non-
Muslim country and both of them reside in a non-Muslim country then, in this case: 
a- If the marriage contract was conducted in a Muslim state, they should seek the 
rule of its courts. If they sought the rule of the courts in the state of residence 
they should claim the application of the provisions of the Muslim country. But 
usually the state of residence applies their own law claiming that one party in the 
conflict is of their citizens, so the verdict of the non-Muslim judge becomes 
binding to the Muslim party. 
b- If the contract was conducted according to the law of the country of residence- 
the European country- and a conflict was between its citizens, then the court will 
apply the law of the country which is binding to Muslims. 
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c- If the spouses hold the citizenship of a non-Muslim country, they are obliged to 
their marriage contract in accordance to the law in that country and to seek the 
judgement of that law in case of conflict. 
It is important to mention that there is a wide range of conflict between laws, especially 
when the marriage is conducted in a country other than the European country and when one 
party in the conflict is a citizen of a Muslim country and does not reside permanently in the 
European country alongside the other, such as those mentioned previously, which might be a 
subject for future research.
694
 The European Council of Fatwa and Research issued a 
resolution in this regard that states:  
a- The principle is that a Muslim only resorts to a Muslim Judge or any 
suitable deputy in the event of a conflict. However, and due to the 
absence of an Islamic judicial system in non-Muslim countries, it is 
imperative that a Muslim who conducted his marriage by virtue of those 
countries' respective laws, to comply with the rulings of a non-Muslim 
judge in the event of a divorce. Since, the laws were accepted as 
governing the marriage contract, then it is as though one has implicitly 
accepted all consequences, including that the marriage may not be 
terminated without the consent of a judge. This case is similar to that in 
which the husband gives authority to the judge to do so, even if he did so 
implicitly, and which is considered acceptable by the vast majority of 
scholars. The principle of Islamic jurisprudence applicable in this case is 
that whatever is normal practice is similar to a contractual agreement. 
Furthermore, implementing the rulings of a non-Muslim judiciary is an 
acceptable matter, as it falls under the bringing about of what is 
considered to be of interest and to deter what is considered to be of harm 
and may cause chaos, as stipulated by more than one of the most 
                                                     
694
 See Fayṣal Mawlawī, ‘The Ruling of The Divorce Issued by A Non-Muslim Judge’, in The scientific review 
of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, issue 1 (2002), pp. 77- 88. 
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prominent Islamic scholars, such as al-
c
Izz b. 
c
Abd al-Salam, Ibn 
Taymiyyah and al-Shāṭibī’.695 
Appendix 2 
The Islamic Fiqh Academy of India held its 13
th
 conference on the issue of ‘The parents who 
force their daughters/sons to marriage according to their wishes in Britain and Western 
countries and the dreadful events it led to’. The participants decided in this regard the 
following: 
1- The Islamic legislation granted the major sons and daughters the right of disposal in 
their own affairs and the right to choose in marriage. This personal freedom is a 
character of the Islamic legislation. 
2- Guardians cannot defiantly force the major woman or a major son to marriage 
without their consent. The guardians’ insistence and usage of different means of 
threat in order to force them to marriage is not but a condemned attempt to strip them 
of their rights which were granted to them by the Islamic legislation. 
3- Sons and daughters shall trust the choices of their guardians in choosing their 
spouses because of their vast experience in life and the fact that they show full 
consideration for their children’s interest because of their mercy and compassion. 
This point may possibly indicate arranged marriage. 
4- For marriage to be considered as initiated, consent must be expressed at the time of 
the marriage contract so when the son or daughter expresses their consent the 
marriage contract become initiated. 
5- If it was proved to the judge and the judicial authorities that the guardians used 
coercion in the marriage of a major woman and they forced her to utter her consent 
while she was discontented with this marriage and she asks for annulment while the 
                                                     
695
 European Council of Fatwa and Research, Resolutions and Fatāwa, Resolution number: 15, 3/5, pp. 48-49.   
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husband refuses to voluntarily leave her through divorce or khul
c
, then the judge has 
the right to annul this marriage in order to repel oppression. 
696
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
696
 Majma
c
 al-Fiqh al-Islāmi in India,  al-Ijbār cAla al-Zawāj, V. 7:10 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 
2007), p10.  
 
